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1
Introduction
Many people love their country. They think it’s the
greatest. It’s the place where they want to live. They
defend it against criticism. They may even be willing to
die or kill for it.
Some phrases indicate unwavering loyalty. A US
example is “My country, right or wrong.” Others phrases
condemn those who are disloyal. In the US, “unAmerican”
is a term of contempt, and social critics may be told,
“Love it or leave it.”
However, even among critics, feelings of national
pride or identification are common. When it’s time for the
World Cup, how many soccer fans cheer for a team from a
country where they have never lived nor have any family
or personal connections? How many people care more
about the economic prosperity of people in Bangladesh or
Togo than those in the country where they live?
Thinking from the viewpoint of a country—including
its people, its government and its social institutions—can
generate enormous passions. This commitment could be
called patriotism or nationalism, but it is broader than
this—it is a way of understanding the world and one’s
place in it.
There’s no good word to describe this sort of thinking. It might be called “countryism,” except there’s more
involved than the country. A key part of the equation is
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the link between loyalty to and identification with a
country and loyalty to and identification with the government and its related functions, commonly called the state.
These are certainly not the same. You might love a
country and hate its government. But government supporters have another agenda: they want to tie country loyalties
to support for dominant social arrangements, including the
government itself and, more generally, the distribution of
wealth and power. This doesn’t come naturally, so a lot of
effort is devoted to shaping the way people think about the
world. This includes thinking of the world as naturally
being divided into countries ruled by governments, not
questioning the distribution of wealth and power in any
fundamental way, and not pushing for radical alternatives.
Why tactics are needed
In human prehistory, people lived in small bands,
probably no larger than one or two hundred people. In
these groups, loyalty could be vital for survival, so it is
plausible that humans are predisposed to form group
loyalties. In today’s world, though, the groups are much
larger. Instead of a hundred people, where you know
everyone else and have many close personal bonds, today
many countries have millions of residents. Loyalty is now
to an abstraction, a group of symbols, rather than attached
to individuals you interact with daily. How did the human
predisposition towards group loyalty become reoriented to
country-level emotional commitments?
My aim here is to illustrate some of the techniques
used to build identification with dominant social institutions—including inequalities in wealth and power—as

Introduction

3

embedded within a country. My assumption is that statecentred thinking is not natural or automatic, but has to be
forged and continually reinforced in relation to other
commitments. By recognising and understanding the techniques involved, it may be easier to question, challenge
and replace them.
In doing this, I do not assume love of country is
always bad. Sometimes it serves noble purposes, as in
willingness to support others in need. In many cases it is
unimportant, as in choosing what clothes to wear. My
concern is about country-centred thinking when it is
exploited to serve damaging activities, for example
constructing weapons of mass destruction or exploiting
foreigners.
Scholars have analysed patriotism and nationalism,
and in chapter 3 I discuss the work of a few of them. My
aim here is more practical, namely to highlight some of
the day-to-day efforts and activities that reinforce countrycentrism and to suggest this is not something inherent in
humans but rather one possible way loyalties can be
assigned.
The next step is to point to alternative ways of
assigning loyalties. Again, many have argued for alternatives. For example, rather than the United Nations, which
is built around states, some globalists have supported a
world parliament. Then there are individuals who try to
transcend their formal citizenship and instead think and
act as global citizens. Out of the multitude of alternatives,
I focus on those that involve greater freedom, equality and
justice.
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After this, the following step is to look again at
tactics, this time at tactics to counter ruling tactics and
instead promote alternatives. The number of possible
examples is huge, so I proceed by looking at particular
arenas, for example sport and language, looking at two
sorts of tactics. Firstly there are counter-tactics, challenging ruling tactics, and secondly there are tactics to
promote alternatives.
My main aim is to show an approach to analysing
tactics. After you start noticing the use of everyday
methods to promote patriotism or to encourage thinking of
the world as a set of countries, you are in a better position
to recognise alternatives and to understand strategies for
resistance and building alternatives. Whether to join these
efforts of course is a matter of choice.
Chapter 2 describes research on “moral foundations”
that is useful for putting ruling tactics in context. Chapter
3 discusses ideas from a few key writings about nationalism. In subsequent chapters, I canvass various areas where
ruling tactics can be observed in everyday life. These
chapters can be read independently. As will be seen, the
patterns are similar, though the arenas involved are quite
different. My aim is less to provide a comprehensive case
than to show how an analysis of tactics can proceed. Other
possible areas for analysis include disability, disease, employment, environment, gender, history and technology.
Chapters 4 to 13 each begin with a general discussion
of the issues, followed by an examination of specific
tactics, using some of the following categories.
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System-support tactics
1. Exposure (of positives); attention
2. Valuing
3. Positive interpretation
4. Endorsement
5. Rewards
System-support tactics: opposing challenges and
alternatives
1. Cover-up
2. Devaluing
3. Negative interpretation
4. Discrediting endorsements
5. Intimidation
Opposing system-support tactics
1. Exposure (of negatives)
2. Devaluing
3. Negative interpretation
4. Discrediting endorsements
5. Refusing rewards
Promoting alternatives
1. Exposure
2. Valuing
3. Positive interpretation
4. Endorsement
5. Rewards
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My interest is not just in the more ardent forms of national
chauvinism but more generally in how people think of the
world in terms of countries and their governments, what
Michael Billig calls “banal nationalism.”1 I chose the title
Ruling Tactics because thinking in terms of nations serves
rulers. However, rulers use a host of other tactics too,
hence the long descriptive subtitle.
How I got onto this topic
For many years, I’ve been interested in strategy for social
movements, for example the environmental and peace
movements. How can activists be more effective in
pursuing their goals? My special interest has been in
nonviolent action, including methods such as rallies,
strikes, boycotts and sit-ins. Most of the effective social
movements, including the anti-slavery, labour and
feminist movements, have relied primarily on nonviolent
methods.
When activists mount a campaign, sometimes the
government uses force against campaigners, with arrests,
beatings and shootings. Occasionally, government repression doesn’t work: it generates huge outrage and triggers
greater popular resistance. For example, in 1960 in South
Africa, police shot into a crowd of protesters in the town
of Sharpeville, killing about a hundred of them. Journalists
were present and photos were taken. The Sharpeville

1 See chapter 3.
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massacre undermined the South African government’s
credibility internationally.2
However, instances in which government repression
is counterproductive are rare. I started looking at the
methods used by governments to reduce outrage, and
came up with five main methods: cover up the action,
devalue the target, reinterpret what happened (through
lying, minimising consequences, blaming others and using
favourable framing), use official channels to give an
appearance of justice, and intimidate or reward people
involved. After the Sharpeville massacre, the South
African police and government used all these methods.3
The next step is to look at counter-methods. These
are exposing the action, validating the target, interpreting
the events as an injustice, avoiding official channels and
instead mobilising support, and resisting intimidation and
rewards.
Before long I was looking at all sorts of issues in
terms of tactics, including bullying at work, sexual
harassment, censorship, torture and genocide.4 Tactics are
just methods, and to refer to tactics doesn’t necessarily
imply that people are sitting around plotting what they are
going to do. Most tactics are instinctive in the sense that
2 The authoritative source is Philip Frankel, An Ordinary
Atrocity: Sharpeville and its Massacre (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2001).
3 Brian Martin, Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). Chapter 2 is on the
Sharpeville massacre.
4 “Backfire materials,” http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/backfire.html
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people use them without carefully considering options for
achieving goals, though subsequently they often think up
rationalisations for their actions. At Sharpeville, just after
the police had shot and killed protesters, they removed
some of the bodies whose injuries revealed the use of
dum-dum bullets, banned internationally. This served to
hide evidence but, like the shooting, the removal of bodies
was unplanned, not the result of a thoughtful consideration
of alternatives.
At some point, I started thinking about tactics in
relation to patriotism and nationalism. As discussed in
chapter 2, patriotism and nationalism are not natural. In
fact, quite a few people are critical of them. What
maintains thinking in terms of nations and maintains
loyalties to particular nations? I decided to apply my
tactics framework to the topic, and this morphed into the
categories listed above. I then picked some of my favourite topics and looked for examples. I find it fascinating to
see how easily thinking (including my own) can be
channelled, and challenging to figure out how to think and
act differently. This book is part of my journey. I hope you
can see what’s involved and find your own path, whatever
it may be.

2
Moral foundations
What makes a person think it is good to be patriotic? To
help understand the need to foster identification with a
country and its institutions, it is useful to study the work
of Jonathan Haidt on the foundations of morality.1 Haidt is
a psychologist who wants to understand why people make
commitments to particular religions and political parties,
among other things. Here I outline some of Haidt’s ideas,
noting their relevance to understanding why efforts are
needed to encourage citizens to identify with their country.
The rider and the elephant
As a preliminary, Haidt presents the view that each of us
has two minds.2 One mind is intuitive, automatic and high
capacity. If you see a rock approaching your head, it is
1 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are
Divided by Politics and Religion (New York: Pantheon, 2012).
Haidt and his collaborators have written many detailed technical
articles.
2 This view is standard among psychologists. See, for example,
Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Thinking Twice: Two Minds in One
Brain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Daniel
Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 2011); Timothy D. Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves:
Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2004).
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valuable to duck without pausing to calculate the trajectory of the rock or indeed determine whether it actually is
a rock rather than an illusion. In early human evolution,
such an automatic system improved the odds of surviving.
Responding quickly and automatically to suspicious
sounds could enable escape from a predator, and was
advantageous even if most such sounds were false alarms.
In the modern world, the intuitive mind still rules
much of people’s behaviour. A soldier learns to respond
quickly to the sound of gunfire and, after returning to
civilian life, may hit the ground at the sound of a car
backfiring.
The other major component of the mind is slow,
methodical and low-capacity: it takes more effort. It is the
part of the mind commonly thought of as rational. It
weighs up evidence, considers options and draws conclusions, and then may assess them on the basis of new
evidence. Scientific research, in its ideal form, relies
entirely on this sort of rational evaluation.
Haidt calls the intuitive mind the elephant and the
rational mind the rider. In Haidt’s metaphor, the rider sits
on top of the elephant, perhaps trying to steer it but in
most cases actually being at the mercy of the elephant’s
whims. The elephant is too strong and independent for the
rider to control it except in carefully constructed circumstances. What often happens is that the elephant goes in a
direction and the rider simply follows: the intuitive mind
reaches a conclusion and the rational mind then figures out
reasons to justify this conclusion.
Haidt provides some illuminating examples that are,
by design, uncomfortable or even repellent for some
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people asked to consider them. One is a hypothetical
situation of a brother and sister who are travelling together
and decide to have sex with each other just to see what it
is like. They do it just once, each of them using birth
control. They enjoy it but decide not to do it again. The
first question: is this right or wrong? The second question:
why? Many people immediately react by saying it’s
wrong. That is their elephant speaking. But they find it
challenging to explain why. Some say it is because of the
possibility of conceiving a child with genetic defects,
ignoring the information about birth control. The rider
casts about for a plausible justification of the elephant’s
choice, but in this case gets stuck.
With other issues, the rider has more options. Consider the issue of drugs such as heroin and cocaine. Many
people react intuitively to say they should be illegal. In a
debate with a proponent of harm-minimisation, who
recommends decriminalisation or legalisation, people
might say the dangers are too great, that enforcement
needs to be stronger and any of a host of other reasons.
But they seldom argue for making alcohol or nicotine
illegal. The same applies to those on the other side: they
too can come up with many reasons to justify their views.
Seldom does someone say, “I don’t really know which
drugs should be illegal, if any, because I haven’t studied
the issue in enough detail.”
The elephant usually prevails even when the rider is
more sophisticated. People with greater intelligence may
simply be better at developing clever arguments to justify
positions they have taken on intuitive grounds. Intelligence is not a guarantee against bias and prejudice.
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An effective counter to misguided views is other
people who point out shortcomings. This is most apparent
in scientific research. Many scientists, including leading
scientists, are strongly committed to their viewpoints, so
much so that new evidence will not budge them: they
simply come up with ingenious reasons why the contrary
evidence is wrong or irrelevant and why their position is
still viable. This was shown in a classic study of 40
scientists involved in studying rocks from the moon.
Following the first voyages to the moon and return of
moon rocks to earth, there was lots of new evidence that
could be used to adjudicate between different theories
about the origin and nature of the moon. However, key
scientists who were advocates of different theories, and
who were considered by their peers as especially outstanding in the field, were highly resistant to changing
their views. This study showed that commitment plays a
crucial role in science and that the idea that scientists seek
to falsify their theories is not the way science operates in
practice.3
So for scientists, the rider sometimes serves to justify
a gut reaction, especially commitment to a viewpoint on
which they have built careers and reputations. What make
a difference, eventually, are other scientists. Those
without prior commitments or who are more open to
3 Ian I. Mitroff, The Subjective Side of Science: A Philosophical
Inquiry into the Psychology of the Apollo Moon Scientists
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1974). See also Michael J. Mahoney,
Scientist as Subject: The Psychological Imperative (Cambridge,
MA: Ballinger, 1976).
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evidence may adopt different views. More importantly,
scientists with contrary views will point out flaws in
evidence and logic. The rider-elephant combination may
not change direction on its own, but other rider-elephants,
going in different directions, sometimes can have an
impact.
If this sort of commitment is common in science,
with all its systems for peer review and emphasis on
rigour, it is even more likely to prevail in politics. After
someone develops loyalty to a political party, for example,
they may stick with it tenaciously. The elephant has
formed a preference and the rider will try to figure out a
justification.
The six foundations
Haidt argues that people’s moral judgements—their
judgements about right and wrong—are influenced by six
elements or reference points. He calls them moral foundations. They are care, fairness, liberty, loyalty, authority
and sanctity.
People’s behaviour and thoughts are potentially influenced by each of these foundations. Haidt says they are
deeply embedded in human evolution and social interactions. However, an individual’s foundations can change
through various processes.
Care means caring for others. The most obvious
instance is looking after children, something that most
mothers seem to find instinctive. Small groups of humans
that did not care for their children would have had a hard
time surviving. Furthermore, caring for other adults in the
group was also advantageous, because otherwise individu-
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als might compete with or even attack each other,
undermining the capacity of the group as a whole to
survive.
In modern-day societies, the care foundation manifests itself in support for those who are disadvantaged, for
example people with disabilities, those who are ill, people
in poverty—including people in remote parts of the world.
The care foundation evolved from concern about vulnerable members of one’s own group, but now can be
extended to people anywhere in the world, and even more
broadly to animals and the natural environment.
Fairness is another important moral foundation. It
can be evoked when someone else receives something
they apparently don’t deserve. A small child may protest
when a brother or sister receives a bigger portion of ice
cream. In the workplace, workers at the same level may
protest if a co-worker receives special privileges, such as
attractive assignments from the boss, or a higher salary for
the same work.
The sense of fairness doesn’t always give the same
results. Some people think it is unfair that those who do no
paid work receive unemployment payments—they may be
called spongers or welfare parasites—whereas others think
it is unfair when children inherit money and property from
parents, especially when they did nothing to deserve this
windfall. This suggests there are many processes involved
in assigning the sense of fairness to particular situations.
Liberty is the sense or demand to be free and independent of oppressive power. It is especially pronounced
among libertarians, who oppose many or even most
functions of government, instead supporting private
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solutions, such as markets or voluntary arrangements such
as charity. Even those from other parts of the political
spectrum are influenced by the urge for liberty. This is
seen especially among people subject to repressive
governments, some of whom are resentful, even when the
government functions well. Those with a strong liberty
orientation would oppose a benevolent dictatorship.
Loyalty involves commitment to a group, a movement or even an abstraction. People can feel loyalty to
family, friends, neighbours, clubs, co-workers, employers,
sporting teams, commercial brands and countries. In
warfare, soldiers may feel tremendous loyalty to their
closest mates, even being willing to die for them.
Loyalty to one’s country is central to patriotism. This
often means supporting one’s own government in any
contest with others.
Loyalty is often expected of others in the same group.
Those who go against expectations may be called traitors.
Spies are caught in the crossfire of competing loyalties:
they are patriots to those on one side and detested by the
other. Few people think of spies as simply doing a job.
In human prehistory, the survival of the group was
vital, and loyalty to the group was highly advantageous.
This is the evolutionary basis for loyalty being a moral
foundation. However, people today are loyal to groups
quite unlike earlier times—sporting teams, for example,
have no relevance to survival, except in a metaphorical
way. Even more divergent from earlier forms of loyalty is
patriotism, when the commitment is to a “community”
thousands of times larger than one’s personal interactions.
This suggests that patriotism is not automatic or natural in
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any sense, but instead requires active efforts to initiate,
cultivate and maintain it.
Authority is a moral foundation built around acceptance of systems of formal power, hierarchy and
credibility. Many people believe that authorities should be
followed, whether they are government leaders, medical
experts, employers, sports coaches or heads of families.
Respect for or obedience to authority helps make societies
more stable. If no one accepts a boss’s directives, then the
boss has no power and perhaps a new method of making
decisions will take over.
Much of political life involves a struggle over authority. There are struggles over positions of authority, for
example military coups, elections and popular uprisings
against rulers. Within organisations, there are struggles for
positions of influence. Authority figures of various types,
from politicians to judges, seek to exert their power, often
encountering resistance from other authority figures and
from those lower down.
The moral foundation of authority gives an advantage
to those currently in positions of power. If someone
believes that formal leaders should be respected and
obeyed, this makes change more difficult. Yet many
authorities need to be resisted. Repressive rulers cause
much suffering.
One of the important types of authority is the law, a
set of rules administered by various agencies, notably
police and courts. The moral foundation of authority
means that obeying the law is the default for many people.
However, some laws are so unjust or harmful that
breaking them might seem justified—to some people,
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anyway. Those who heed the authority imperative may
reject any sort of law-breaking.
Moral judgements can be selective. Some challenges
to authority are considered acceptable, others not. For
example, in the US, questioning the views of the president
might be okay or not, depending on who the president is.
Authority becomes more important in some arenas. In the
military, obedience to authority is a foremost value,
drummed into recruits, despite lip service to a higher
loyalty to other values.
In Nazi Germany, the authority foundation played a
crucial role in enabling mass killing and other horrific
human rights violations. The famous Milgram experiments
showed that this sort of obedience to authority also was
widespread in the US. The subjects of the experiment
believed they were administering electric shocks to
someone else; following instructions from the experimenter, many would continue even to dangerous levels.4
Sanctity is a moral foundation built around feelings
that some things are sacred and should not be treated
casually or with contempt. In the US, many patriots treat
the flag as a sacred object that needs to be respected.
Raising and retiring the flag is supposed to be done
following specified protocols. The way it is folded is
specified, and the flag should never touch the ground,
which would defile it. When protesters or artists treat the
flag in apparently disrespectful ways—for example
burning it—this is seen as sacrilegious.
4 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper &
Row, 1974).
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Moral foundations and tactics
Haidt provides considerable evidence and many arguments in support of his classification of these six moral
foundations. Most individuals are affected by all six
foundations, but to different degrees. There are some
patterns worthy of note. Haidt compares the role of the
foundations in three political orientations in the US:
libertarians, liberals and conservatives. Libertarians are
opposed to most government functions and want society to
be run through markets. As already noted, for them the
liberty foundation is dominant.
Liberals, in contrast, are primarily influenced by
three foundations: care, fairness and liberty. For them,
loyalty, authority and sanctity are less influential. This
helps explain why liberals are likely to support measures
such as unemployment benefits, progressive taxation and
foreign aid.
Conservatives, Haidt discovered, are influenced more
equally by all six foundations. They are more likely than
libertarians or liberals to be concerned about respecting
police and the flag, for example.
Although there are systematic differences between
people with different political and religious views, what is
striking to me is the arbitrariness of people’s moral
commitments. Haidt says that the six moral foundations
are the “first draft of the mind”: most people have innate
tendencies towards caring for children (and hence caring
for others in need), and so forth through all the foundations. But the way these are played out in practice depends
on circumstances.
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Suppose a person has a strong tendency towards
being loyal. But loyalty to what? There are many potential
recipients of the feeling of commitment, support and even
love: sporting teams, neighbourhoods, family members
and companies, as well as governments and countries.
Furthermore, there are many choices involved. Does
loyalty to country mean not buying foreign goods? Does it
mean not caring about government crimes? Or does it
mean being especially concerned about government
crimes? Does it mean supporting mining companies that
are extracting and exporting the country’s minerals—even
if the companies are foreign owned? Or does it mean
supporting calls to use the minerals within the country, or
calls by environmentalists to leave the minerals in the
ground and maintain a pristine environment? Loyalty has
many potential attachments or recipients. To say that
loyalty is a moral foundation is only the beginning of
understanding how loyalty operates in practice.
My interest here is loyalty to a country or its government or people or ideals. Some people are patriotic, but
many are not—indeed, there are plenty of people who are
anti-patriotic. However, closely related to patriotism is
something more common that can be called countrycentredness, which means thinking about the world from
the perspective of a particular country, usually the one
where one lives or where one was born, and thinking of
the world as made up of countries. News stories tell of a
disaster affecting a few citizens of your country and ignore
thousands dying in remote parts of the world. Stories
about the economy or employment focus on local impli-
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cations, not implications for elsewhere, whether Albania
or Zambia.
How does patriotism and, more generally, countrybased thinking develop? How is it maintained? In the
following chapters, I examine some of the processes
involved, looking at methods, behaviours and assumptions
that foster identification with a country, then at alternative
forms of action and identification and finally at strategies
to move towards alternatives.

3
Nationalism
The term “nationalism” refers to support for a nation. In
common parlance, a nation is a country like Albania or
Zambia. However, it is useful to distinguish several
things: countries, nations, states and governments.
Let’s start with “country.” It is easiest to think of a
country as a geographical area plus everything in it,
including mountains, plants and people. Argentina as a
country has plains and rivers, sheep, buildings and a
population of 43 million.
Next consider “government.” This can refer to the
political rulers within a country. Governments may include both an executive, with a president and cabinet, and
a legislature. In dictatorships, there may be no legislature,
or only a powerless one. In parliamentary systems, the
executive—including the prime minister and cabinet—is
drawn from the legislature. “Government” may also
include various administrative supporters for the executive
and legislature, for example heads of treasury, defence and
environment departments.
Closely related to government is the state. The state
includes everything officially run by or owned by the
government. It includes the various departments or ministries that are headed by government figures. It includes
government-run institutions such as schools, police,
military, railways and so forth. People’s private lives are
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not part of the state; only when they are at work are
government employees part of the state. Private corporations are not part of the state. Independent religious bodies
are not part of the state. (In a few countries, like Iran and
Israel, there is a state religion.)
In simple terms, the government runs the show and
the state is the government plus everything it runs.
Then there is “nation,” a more challenging notion. A
nation can be said to be a group of people who share a
common identity. This may involve shared experience,
blood ties, the same language, a religion, eating habits and
various traditions. Among Native Americans, tribes like
the Apache, Sioux and Cherokee are called nations: they
had (and to some extent still have) shared language and
culture, distinct from other tribes. In Europe, nations
include the Armenians, Finns, French, Hungarians and
Kurds.
The complication is that nations do not necessarily
correspond to countries. Most people living in Japan today
might be considered members of the Japanese nation, but
there are some indigenous people, for example the Ainu
from northern Japan (and eastern Russia), who are a
distinct cultural group, and there are some immigrants, for
example from Korea, who would be part of a different
nation: the Korean nation.
Then there are nations that are spread across lots of
countries. The Jewish people could be considered to be a
nation; they are concentrated in Israel but millions live in
other countries. People of Chinese ancestry don’t all live
in China: many live in Malaysia, Vietnam and other
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countries. (And within the country of China there are
numerous other national groups).
Immigration is a complication for understanding
nations. Consider an Egyptian family that immigrates to
New Zealand. Are they Egyptian or Kiwis? If they remain
in an Egyptian enclave and maintain Egyptian culture
(religion, food, language), then they might be considered
part of the Egyptian nation. But if the children grow up
speaking English with a New Zealand accent, play or
follow Kiwi sports, join the Anglican Church (or none at
all), have they become part of the New Zealand nation? Or
is New Zealand a nation at all, given its mixture of
Maoris, descendants of British and other European immigrants, and new arrivals from various countries?
Reference is often made to a “nation-state.” This
concept assumes that a nation and a state coincide. In
some cases it is nearly true, but nearly always there are
some indigenous people, some immigrants and some
locals who have emigrated (called expatriates).
Benedict Anderson calls nations “imagined communities,” and this idea has been widely taken up.1 A
community is a group of people having something in
common: they live in the same neighbourhood, eat lunch
together, collect stamps or whatever. An imagined
community is one in which what people have in common
is not something they do, but only something in their
imagination, in their minds. If you live in Brazil, you
1 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991, revised
edition).
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cannot possible interact with 200 million other people,
including ones with different religions, ethnicities and
ways of life. “Brazil,” as a community, as a group of
people, exists primarily in the minds of the people living
in Brazil, as well as in the minds of people from other
parts of the world.
Isms
Let’s go from the nation to nationalism. “Nationalism”
usually refers to a commitment to or identification with a
nation. It can involve pride. Many people are excited when
“their” national team does well in the World Cup, despite
having no personal connection with any members of the
team. Nationalism, at the psychological level, might
involve support for or identification with political leaders,
policies, climate, habits or any number of other attributes.
One’s own country usually is contrasted with others.
Nationalism involves identification with and support for
my country, not others. For most people, nationalism is on
behalf of a single country, though it’s possible to identify
with Africa, the European Union or the world.
Nationalism, strangely enough, is only sometimes on
behalf of a nation, at least in the sense that many scholars
think of nations. If we think of Canadian nationalism, it is
usually connected to the whole population, including
separatists in Quebec and members of First Nations. So
what should this commitment to a country be called?
There’s no such word as countryism. So perhaps this is
where the word patriotism is useful. A patriot is a person
who supports their own country, and patriotism is the
commitment itself.
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In many cases, patriotism is harnessed to the goals of
the state or government. A patriot is prone to support
policies adopted by the government in relation to other
governments. This is pronounced in the case of war:
patriots typically support their compatriots—citizens of
their own country—against enemies. The opposite of a
patriot is a traitor, someone who supports the enemy.
Patriotism has its positive side, including pride in
group accomplishments and a willingness to sacrifice for
the good of the whole. When people in a country are doing
worthwhile things, it makes sense to support them and
take pride in their achievements. But there is a darker side
to patriotism: it can involve supporting crimes and abuses,
including military aggression, torture and genocide. In the
US, there is a saying, “My country, right or wrong.”
Supporting “the US”—usually meaning the government’s
policy in international relations, when it seems in the
interests of the US people—for good causes is reasonable,
but why support policies and actions that are wrong?
Patriotism becomes “blind patriotism” when people
take a position simply because it is identified with their
country or state, even if it involves lying, unfair dealings,
theft and other crimes. This sort of patriotism is common
when agents of the state are involved, including political
leaders and soldiers. In the US, supporting US troops in
foreign wars has become unquestionable; it is a touchstone
of being patriotic. Even US opponents of the government’s wars are careful not to criticise the troops, restricting themselves to criticising politicians and policies.
This remains true even when the troops are involved in
crimes.

26

Ruling tactics

In 1968, during the Vietnam war—in Vietnam called
the American war—US soldiers in Charlie Company went
on a rampage of killing in a village named My Lai,
leaving hundreds of civilians dead, including women and
children. Commanders informed about the massacre did
nothing. Ron Ridenhour, hearing about what had happened, collected information and sent a powerful letter to
various media and politicians, but none of them would act
on it. Eventually, through the efforts of investigative
journalist Seymour Hersh, the story broke, a year after the
massacre. However, only one soldier, Lieutenant William
Calley, was convicted of any crime, and he served
minimal time in prison. Many US citizens sided with
Calley. On the other hand, Hugh Thompson, who had tried
to stop some of the killing and who testified about what
had happened, was ostracised by other troops. In the midst
of the war, many people in the US did not want to know
about crimes by “their” troops. It was a classic case of
“my country, right or wrong”—in this case, wrong.
Related to the concept of nationalism is what can be
called statism: support for the state, sometimes glorification of the state. It is often associated with dictatorships, in
which the ruler is attributed superhuman capacities. One
example of statism is Nazi Germany, with Hitler the father
figure who could do no wrong. The massive rallies at
which Hitler spoke were rituals of worshipping the state.
Nazi Germany shows a toxic mixture of nationalism
and statism. The nation in this case was associated with
Aryan ethnicity and culture, as distinguished from others
such as Slavs, Gypsies and Jews. After the invasion of the
Soviet Union, Hitler initiated the “final solution,” the
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extermination of Jews and other non-Aryans. This could
be considered the operation of the state to enforce a
particular conception of the nation, using the most drastic
methods.
Historically, state elites try to harness nationalism for
their own purposes. But this is complicated because
nations don’t map onto states in a one-on-one fashion. So
what state elites usually try to do might better be said to be
promoting statism and countryism.
Benedict Anderson and imagined communities
As mentioned earlier, Benedict Anderson’s idea of
“imagined communities” is widely cited as a way of
understanding how nationalism operates. In a population
of one million, it is impossible to know more than a tiny
fraction of the people in a country, so the “community”
exists only in the minds of the people, not in direct
interactions.
Anderson’s book Imagined Communities is a highly
sophisticated treatment of the origins and spread of
nationalism. He uses a highbrow writing style and
assumes the reader can understand short passages in
French and German. This is not bedtime reading, but it
does contain many insights relevant to patriotism tactics.
Many of today’s patriots refer to long traditions,
often talking about a homeland that has been defended or
sought for centuries. Serbians talk about the battle of
Kosovo in the year 1389. However, Anderson says that
any such long traditions exist only in the imagination.
National identity is fairly new, something that developed
beginning in the late 1700s in the Americas, adopted in
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Europe in the early 1800s, and then exported to Africa and
Asia through imperial conquests and by providing a model
for others to follow.
Anderson notes that Europeans in the year 1500 or
1700 did not think of themselves as part of a nation. Upper
class Europeans were part of a house of nobility that could
stretch across several of today’s countries. Peasants
thought in terms of the area where they lived and worked.
Anderson, drawing on the work of other scholars as
well as his own studies, attributes the origin of nationalism
to developments in the Americas from roughly 1760 to
1830 involving a complex interplay of administration,
printing and capitalism. Spain’s colonies in the Americas
were divided into administrative units. Spanish-born
administrators in the Americas could move from unit to
unit—for example from Chile to Mexico—and climb a
career ladder with the highest rungs being in Spain, the
centre of empire. But American-born administrators,
called creoles, were restricted to a single unit. Nationalism
provided a means of mobilising the population to throw
off the restrictions imposed by Spanish rulers. The newly
independent states were divided along the same boundaries as the divisions in the Spanish colonial bureaucracy.
Back in Europe, in contrast, languages and printing in
the vernacular (rather than Latin, previously used for
official purposes) enabled the mobilising of support for
control over populations by emerging states. In Japan, the
threat of conquest after 1868 triggered a process of
administrative centralisation, with conscription, promotion
of universal male literacy, elimination of the privileged
position of the samurai, the removal of feudal controls
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over peasants, and subordination of local military units to
a central command. Nationalism was a tool for
modernisation.
Anderson identifies another type of nationalism,
sponsored by governments that wanted to prevent challenges from below. This sort of “official nationalism” was
important in Europe in the mid 1800s. The AustroHungarian empire, for example, was threatened by popular
nationalism, so it sponsored its own fake nationalism. This
involved rewriting of history, official propaganda and
compulsory state-run education (presenting a mythical
national past). Nevertheless, there was a tension in official
nationalism between the myth of a single ancestor nation
and the reality of an empire containing several possible
nations.
The paradoxes of official nationalism were accentuated in England, where a mythical history of England was
developed. It was mythical in that there was no historical
English nation. For example, some of the supposedly
“English” kings were from continental European dynastic
houses and could not even speak English, and centuries
ago residents of what is today called England had no sense
of being part of a nation. Anderson notes, parenthetically:
The barons who imposed Magna Carta on John
Plantegenet did not speak “English,” and had no
conception of themselves as “Englishmen,” but they
were firmly defined as early patriots in the classrooms of the United Kingdom 700 years later.2
2 Ibid., p. 118.
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There was also a tension between England as a nation
and the reality of an empire. In the 1800s within the
empire, aspiring colonials seeking a career in government
service were blocked in their advancement. A talented,
educated bureaucrat from India could never attain a
position in London, nor even in the capitals of colonies in
Africa such as Kenya. Anderson notes that there was a
strong dose of racism in British colonial policies, but that
white colonials, for example from Australia and New
Zealand, faced the same blockages. The reality was an
empire ruled by upper class figures at the centre, so the
idea of a nation, in which all members have some sort of
common membership and some level of equality, was
patched on top and never fully convincing, hence the need
for government sponsored efforts to foster a manufactured
national myth.
After the initial development of nationalism in some
parts of the world, it became a model for use elsewhere,
by both insurgent movements against colonial powers in
Africa and Asia and by governments to forestall challenges. As a model, nationalism has been extraordinarily
powerful. Anderson notes the significance of the wars
between China, Vietnam and Cambodia in the late 1970s.
These wars were the first between socialist states, states
that were premised on international solidarity of the
working classes. In practice, though, rulers found it expedient to encourage citizens to identify with the state rather
than the working class. Anderson notes that the average
Chinese peasant had no particular interest in a dispute with
peoples to the south.
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Anderson addresses the connection between nationalism and racism. It is commonly thought that these are
related, but Anderson notes a positive side to the emotional dimension of nationalism, namely that it is about
love for a country, not contempt for supposedly lesser
ethnicities. He points to a remarkable absence, among
writers from subjugated populations, of antagonism
towards their oppressors: they are far more likely to laud
their own culture than to denigrate others. Though there is
more to say about the connection between nationalism and
racism, it is wise not to assume they are automatically
related.
John Breuilly and nationalism as politics
John Breuilly presents a useful perspective in his book
Nationalism and the State.3 Basically, he sees nationalism
as a form of politics, in other words as a way of exercising
power, most commonly to take control of the state. To
appreciate Breuilly’s perspective, it’s helpful to look first
at conventional views of nationalism that see it as associated with support for a nation, based on cultural characteristics such as language, ethnicity and customs. The
usual idea is that members of a nation may feel oppressed
by a state and seek to create a state of their own.
Breuilly says it is more the other way around. Certain
groups want to increase their power, and can do this by
challenging the state, seeking the power of a state for
themselves. They could justify their challenge by claiming
3 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1993, 2nd edition).
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to be superior administrators or having a better set of
beliefs, for example defending freedom from tyranny as in
the American Revolution. However, in many circumstances it is more effective for challengers to claim to
represent the aspirations of a nation. For this purpose, they
then refer to an illustrious history of the nation and
emphasise cultural characteristics that distinguish their
group from others.
Consider Yugoslavia, a country prior to 1990 containing many different ethnic groups: Serbians, Croatians,
Slovenians and so forth. After the collapse of Eastern
European regimes in 1989, there was a struggle for power
in Yugoslavia, eventually leading to war. Nationalism was
invoked as an explanation for the breakup of the country
but, looking at the process from Breuilly’s perspective,
actually the struggle for power was the primary driver, and
national characteristics were used as a justification. This
was most obvious in Bosnia, where Serbians, Croatians
and Muslims (not a national group) had long lived
together without difficulty. In the Bosnian war, the idea of
nations seeking autonomy was the pretext for a bitter quest
for power.
Breuilly takes “nationalism” to refer to “political
movements seeking or exercising state power” that use a
political argument with these three features: (1) there is a
nation with its own special features; (2) the nation’s
interests and values are paramount; and (3) the nation
needs to be independent.4 The key bit of this viewpoint is
4 Ibid., 2.
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that nationalism is all about power, in particular state
power.
Another part of Breuilly’s argument is that the rise of
nationalism occurred along with the rise of modern states,
initially in Europe and then worldwide via European
colonialism. Without the state, there would be no point of
nationalistic fervour. Like Anderson, Breuilly says that
people centuries ago, before the rise of modern states, did
not think of themselves in terms of nations. Their identification was more local.
Breuilly’s analysis of nationalism is based on a wideranging examination of movements from around the
world, including for example both unification and separation nationalism in Europe in the 1800s, anti-colonialism
nationalism in India, Kenya and elsewhere, reform nationalism in China, Japan and Turkey, and nationalism after
the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union.
Breuilly’s perspective can be summed up this way:
Nationalism is not the expression of nationality, if by
nationality is understood an independently developed
ideology or group sentiment broadly diffused through
the “nation.” … Rather, an effective nationalism
develops where it makes political sense for an opposition to the government to claim to represent the
nation against the present state.5

5 Ibid., 398.
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My aim in this book is to point out the use of tactics by
ruling groups to maintain their power. Breuilly’s perspective meshes quite well with the study of tactics, because
he’s saying that the mobilisation of support for a political
movement by reference to national characteristics is usefully understood as a political strategy, not as something
inherent in a nation.6
Michael Billig and banal nationalism
In his important book Banal Nationalism,7 Michael Billig
gives a different perspective than Breuilly. “Banal” refers
to things that are ordinary, routine and everyday. Billig
argues that nationalism is not just something that is
emotional, extreme and usually somewhere else, but is
around us all the time even when it is unnoticed: it is
banal. He gives the example of the US flag, which is hung
from people’s homes and printed on T-shirts. Most of
these flags and flag images are treated as part of the
background of daily life, yet they foster a consciousness of
6 Since writing Nationalism and the State, Breuilly’s ideas have
evolved. See for example “Nationalism as global history,” in
Daphne Halikiopoulou and Sofia Vasilopoulou (eds.), Nationalism and Globalisation: Conflicting or Complementary? (London:
Routledge, 2011), pp. 65–83; John Breuilly (ed.), The Oxford
Handbook of the History of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013); John Breuilly, “Nationalism,” in John
Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.), The Globalization
of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, sixth edition), pp. 387–
400.
7 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995).
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the nation as integral to the fabric of life. Similarly, in
schools around the country, children daily stand, put their
hands on their hearts and together recite the pledge of
allegiance: “I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United
States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands,
one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice
for all.”
By referring to nationalism as banal, as ordinary,
Billig is not saying it has no adverse consequences. As he
puts it, “banal does not imply benign.”8 Banal nationalism
can be toxic in its own way, blinding citizens to the
assumptions underpinning the way they see the world and
enabling aggression and wars.
Billig, like other writers on nationalism, notes that
just a few hundred years ago very few people had any
conception of themselves as members of a nation. In
medieval Europe, peasants saw their world as extending
only to the groups of people they interacted with and
encompassing a limited geographical area without fixed
boundaries. Few people living in what is today called
France thought of themselves as French. In today’s world,
in contrast, every bit of land is assigned to one country or
another and boundaries are clearly demarcated. The idea
that there could be large numbers of people not attached to
countries or there could be populated territory not
included in a country is hard to grasp.
The contemporary way of thinking about the world is
built on assumptions about membership of groups and the
division of territories, assumptions that are hard to
8 Ibid., p. 6.
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appreciate because they are unspoken and seldom articulated. When a political leader says “We must protect the
French way of life,” it is not necessary to spell out that
“France” is being distinguished from other distinct countries and that it is reasonable to assume the existence of a
“way of life” for everyone encompassed by the adjective
“French” despite the vast differences in thought and
behaviour between different people implicated in the term.
Billig says that, “nationalism is the ideology by which the
world of nations has come to seem the natural world—as
if there could not possibly be a world without nations.”9
Billig thus conceives nationalism as something more
pervasive and unnoticed that the usual usages by scholars
in the field who, like Breuilly, see it as mainly being
manifested in challenges to existing states. Much of
Billig’s book is a critique of scholarship that ignores the
routine and fails to examine assumptions underlying the
current way the world is organised and thought about. He
addresses the claims of postmodernists that national
consciousness is being superseded by other forms of
identity, and shows postmodernists’ failure to consider
banal nationalism. He provides a close critique of the
work of famous philosopher Richard Rorty, showing
Rorty’s philosophical pragmatism is built on unacknowledged assumptions about US nationalism. Billig’s many
examples include several that I address in later chapters,
including language and sport.10
9 Ibid., p. 37.
10 Billig’s ideas have been the subject of critical attention. See
for example Michael Skey, “The national in everyday life: a
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What Billig calls nationalism I might call statism or
countryism or country-centredness, but the terms are less
important than the basic idea, namely that people think of
the world as divided into countries and of themselves as
members of a country or a nation.
Conclusion
There are several common themes in the books by
Anderson, Breuilly and Billig. One key point is that the
idea of nations is quite new, no more than two or three
hundred years old. Earlier than this, and even today in
many parts of the world, people have not thought of
themselves as part of a nation or a nation-state. The idea
that the world is divided up into geographically bounded
areas, each one administered by a central government, is
new historically. What seems natural today would have
seemed unnatural, even incomprehensible, to earlier
generations.
All three authors see the rise of the idea that people
have national identities as happening in parallel with the
rise of the state system. States rule over people living
within territories; national identity helps make this seem
natural and inevitable rather than arbitrary and open to
challenge.
Another key point is that effort is required to get
people to think in terms of nations, states, borders, citizencritical engagement with Michael Billig’s thesis of Banal
Nationalism,” Sociological Review, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2009, pp.
331–346, and Michael Billig, “Reflecting on a critical engagement with banal nationalism—reply to Skey,” pp. 347–352.
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ship and all the other facets of the system of states.
Sometimes the efforts are strenuous and obvious, such as
during wartime, but more commonly the usual ways of
thinking about the world are reinforced by education,
media and everyday rituals.
Finally, it is important to recognise that the state
system is a power system. It is political, in the sense of
involving the exercise of power. Many individuals and
groups have a stake in the way the world is organised and
resist those who promote alternatives. One of the key uses
of power is to encourage people to think that the system is
natural and that alternatives are impractical.
The body of writing about nationalism and states is
enormous and there is no possibility of even trying to
summarise it. My goal in Ruling Tactics is to point to
ways in which governments and their supporters encourage people to think in terms of countries and from the
point of view of governments. In doing this, I am drawing
on several sources. One is the body of research about
nationalism, and Billig’s Banal Nationalism is as close as
any treatment to my starting point. Another source is the
analysis of strategy and tactics in the social world; James
Jasper’s book Getting Your Way is the pioneering treatment, showing how social dynamics can be analysed in
terms of strategy.11 Finally, I have drawn on my own study
of tactics against injustice, which offers a framework for
understanding the methods used by powerful groups to
reduce outrage over injustice, and which can be used more
11 James M. Jasper, Getting Your Way: Strategic Dilemmas in
the Real World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

Nationalism

39

generally to look at tactics adopted by rulers.12 My aim is
to use a range of topics to illustrate how, by looking at
familiar things in different ways, it is possible to recognise
tactics that help maintain systems of rule and to imagine
ways to take action towards alternatives.

12 Brian Martin, Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). See, more generally,
“Backfire materials,” http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/backfire.html.
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Crime
Murder, theft, assault, burglary—these are staples of news
coverage. People hear a lot about crime, and nearly everyone thinks it’s a bad thing. Yet there are huge differences
in ways different actions are labelled as crime and in the
attention they receive.
The first distortion is that most attention is given to
low-level crime, the sort that hurts a few people and is
carried out by relatively powerless individuals. This
includes many murders, which attract a lot of attention.
Indeed, so potent is murder for attracting attention that it
has become a staple of news coverage as well as crime
novels and television shows: think of Agatha Christie and
CSI and many others like them.
Murder is usually thought of as something done by an
evil person, who needs to be tracked down, proven guilty
and punished. Most despicable of all is the serial killer
who preys on victims over a period of years.
Yet there is another sort of crime that usually escapes
the spotlight, and those responsible are seldom identified
or exposed, much less ever prosecuted and convicted. This
is crime by those with a lot of power.
Let’s start with corporate crime. Corporate executives
may enact policies that predictably kill people, sometimes
large numbers of people. They may hide evidence showing how many people are dying due to their actions.
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A classic example involved the Ford Pinto. As exposed in a classic 1977 article in the magazine Mother
Jones,1 Ford engineers and executives knew about a fault
in the fuel system: collisions to the rear end of the vehicle
could easily rupture the fuel system, leading to fire and
potentially to death of the occupants. Ford already had a
patent for a safer gas tank, but to save money—Ford was
then in competition with Volkswagen for the US small-car
market—the company retained the dangerous tank, and for
years lobbied against government standards that would
have mandated a safer tank. Hundreds of people died from
burns, and Ford settled numerous damage claims out of
court. The company’s internal cost-benefit analysis
showed that paying damage claims was cheaper than
putting in the safer tank. Was this a crime? Technically
not, because auto manufacturers had lobbied against any
provision in the Motor Vehicle Safety Act providing for
criminal sanctions for selling unsafe cars. However, it is
not something that any company would want to admit,
much less advertise.
On a vastly greater scale are the actions of tobacco
companies. Executives know that smoking cigarettes leads
to the illness and premature death of a great number of
smokers. Furthermore, the companies carried out research
of their own that showed the dangers while denying them
publicly. They fought regulations tooth and nail.2
1 Mark Dowie, “Pinto madness,” Mother Jones, September/
October 1977.
2 Stanton A. Glantz, John Slade, Lisa A. Bero, Peter Hanauer and
Deborah E. Barnes, The Cigarette Papers (Berkeley, CA: Univer-
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The movement against smoking has been remarkably
successful in exposing the actions of tobacco companies.
Fines of hundreds of billions of dollars have been
imposed. Yet the companies still do all they can to expand
sales around the world and to resist regulations, such as
plain-paper packaging, that discourage smoking.
If ever there was an industry causing mass death, it is
the tobacco industry. One estimate is that a billion people
may die this century due to tobacco-related diseases. How
many tobacco company executives have gone to jail for
their responsibility?
Another example is the scandal involving the
Australian Wheat Board (AWB), a government agency
(privatised in 1999) with a monopoly on selling Australian
wheat. Between 1991 and 2003, Iraq was subject to UN
sanctions that blocked the import of many items. The
AWB was eager to make sales to Iraq during this time—so
eager that extra payments were paid to dealers, money that
went to the regime in violation of the sanctions, right up
until the time the Australian government sent troops as
part of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. A$290 million in bribes
was involved, a huge support for Saddam Hussein’s
regime. The story eventually broke in Australia, and there
was an inquiry and recommendations for criminal charges,
but the police did not proceed: no AWB officials were
prosecuted for crimes, much less went to jail.3
sity of California Press, 1996); Robert N. Proctor, Golden
Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette Catastrophe and the Case for
Abolition (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012).
3 Caroline Overington, Kickback: Inside the Australian Wheat
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Despite payments by the AWB and other importers,
the sanctions against Iraq were remarkably effective, not
in hobbling Saddam Hussein’s grasp on power, but in
harming the Iraqi people. Due to shortages of sanitation
equipment, medicines, and other vital materials, the death
rate due to malnutrition and disease soared. Perhaps one or
two million Iraqis died as a result of the sanctions. In a
famous quote, US secretary of state Madeleine Albright
was asked whether the sanctions could be justified given
the death of half a million Iraqi children. She answered, “I
think this is a very hard choice, but the price—we think
the price is worth it.”
Some commentators have judged the sanctions
against Iraq to constitute genocide: actions taken knowingly leading to mass death in a target population.4 No one
was ever charged with a crime.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq, led by the US government, was not approved by the UN Security Council. In
the eyes of many legal scholars, it was an illegal war, yet
no one responsible was ever charged.

Board Scandal (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2007).
4 Geoff Simons, The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, Law and
Natural Justice, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). For a
discussion of the shortcomings of international governance in this
case, see Joy Gordon, Invisible War: The United States and the
Iraq Sanctions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2010), pp. 221–230.
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Journalist James Risen has told of corruption in the
aftermath of the invasion.5 To prop up the collapsed Iraqi
economy, masses of US cash were flown from the New
York Federal Reserve Bank to Iraq. The amounts were so
great, even in US $100 bills, that entire cargo planes were
filled with the cash, ultimately $12 to $14 billion. To be
handling so much cash was a temptation for everyone
involved, including US soldiers who were supposed to
count or distribute some of the money. Accounting procedures were so lax that billions of dollars went missing, no
one knows where—at least no one in official places.
Information was pieced together indicating that a couple
of billion dollars were stored in Lebanon on behalf of
corrupt Iraqi government figures. Although provided with
addresses, US officials showed little interest in pursuing
the cash or the criminals. Apparently it was all too embarrassing for US figures involved in the operation.
Crime and the law
Breaking the law is an offence, and not breaking the law is
okay, right? Well, it depends. Some laws are broken so
often and enforced so infrequently that few are concerned.
Laws against jaywalking are an example, in places where
pedestrians routinely cross the street anywhere they
please. So is photocopying or scanning a book that’s in
copyright. Cash-in-hand payments to tradespeople enable
tax avoidance. Technically, in many places, these actions
are illegal, but no one bothers about them.
5 James Risen, Pay Any Price: Greed, Power, and Endless War
(Boston: Mariner Books, 2015).
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Then there are legal loopholes, which are ways to
cheat legally. In the US tax code, legislators have written
in hundreds of special exemptions that apply to a single
business or individual.6 Corporate lawyers search for
loopholes to minimise the tax their companies pay. Tax
havens—countries imposing little or no company tax—are
legal, and expressly designed to help multinational
companies avoid tax in the countries where they do most
of their business.7
There’s an old saying that the golden rule means “He
who has the gold makes the rules.” In other words, those
with wealth have influence over how the law is written
and enforced. Consider an example: a company owner
decides to fire all the employees and hire new ones at
lower wages. In some places, this is legal; in other places,
it’s not legal, but government regulators would not bother
to prosecute. In such circumstances, the main restraint on
this sort of action is the organised action of workers and
their supporters, for example via a work-in or a blockade.
So there are two ways to think about crime and the
law. One is the technical one: something is only a crime if
it’s against the law. The other is the social one: something
is a crime if it defies widespread community expectations
for fair and ethical behaviour.
6 Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, America: Who Really
Pays the Taxes? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). They also
describe a multitude of ways the US tax system has been manipulated to serve the rich.
7 See chapter 11, “Trade deals and tax havens.”
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If someone is homeless and sleeps on a park bench, is
this a crime? If someone passes out leaflets in a shopping
centre, is this a crime? Technically, these behaviours may
or may not be legal, depending on local laws. Socially,
observers will differ in their views about homeless people
or leafletting: whether something is a crime depends on
the way you think about the behaviour and about the law.
State crime
State crime refers to crimes committed by governments
and government agents.8 However, in many cases, actions
by governments are treated as above the law. An example
is torture. Nominally, in nearly every country in the world
torture is considered a crime, but seldom is anyone
charged or convicted of committing torture, least of all by
the governments that sanction it.
Consider first the manufacture of equipment used for
torture, everything from thumbscrews to electroshock
batons. This is a huge industry.9 There are “security fairs”
held in countries around the world displaying the latest
8 Jeffrey Ian Ross, ed., Controlling State Crime, 2nd ed. (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000); Jeffrey Ian Ross,
ed., Varieties of State Crime and Its Control (Monsey, NY:
Criminal Justice Press, 2000); Dawn L. Rothe, State Criminality:
The Crime of All Crimes (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2009); Dawn L. Rothe and Christopher W. Mullins (eds.), State
Crime: Current Perspectives (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 2011). See also the discussion of state terrorism—a type of state crime—in chapter 7.
9 See publications of the Omega Research Foundation,
https://omegaresearchfoundation.org/publications/.
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equipment for surveillance and control. There is also a
well-developed system for training personnel in “advanced interrogation techniques,” a euphemism for torture. Yet it is rare, indeed almost unheard of, for anyone
involved in what should be called the torture trade to be
considered a criminal.
Then there is torture in practice. Governments know
it is going on, but usually will do nothing unless there is
adverse publicity, and naturally enough they usually avoid
publicity if at all possible.
In the aftermath of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan
and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there were reports about
torture in US facilities. There wasn’t much concern until
photos from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq became public in
2004. These showed Iraqi prisoners being piled naked on
top of each other, a hooded Iraqi prisoner in a stress
position apparently in fear of being electrocuted, and an
Iraqi prisoner being threatened by a dog, among other
gruesome images. It was only because of the massive
publicity generated by these photos that a few US prison
guards were charged with crimes. However, the US
government avoided the word “torture,” referring instead
to “abuse,” and the US mass media followed suit. The
government implied actions by guards at Abu Ghraib were
their own initiative, ignoring evidence of higher
responsibility.10

10 Jennifer K. Harbury, Truth, Torture, and the American Way:
The History and Consequences of U.S. Involvement in Torture
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2005); Alfred W. McCoy, A Question of
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Abu Ghraib prison torture was an anomaly, not
because it involved torture, but because it was exposed. It
was business as usual in the sense that higher officials
escaped any censure.
Then there are more routine forms of torture. In US
prisons, it is commonplace for prisoners to be subject to
treatment that fits usual definitions of torture. Supermax
prisons, in which prisoners are kept in isolation most of
the time, serve as a form of torture, using the techniques of
sensory deprivation pioneered by the British in Northern
Ireland.11 Restraint chairs and electroshock weapons are
regularly used to control resistant prisoners, and guards
may knowingly allow prisoners to assault each other.12 It
would be possible to argue that there are more crimes
committed against prisoners in US prisons than the
prisoners ever committed on the outside, especially
considering that many are in prison for victimless lawbreaking such as using drugs. Yet the guards responsible
for direct assaults on prisoners are almost never charged
with crimes. Even less likely is it that politicians and
planners who design prison systems will ever be thought
of as criminals.
Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on
Terror (New York: Metropolitan, 2006).
11 Carol Ackroyd, Karen Margolis, Jonathan Rosenhead and Tim
Shallice, The Technology of Political Control (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1977).
12 On one aspect of this, see Joanne Mariner, No Escape: Male
Rape in U.S. Prisons (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001),
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/prison/report.html.
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To summarise several points covered so far, most attention
in the media is to crimes of individuals and to crime by
people lower down the social hierarchy. Corporate crime
is neglected because it is systemic and those most responsible are top executives. In practice many laws are broken
all the time with impunity, and powerful and influential
groups are able to influence lawmakers and prosecutors so
that their shady operations, such as tax avoidance, are
technically legal. One special category is state crime,
which is crime by governments and their agents. It
receives little public attention and is seldom punished.
Collins on crime
Sociologist Randall Collins provides a valuable insight
into the dynamics of crime.13 He notes that conservatives
explain crime as an individual failing, due to genetics or
poor character: their solution is punishment. However, this
approach doesn’t solve the problem and is best understood
as a moral and political position.
Liberal explanations focus on crime cultures, including poverty, with the solution being rehabilitation. These
explanations are not satisfactory either, because many
poor people are not criminals and many rich ones are.
Radical explanations see crime as a category of
behaviour that is labelled as criminal, with convictions
produced by the law-enforcement machinery. From this
viewpoint, laws create crime, especially victimless
13 Randall Collins, “The normalcy of crime,” in Sociological
Insight: An Introduction to Nonobvious Sociology (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 86–118.
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lawbreaking such as illicit drug use, thereby fostering the
creation of criminal cultures. This explanation doesn’t
work well for property and personal crimes such as theft
and assault.
The class-conflict model, derived from Marxism,
sees crimes as due to class relations, especially the existence of private property. However, socialist societies still
have crime; indeed, they create new categories of it,
especially crimes against the state.
Collins notes that in Denmark in 1944, there were no
police. Property crimes greatly increased but crimes
against people stayed about the same.
Collins’ own preference is a picture derived from
Emil Durkheim, one of the founders of sociology: crime
and punishment serve as a bond for the rest of the
community. A stratified society, in which some groups
have far more wealth and power than others, can be
unified by rituals, and one potent ritual is punishment of
those labelled criminals. This helps explain the attraction
of murder mysteries. Collins says that in power struggles,
there are plenty of actions that can provide offence. Some
of these are criminalised—turned into crimes by laws and
expectations for punishment—and thus provide opportunities for ceremonies of punishment that dramatise the
moral feelings of the community. Each type of society has
its own forms of crime.
Tactics: dilemmas for the state
For government leaders and supporters, the topic of crime
contains opportunities and dangers. Fears about crime can
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be drummed up, but there is a risk the spotlight might be
turned on crimes by those with power and wealth.
The first tactic used by governments to foster a
preferred orientation towards crime is exposure. Government leaders direct attention towards low-level crime, and
crime by individuals, and the media usually are willing
accomplices. Murder—usually involving killing of one
individual by another—has become a topic that, to many
people, is fascinating. The mass media report on murders,
some of which become ongoing sagas. The case of O J
Simpson, a famous US gridiron star accused of murdering
his wife and a friend, attracted enormous media attention.
Fictional treatments of murder, in novels and television
shows, are also popular. It’s as if news media and the
entertainment industry are saying, “Look, here’s what you
should be concerned about.”
The attention to individual crime—murder, yes, and
assault, robbery and embezzlement—serves to create a
perception that crime is due to bad people. There is correspondingly little attention to state and corporate crime,
including the arms trade, illegal wars, and sales of dangerous products such as pharmaceutical drugs. The crimes by
states and corporations cause far more deaths than individual murders but in comparison receive little attention.
A similar disparity occurs with the second tactic,
valuing. This doesn’t mean valuing crime, of course, but
rather valuing efforts against crime. The police, courts and
various agencies are commonly portrayed in news stories
and entertainment as the good guys, taking up the noble
cause of cracking down on drug dealers, robbers, hooligans and welfare cheats. Valuing comes into play in the
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resources given to enforcement agencies. For example,
huge amounts of money are provided to anti-terrorism
bodies but comparatively little to agencies targeting highlevel white-collar crime.
The third tactic is to explain the government’s efforts
against crime, and why they are the right ones and
effective. This might involve statistics on crime rates,
arrest rates, expenditures on policing, and so forth. These
accounts of anti-crime efforts normally ignore questions of
what should count as crime and whether the most
damaging types of crime are being addressed. The figures
include, typically, murder, assault, burglary and so forth,
and omit a separate classification for state crime. Explanations of crime-fighting are sometimes designed to
placate the public by indicating that everything is under
control but sometimes designed to stimulate support for
greater expenditures. This can be a delicate balancing act.
Alarms about escalating criminal activity can scare the
public and provide support for greater spending on prisons
and policing, but these at the same time send a signal that
the government is not doing its job of protecting the
population. In either case, the most important message is
what is assumed, namely that crimes by individuals,
especially those with less power, are of primary concern
and that institutionalised state and corporate crime is off
the agenda.
To provide credibility to the government’s policies, it
is useful to have endorsements, which constitute the fourth
tactic. Endorsements can come from police, politicians,
government officials, media, experts or celebrities, among
others. The basic line is normally is that the government is
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doing the right thing, which might be keeping crime under
control or expanding its efforts against a new type of
crime, due for example to the drug ice or cybercriminals.
It is a different story when it comes to experts who
present a non-standard view about crime, a story pointing
to fundamental flaws in crime control. This will differ
from country to country, but consider the idea of restorative justice. In countries like the US, convicted criminals
are incarcerated and seldom provided extensive support
for rehabilitation: the dominant approach is retribution,
namely punishment. It is so standard that it is simply taken
for granted in most commentary by police, prison officials
and politicians. There is another approach, called restorative justice, involving meetings between offenders and
those harmed and finding a mutually agreed response,
often with apology and restitution (payment, community
service and sometimes incarceration). The motivating
philosophy behind restorative justice is to reintegrate
offenders into the community, not to brand them for life.14
There are many ardent advocates for restorative
practices but, in the US at least, they receive little public
attention. Endorsements of the standard retribution model
are given far more visibility.
Consider also the radical critique of US prison policy,
for example by eminent Norwegian criminologist Nils
Christie, author of Crime Control as Industry: Towards

14 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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Gulags, Western Style.15 There are other critics too, within
the US, who advocate abolishing prisons. These alternatives receive little visibility in the media.
The criminal justice system—what critics might call
the criminal injustice system—offers ample rewards for
those who emphasise the usual sorts of low-level crime.
There are many jobs in the system, in what has been called
the prison-industrial complex, for building prisons,
running police operations and a host of related activities.16
In comparison, there are relatively few rewards for those
pushing for alternatives such as restorative justice and
prison abolition.
Conclusion
If Randall Collins’ ideas about the role of crime in society
are accepted, then it is predictable that in just about any
society some actions will be labelled criminal, stigmatised
and penalised. However, this can be done in various ways,
with differing social and political effects. In the restorative
justice approach, damaging behaviours are dealt with by
community-based efforts to reintegrate the offender into a
meaningful social group.
For rulers, though, there are two great temptations.
The first is to use the advantages of power to commit
crimes or, even better, to set up the rules so that personal
wealth can legally be extracted from the population. The
15 Nils Christie, Crime Control as Industry: Towards Gulags,
Western Style (London: Routledge, 1994).
16 Joel Dyer, The Perpetual Prisoner Machine—How America
Profits from Crime (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000).
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second temptation is to raise the alarm about other sorts of
crime, by enemies or by people lower in the social hierarchy. A parallel double process of persuasion is involved:
hide high-level crime or make it legal, acceptable and
even laudable, and at the same time encourage people to
project their fears and anger about crime onto scapegoats.
The result of these temptations and tactics is obvious
in media coverage (encouraged by government priorities,
for example funding police and anti-fraud agencies) and
hence in everyday conversations. If the size of a crime, or
the proceeds of rules that enable unfair distribution of
wealth, were the determinant of attention, hardly anyone
would get excited about low-level theft when corporations
and governments are extracting, legally or not, billions of
dollars from the populace. When it comes to crimes of
violence, if the scale of devastation and death were the
determinant of attention, then media coverage would
concentrate on state terrorism, not the small-scale efforts
of non-state groups.
To challenge the dominant narrative about crime is
difficult, but can be done. It involves continual exposure
of the techniques used by governments and others to direct
attention to individual criminals, and efforts to promote
alternatives. There are many people doing this, in all sorts
of ways. Useful lessons can be learned from efforts to
challenge the so-called war on drugs: exposing its sordid
origins and harmful effects, showing the rationality and
publicising the beneficial effects of decriminalising drugs
(as in Portugal), and fostering sensible ways to reduce the
harmful effects of addiction (rather than assuming legali-
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sation on its own is sufficient).17 Proponents of harm
reduction want to treat drug use as a social and health
problem rather than a legal and policing problem. Similar
efforts can be taken on other issues in which the “crime
problem” is used to serve vested interests.

17 Johann Hari, Chasing the Scream: The First and Last Days of
the War on Drugs (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015).

5
Sport
It’s the year of the Olympic Games. For many fans, this is
one of the highlights of the sporting calendar. Even those
who do not follow sports may tune into the spectacular
opening ceremony.
The modern Olympics supposedly were set up for
noble purposes: instead of waging war, nations could
engage in peaceful, healthy competition. From the start,
though, the games were driven by baser considerations,
including nationalism and, later, commercialism.1

1 Useful treatments include Robert K. Barney, Stephen R. Wenn
and Scott G. Martyn, Selling the Five Rings: The International
Olympic Committee and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism
(Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 2002); Jules
Boykoff, Celebration Capitalism and the Olympic Games (New
York: Routledge, 2013); Jules Boykoff, Power Games: A
Political History of the Olympics (London: Verso, 2016); Richard
Espy, The Politics of the Olympic Games (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1979); Christopher R. Hill, Olympic Politics
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); John
Hoberman, The Olympic Crisis: Sport, Politics and the Moral
Order (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1986); Jeffrey
Segrave and Donald Chu (eds.), Olympism (Champaign, IL:
Human Kinetics, 1981); Alan Tomlinson and Garry Whannel
(eds.), Five-Ring Circus: Money, Power and Politics at the
Olympic Games (London: Pluto Press, 1984).
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The nationalist bias is apparent in several features.
Athletes compete as representatives of their country of
citizenship. In individual events, no more than three
competitors are allowed from any country. In team sports,
such as basketball, each country can have only one team.
So the Olympics, rather than being a genuine world
championship of the best athletes, are constrained by the
artificial barriers of citizenship. Team sports in particular
can become surrogates for international rivalries.
In the opening ceremony, watched by billions around
the globe, athletes march around the host stadium in
national teams. It is a special honour for an athlete to lead
the team, carrying the country’s flag.
In most media coverage of the Olympics, a country’s
media concentrate on the progress of their “own” athletes,
namely the ones representing their country. Viewers are
encouraged to identify with these particular athletes. For
example, in the 2000 Sydney Olympics, Cathy Freeman, a
sprinter in the 400 meters and a prominent Indigenous
Australian, was favoured to win. She was chosen that year
to light the Olympic flame. When she won the final in her
signature event, there was rejoicing throughout the
country, with saturation media coverage both encouraging
and responding to this popular interest. Many viewers saw
Freeman’s victory as not just a personal achievement but
as representing Indigenous success and, more generally,
an achievement for the whole country, especially given
these games were in Australia.
Hosting the Olympics is treated as a matter of
national prestige, as well as kudos for the city. Government officials use all sorts of persuasive means, including
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bribery, to encourage Olympic committee members to
support their bids to host the Olympics. Politicians and
entrepreneurs in cities and countries where the Olympics
are held use the opportunity to sell their preferred image,
perhaps as a responsible member of the international
community (for example, Beijing) or a desirable tourist
destination (for example, Sydney). A winning bid to host
the games is widely seen as a diplomatic triumph, despite
the huge costs and headaches in getting the venues ready
in time.
Behind the scenes at Olympic host cities, governments carry out various forms of civil and social
engineering in order to present a positive picture to the
world. This includes moving homeless people out of city
centres, bulldozing homes, suppressing dissent and
creating huge facades.
Meanwhile, among the athletes, every attempt is
made to foster a clean image. Competitors, in their quest
for Olympic gold, will make all sorts of sacrifices, and for
some this includes performing while injured, using banned
drugs and using unethical techniques to undermine
opponents.
The Olympics are officially presented as a moral
paragon, as a unifying enterprise for the world. In practice,
Olympics politics represent one of the worst models of
compromise and lack of principle. In order to enable
participation, nearly every government, no matter how
dictatorial and corrupt, is allowed to send a team. Thus
oppressive regimes can bask in the reflected glory of
having their chosen athletes compete. For some governments, participation is restricted to those considered
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acceptable. For decades, numerous governments allowed
only men to compete, and persecuted minorities are
commonly excluded. Olympic officials seldom intervene
in decisions made by national committees. In these ways,
the Olympic movement panders to nationalism.
The Olympic Games have often been used as tools in
international diplomacy. In 1980, many governments
boycotted the games in Moscow as a protest against the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In some places, Australia
among them, athletes were placed in a quandary. Should
they follow the recommendation of their government and
boycott the games, or instead attend anyway in order to
achieve what for many is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity
to participate in the world’s most prestigious sporting
competition? In 1984, Soviet-bloc governments held a
payback boycott of the games in Los Angeles.
The Olympics have also become highly commercial,
especially with the rise of television coverage in the 1950s
and 1960s, providing huge revenues to the International
Olympic Committee and leading to transformation of the
games into an ever greater spectacle.
Originally, Olympic athletes were required to be
amateurs. This gave an advantage to members of upper
classes who had access to facilities and leisure time for
training. As the Olympics became more prestigious, some
governments and athletic organisations gave support to
their athletes in ways that got around the amateur rule. In
the Soviet bloc, elite athletes were de facto professionals
with sham jobs. In the US, athletic scholarships at
universities, combined with soft study options, enabled
many athletes to train almost like full-time professionals.
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Furthermore, many received covert payments or benefits,
so this era was sometimes called “shamateurism.” The
ending of the amateur requirement meant these forms of
hypocrisy were avoided, though at the expense of the
original Olympic ideal.
In the Soviet bloc, scientists were involved in designing training for national teams. The East German team
was highly successful, producing many world champions,
and was also notorious for the widespread use of banned
drugs. The quest for Olympic gold was so strong that
athletes in many other countries also used drugs.
Drugs are only one way to seek a competitive advantage. In several countries, national training centres
undertake research to support elite athletic performance.
In the 1976 Montreal Olympics, the Australian team did
not obtain a single gold medal, a dismal performance in
the eyes of political leaders who saw athletic success as a
source of national pride. In response, the government set
up the Australian Institute of Sport to undertake research
and oversee training of elite athletes. This was modelled
on the Eastern European efforts, but without the emphasis
on drugs. The AIS has studied training regimens, psychology, special technological aids in training, coaching
techniques and other areas. It has been one factor in the
later successes of the Australian team, putting it ahead of
larger countries on a per-capita basis.
The rhetoric of sport sometimes proclaims that the
aim is participation, not winning, but in practice the
emphasis is on victory, as in US football coach Vince
Lombardi’s famous saying “Winning isn’t everything, it’s
the only thing.” The emphasis on winners, and on elite
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athletes, is obvious in media coverage. Olympic coverage
is on the finals and on medallists, especially gold medallists. In many countries, coverage is selective, with
attention given to athletes from the country in question. A
local hero might be followed through the heats of an
event, but if beaten, coverage switched to other events.
Viewers who want to watch the “best in the world” may
be frustrated by coverage oriented to national competitors.
Then there are the unofficial medal totals, listing the
number of gold, silver and bronze medals obtained by
athletes from different countries. In 2012, the countries
with the most total medals were the US, China and Russia.
However, further down the list, many people in countries
such as Algeria and Guatemala were proud that a single
competitor from their country received a medal.
Media coverage and medal totals encourage identification with a national team, and with a country. Flags are
in abundance, and national anthems played for winners.
These processes encourage citizens to identify with the
elite athletes from their own country. (Immigrants often
have conflicted loyalties.)
When citizens identify with Olympic athletes from
their countries, many important differences are obscured.
Just because runners or shooters on an Olympic team do
well does not mean ordinary citizens from the country are
any good at running or shooting. They might be, but many
of them might be unable to run more than a short distance
and never have used a rifle. Success in the Olympics can
make viewers feel like winners, by proxy.
Olympic athletes must be highly dedicated to achieve
world-class performance levels. This typically means
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spending hours per day for years on end. This sort of
commitment is uncommon. Viewers can bask in the
illusion that dedication by athletes has some spin-off
association with dedication by themselves or others in
their societies. This might be true, but often isn’t.
The Olympics, like most sports in other contexts, are
presented as clean, honest, fair competitions, in which
those with superior capabilities are victorious. Sports are
widely seen as separate from the messy and corrupt
practices found elsewhere in society—they provide an
escape into an ideal world. This illusion is sometimes
threatened by the behaviour of athletes, for example when
they are discovered cheating or when committing crimes
in their life outside the sporting arena. These violations of
the image of sport as pure are seen as especially objectionable, and constitute one reason why the crusade
against drugs in sport is unrelenting: sport must be seen to
be fair so the illusion of a pure, separate world can be
maintained. Governments like to be associated with the
image of sporting success—as long as it’s a clean image.
Other sports
National identification is promoted via sports such as
cricket and rugby in which there are national teams, so it
sometimes can seem like countries are competing against
each other when actually only teams representing countries are competing. Commentators say “India defeated
England” rather than “The cricket team representing India
defeated the cricket team representing England.” Many
fans identify with national teams.
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In individual sports, like golf and tennis, there is
some identification based on country of origin. That tennis
star Rafael Nadal is from Spain can be a source of pride
for Spaniards, but this is minor compared to what happens
with the World Cup.2 Football—called soccer in the US—
seems to arouse tremendous passions, and nationalism is
an important component of this emotional process. Football is indeed the “world game”—the US baseball finals
are misleadingly called the world series—so every
national team carries the hopes of many of its citizens.
The World Cup is broadcast internationally, and is
the ultimate football competition. Normally, fans will back
a local team, but when it’s time for the World Cup, these
parochial attachments are set aside in a bigger type of
parochial partisanship, identification with the national
team. Many athletes see their greatest achievement as
playing in the World Cup, especially in the finals.
It should be noted that women’s football is insignificant in audience ratings compared to the men’s game.
Many competitive sports remain male dominated in terms
of prominence. Patriarchy influences sport in various
ways, intersecting with nationalism, commercialism and
other factors.3

2 David Goldblatt, The Ball is Round: A Global History of
Football (London: Viking, 2006).
3 On the politics of football, see Gabriel Kuhn, Soccer vs. the
State: Tackling Football and Radical Politics (Oakland, CA: PM
Press, 2011).
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The arbitrariness of sporting attachments
Most sports fans develop strong commitments to particular
players or teams. When fans support a local player or
team, loyalty is usually based in a sense of community, in
which the team is treated as a representative of the
locality, city, region or country.
Very few fans can observe games dispassionately,
not caring who wins but simply observing a game of skill.
Instead, the games involving favoured players or teams
receive far more attention. If a sport is not played locally
and is not widely established internationally, few fans will
have any interest in it. For example, Australian rules
football has a limited following in China, India or Russia.
It may seem logical that fans will support the local
team, especially when the players are local identities,
perhaps even meeting with the fans. However, most fan
identification with players is vicarious, through watching
their team, not by personally interacting with them.
The arbitrariness of these loyalties is shown when
players are brought in from other parts of the country or
the world. A US basketball player who joins an Australian
team usually has no prior connection with Australia, yet is
eagerly adopted by local fans as part of their team. Players
and coaches are traded and transferred, basically as
commodities, but only occasionally does this alienate fans.
It seems that the name of the team is enough to inspire
loyalty to it.
This is apparent in baseball in the US, where loyalty
is most commonly to the team with a city’s name, for
example the Chicago Cubs or the New York Yankees.
When a team moves to another city, as when the Dodgers
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moved from Brooklyn to Los Angeles, city-based loyalties
usually trump loyalties to the players. In any case, players
are regularly traded, so teams are not composed of local
athletes but simply of players who have been made part of
a team with a local name.
The same applies to international sport. Players are
often born and bred in the country they represent, but this
not essential. There are plenty of cases in which players
change their citizenship in order to join a team in their
adopted country. Such players are usually welcomed with
open arms as one of our athletes. Assignment of loyalties
is more about the label than about any deep connection to
the country or its institutions.
Alternatives
International sporting competitions, such as the Olympics
and the World Cup, seem so natural that it can be hard to
imagine any other way of doing things. Therefore it is
worth noting some possible alternatives, not because they
are likely or even desirable, but to highlight assumptions
about sport.
One alternative is simply to abolish all elite international sporting competitions. Instead, emphasis could be
placed on mass participation in health-promoting and
socially engaging sport and physical activity. Research
shows that physical activity is a reliable way of improving
happiness—more reliable than watching sporting competitions on television, for example—and there are health
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benefits too.4 So if the aim is to improve gross national
happiness, rather than gross national product, then widespread participation in sport is an obvious candidate.
Another option is to set up sporting competitions on a
different basis, so national identification is limited. In the
1920s and 1930s, there were a number of “workers’
games” run as alternatives to the Olympics. In these
games, competitors did not represent countries. The
orientation was to achievements by members of the
working class, at a time when many elite athletes were
from privileged backgrounds.5
Yet another option is cooperative games.6 An
example is football with an added rule: when a player
scores a goal, this player joins the opposing team. When
players switch sides during a game, winning becomes a
side issue, because it is not even clear exactly who has
won. This sort of rule undercuts the competitive dynamic
and orients players to enjoying the game rather than
4 John J. Ratey with Eric Hagerman, Spark: The Revolutionary
New Science of Exercise and the Brain (New York: Little, Brown,
2008).
5 Boykoff, Power Games, pp. 60–65; James Riordan, “The
Workers’ Olympics,” in Alan Tomlinson and Garry Whannel
(eds.), Five-ring Circus: Money, Power and Politics at the
Olympic Games (London: Pluto, 1984), pp. 98–112.
6 Terry Orlick, Cooperative Games and Sports: Joyful Activities
for Everyone, 2nd edition (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics Press,
2006). More generally on the advantages of cooperation, see Alfie
Kohn, No Contest: The Case against Competition (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1986).
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winning. Many different sorts of cooperative games have
been devised and played. Few of them would serve as
vehicles for accentuating nationalism. Indeed, cooperative
games might actually help break down national identification, as players from different countries helped each other
in joint endeavours.
Tactics promoting nationalism in sports
There are several routine methods that promote nationalistic thinking and fervour in sport.7 First is exposure: the
sports, and athletes identified with countries, need to be
publicised. Commonly this happens via the media, for
example the worldwide coverage of the Olympics and the
World Cup. Note that only some sports are publicised to a
great extent. Many sports and athletes languish in obscurity, or have very limited followings. It is interesting that
some of the most widely publicised competitions, with
global coverage, involve athletes representing countries.
Second is valuing: the sports and athletes need to be
seen positively. This is almost always the case for sport.
Only a few sports, such as boxing, are stigmatised in some
circles. Elite athletes as a group are highly esteemed,
though some individuals fall from grace, especially those
exposed as cheats or who commit serious crimes. By and
large, athletes are seen as dedicated and talented, and are
lauded for their achievements.
In 2014, 26-year-old Australian cricketer Philip
Hughes was killed when hit in the head by the cricket ball
while batting. This led to a huge outpouring of grief, aided
7 See chapter 1 for the framework used for this exposition.
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by saturation media coverage. For example, some major
newspapers devoted six or more pages to the story for day
after day. It was the biggest such public grieving spectacle
since Princess Diana died in 1997. Hughes had played on
the national team and was well known to anyone who
followed Australian cricket, though he was not the
country’s most prominent cricketer. This episode showed
a confluence of valuing processes: it involved a sport that
many in Australia have seen as the traditional national
sport, and one in which the Australian team has often been
the world’s best, a young player seen as exemplary in
dedication to his craft, and a sudden drama and tragedy,
ideal for media coverage. It should be noted that some
letter-writers were sceptical of giving so much adulation
to a sportsperson, and pointed out that other people, who
had made greater sacrifices to serve the community, had
died without much media coverage. Perhaps a key factor
was that Hughes contributed towards a sense of national
identity, at least for those who followed cricket.
Nationalistic thinking is promoted using various
arguments that give a positive interpretation of countryidentified sporting competition. There is the trickle-down
argument that elite sporting success will be an inspiration
for others in the country, the economic argument that
tourism and trade will benefit from international recognition, and the status-related argument that international
prestige is tied to involvement in and success in international sport.
Another key tactic is endorsement of international
sport by governments and national sporting bodies. This
works in two ways: governments and sporting bodies
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endorse participation in international sport, and by
competing with others implicitly endorse other teams and
governments. This routine endorsement is usually unnoticed, only coming to attention when challenges are made.
From the 1960s through the 1980s, as South Africa’s
apartheid government faced increasing opposition to its
racist policies, it sought international validation through
its sporting teams. Opponents of apartheid protested
against events involving South African teams. For example, in the early 1970s, there were protests in Australia and
New Zealand against matches with the visiting the South
African rugby team. The point here is that national teams
serve as de facto ambassadors of governments, and as
emblems of national pride: endorsement of the team is
assumed.
The final tactic is rewards for joining in the glorification of athletes representing countries. The athletes themselves receive several types of rewards: the satisfaction of
achievement at the highest level (being good enough to be
selected for a national team is impressive), the prestige of
being a winner at the international level, and occasionally
financial returns from endorsements and career opportunities.
Companies can gain by associating themselves with
sports. A few are involved with sports equipment, such as
running shoes; others attach themselves to teams or
prominent athletes through sponsorship deals; yet others
benefit when a country hosts an international sporting
competition.
Governments can gain by associating themselves
with elite sports. In Australia, prime ministers sometimes
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attend sporting events, a mutually beneficial media
opportunity, and by trying to associate themselves with
sporting heroes. When hosting the Olympics, politicians
take maximum advantage of the associated international
prestige.
Finally, when identification with international sports
teams is widespread, there are rewards for ordinary
citizens: being an avid supporter of the team enables
solidarity with friends and co-workers. If nearly everyone
at the office is excited by an international match, then
those who are uninterested are safer saying nothing—and
supporting an opposing team can sometimes be awkward.
Tactics against alternatives
Alternatives to national identification in elite competitive
sport—including abolition of international competitions,
workers’ games, and cooperative sports—are seldom
mentioned. So it might be said that a key tactic against
these alternatives is cover-up, except that so few people
advocate such alternatives that active efforts to suppress
information are hardly necessary.
International elite competitive sport has become
hegemonic: it seems part of everyday reality. Those who
are not interested in sports ignore the issue, and few of
those interested in sports spend much time promoting
alternatives. Meanwhile, young athletes see participation
in a national team as an aspiration.
Then there are tactics to challenge nationalism in
sports. This does not mean supporting a foreign team,
because this doesn’t question the importance of national
identification of some kind. Let’s consider some more
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frontal challenges. One is to denigrate international
competitions, for example by exposing corruption,
cheating and damaging side-effects. There is certainly
plenty of critical material about the Olympics, for example
exposés by journalists about the machinations of the International Olympic Committee.8 Activists in host cities have
tried to oppose the repressive and damaging measures
used by governments to control the image portrayed about
the games, for example moving homeless people out of
urban areas and implementing harsh security measures.9
Every four years, a fresh crop of critics of the games
emerges, especially in the host city. However, only a
portion of their activity is directed against Olympics in
general, or against the nationalistic dimensions of the
games. Furthermore, in between Olympic years, there is
little activity critical of the games or their patriotic
dimensions. Possible tactics for challengers include exposing shortcomings and abuses (and plenty have been
documented), denigrating the Games, explaining what is
wrong with them, and mobilising protests.
There is one major obstacle to direct criticisms of any
international sport: it is easy for others to say that this is
8 Andrew Jennings, The New Lords of the Rings: Olympic
Corruption and How to Buy Gold Medals (London: Pocket
Books, 1996).
9 Jules Boykoff, Activism and the Olympics: Dissent at the
Games in Vancouver and London (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 2014); Helen Jefferson Lenskyj, Inside the
Olympic Industry: Power, Politics, and Activism (Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 2000).
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criticism of athletes. Elite athletes are sometimes treated
as almost sacred: when they are unblemished in their
personal and professional lives, they are considered
beyond criticism. To question elite sport may be taken to
imply, “You’ve been putting incredible effort into
something that’s not all that worthwhile.”
Rather than mount a campaign against elite international sport, probably a better strategy is to promote
alternatives—and there are many who do this. Increasing
public participation in sport is a worthy alternative task,
with well-documented benefits for health, personal
satisfaction and social interaction. It would seem a
reasonable step to argue that government expenditure
should be redirected away from elite sport towards greater
public participation. Cooperative sports—rather than
competitive ones—are a complementary alternative, and
might be promoted as a way of getting people to think of
the disadvantages of competition.
Finally, there is another option: simply paying no
attention to elite competitive sport, especially its nationalistic dimensions. Many people are already uninterested,
but often they are polite about it. This could be encouraged, so that avid sports-watching is seen as uncool, or
simply boring. This is already the case in some circles.
Whether this could be the basis for something broader
remains to be seen.
Conclusion
Sport can serve as a tool to promote nationalism. To do
this effectively, participants need to be representatives of
countries, so that engagement in the sport can be inter-
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preted as a national enterprise. The sports need to be
competitive, allowing individuals and teams representing
countries to engage with those from other countries, so
there is national honour involved in what would otherwise
just be a contest between athletes. Ideally, the competitors
are elite performers, without moral blemish, encouraging
citizens to identify with the athletes representing their
country. By glorifying national sporting heroes, especially
winners, identification with one’s country is encouraged,
while governments bask in reflected prestige.
The role of these various components of international
sport can be seen by imagining alternatives. A global fun
run, in which participants are identified by some arbitrary
characteristic such as birthday or height, would not
provide much fodder for nationalism. A cooperative game,
with participants joining for a common goal such as
keeping a ball aloft, might foster a sense of international
cooperation. A competition between non-elite performers—for example a swimming contest involving several
presidents and prime ministers—would be more an
amusement than a source of national identification, with
internal opponents of any given president likely to support
others.
Ironically, it is the seeming neutrality and nonpolitical status of sport that makes it such a potent tool for
national identification. Because sporting contests seem to
be separate from politics and instead as places of moral
virtue where the best athletes win, they are attractive to
viewers, allowing them to identify with their preferred
individuals or teams—and national identification comes as
part of the package.
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Because elite international competitive sports are so
highly entrenched, it is difficult to challenge them. Direct
criticism has a role, but perhaps more effective in the long
run is promotion of alternatives, including mass participation in physical activity and cooperative sport.

6
Spying and surveillance
Spies: are they good guys or bad guys? The answer is
easy: the spies on our side are good whereas the spies on
their side are the worst of the worst.
Spying and surveillance are tricky for governments
because of secrecy and obvious double standards. Let’s
look at some of the aspects and complications.
Spying on foreign enemies is the easiest case: it’s
assumed to be a good thing. However, to be effective,
spying needs to be done covertly, so it’s hard to praise
spies in public. Furthermore, spying in general is often
seen as a bit devious, so governments seldom boast that,
“We have the best spies.” Even mentioning the existence
of current spies is a bit risky.
One solution is to praise past spying operations, done
for a good cause. An example involves the Enigma
machine, built in Britain during World War II to break
Nazi secret codes. Breaking into codes is a type of spying,
done at a distance, though it is perhaps better called
surveillance. The story of the Enigma machine has been
told in books and films, including the 2014 film The
Imitation Game. It portrayed some British military figures
unfavourably, with commanders being contemptuous of
mathematicians and, after the war, showing serious bias
against Alan Turing because he was gay. But this
portrayal was in the overall context of the assumption that
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breaking German codes was a gallant, militarily crucial
endeavour.
Very few people have personal experience of spying,
or have even talked to a spy about what they do on the job.
Consequently, ideas about spying are largely shaped by
media coverage, much of it fictional in novels and films.
In the widely read novels by John Le Carré, most of them
set during the cold war, the world of spies is deceptive and
morally challenging, with agents, double agents and
double crossing. Overall the impression is that spying is
somewhat disreputable. Indeed, spying requires lying, and
thus has a taint about it.
Perhaps for this reason, as well as operational secrecy, governments say little about their own current
spies. But when it comes to foreign spies, it is another
matter: they are mightily condemned. (In practice, many
foreign spies are monitored but never exposed; some are
quietly expelled.) A few are arrested, tried and given long
prison sentences, worse than if they had committed
murder.
The most severe condemnation is reserved for insiders who serve the enemy: citizens, who are supposed to be
loyal, who sell secrets or, even worse, reveal secrets
because they believe in the cause of the enemy. Spying is
cast into the mould of us versus them.
However, old-fashioned spying using agents has long
been superseded by signals intelligence, which involves
surveillance of electronic communications. All sorts of
sophisticated techniques are used to monitor phone calls,
emails and every form of electronic communication.
Mostly this goes on in secrecy by all involved. Occasion-
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ally, though, there are stories about foreign dangers, for
example hacking into databases by agents on behalf of
North Korea or China. Because of secrecy, media stories
are untrustworthy. Foreign governments seldom fess up
saying “Yes, we were trying to access your vital data.”
Informed observers are wary: media stories may be due to
strategic leaks intended to serve political objectives.
Some ways to refer to an agency
National security
This is the most serious-sounding
agency
terminology, implying grave
responsibility. This is the most
overtly state-oriented expression.
Intelligence
The word “intelligence” has
organisation
positive connotations because of
the more common usages of the
word, so this is a favoured
expression by supporters of these
organisations.
Surveillance
This emphasises a potentially
operation
negative side to agency activities.
Spy agency
This has negative connotations,
given that spying is often seen as
somewhat underhanded.
Secret police or
These terms highlight the capacity
political police
for political repression, and point to
a connection with dictatorial
regimes.
The spooks
This is an informal, humorous term.
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A lot of surveillance is about economic information,
for example trade secrets, designs and plans. Supposedly
every government with suitable capacities does this, but it
is usually kept secret. Occasionally there are popular cries
to stop foreigners from “stealing our secrets,” as though
only foreigners engage in commercial espionage.
Then comes the most challenging surveillance of all:
a government spying on its own citizens. In police states,
this is a means of keeping control by monitoring dissent.
In the former East Germany, the Stasi—the feared secret
police—received information from one out of ten citizens
in one of the most pervasive monitoring systems ever
known. In the west, this sort of surveillance is condemned,
so it is not surprising that western governments’ own surveillance of their citizens is carried out in utmost secrecy.
Thinking in terms of in-groups and out-groups, there
are two sets of processes going on here. Governments seek
to build loyalty by encouraging citizens to think of
themselves being part of a loyal in-group, and can foster
this by creating, exaggerating or stigmatising out-groups.
Foreign enemies are prime candidates for being outgroups and for bolstering in-group solidarity. Terrorists
serve the same function, especially when they are seen as
foreign or alien. But what if some of the “enemy” are
actually part of “us”? This makes things trickier. The
internal enemy could be communists, capitalists, ethnic
groups, religious groups and so on. The risk to the government is that its own agents, including ones undertaking
surveillance, will come to be seen as the enemy.
Consider the former Soviet Union, in which people
were encouraged to report family members who were
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enemies of the state. For those who did this, one reward
was greater identification with the state: for them, the outgroup was class enemies. But for others, family loyalties
were greater, and attempts by the government to encourage spying caused questioning of the state itself: for them,
the state became an out-group.
Only in some circumstances can groups create loyalty
that outweighs all competing loyalties. One of the reasons
for the celibacy of priests in the Catholic Church is that it
removes a competing source of loyalty: wives and
children. Some cults require celibacy whereas others break
down personal loyalties by expecting or mandating sexual
relations with many different partners.1 Governments have
seldom been able to break down family loyalty; when they
try, they risk being seen as the enemy of the people.
The governments of Australia, Britain, Canada, New
Zealand and the US for decades had an intelligencesharing arrangement called the Five Eyes agreement.
Secret monitoring stations were set up to collect every
possible electronic communication, and software developed to search the resulting data. This operation was so
secret that its existence was hidden from the public, and
even its name, Echelon, was secret.
New Zealand campaigner Nicky Hager made the first
major breakthrough. Through conversations with workers
at the facility at Waihopai run by the Government
Communications Security Bureau, the New Zealand
government’s signals intelligence agency, he gradually
1 Lewis A. Coser, Greedy Institutions: Patterns of Undivided
Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1974).
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pieced together more and more information. The more
information he obtained, the more he was able to suggest
he knew more than he did, and thereby gather additional
information. His 1996 book Secret Power2 became well
known among those who followed the machinations of
government spy agencies, who also read James Bamford’s
The Puzzle Palace about the US National Security Agency
and related exposés.3 Hager’s discoveries received some
publicity when in the late 1990s repression-technology
expert Steve Wright wrote about the Echelon surveillance
system in a report to the European Parliament.4
Wider public awareness of massive western government surveillance of their own citizens did not occur until
Edward Snowden’s massive leak of documents from the
US National Security Agency—the lynchpin agency in the
Five Eyes agreement—hit the news in 2013.5 Snowden’s
amazingly detailed information overshadowed previous
2 Nicky Hager, Secret Power: New Zealand’s Role in the International Spy Network (Nelson, New Zealand: Craig Potton, 1996).
3 James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America’s
Most Secret Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).
4 Steve Wright, “The Echelon trail: an illegal vision,” Surveillance & Society, Vol. 3, Nos. 2/3, 2005, pp. 198–215.
5 For informative accounts, see Glenn Greenwald, No Place to
Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the Surveillance State
(Hamish Hamilton 2014); Michael Gurnow, The Edward
Snowden Affair: Exposing the Politics and Media Behind the NSA
Scandal (Blue River Press, 2014); Luke Harding, The Snowden
Files: The Inside Story of the World’s Most Wanted Man
(Guardian Books 2014).
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findings, which were for the most part forgotten or
ignored. The evidence was clear: massive government
surveillance, carried out in supposedly democratic countries, was standard practice, not only against foreign
enemies but also against ordinary citizens. It was bad
when done by the East German Stasi. Why was it okay in
the US?
Whereas previously the spying had been kept out of
the public eye, not just for operational reasons but to
prevent outrage, now it needed to be explained and
justified. For governments and their apologists, a series of
rationales emerged. One was to attack the messenger,
calling Snowden a traitor. Another was to say, as had been
said many times before, “If you’ve got nothing to hide,
you have nothing to fear,” implying that only criminals
and terrorists should be concerned about government
surveillance. There are many replies to this presumption in
the form of a question. One of the easiest is to say, “In that
case, please give me your credit card numbers and
passwords.”6
Governments can try to justify surveillance through
the usual us-versus-them dichotomy, assuming surveillance is entirely against enemies of the state and people.
The trouble is that many citizens start distrusting the state
itself. This is apparent in the popularity of 9/11 conspiracy
theories. Setting aside the question of whether President
George W. Bush or other US officials actually had
6 Actually, the issues are more complicated than this. See Daniel
J. Solove, Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy
and Security (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).
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anything to do with the planning or execution of the
attacks on 11 September 2001, that so many people
believe they might have suggests a deep-seated distrust of
the US government.
Then there is the role of US spy agencies in other
countries: they often team up with repressive governments, in particular with security forces involved in
surveillance, arrests, torture and killings. For example,
rage in Egypt against President Hosni Mubarak, who
stepped down in 2011 following massive protests, was in
part directed against his ruthless security apparatus and, by
association, US partners.7 So there is an international
dimension to outrage over spying on citizens: when
governments share intelligence information against alleged enemies, this can undermine trust among citizens
who know about it.
Secrecy and surveillance
Scott Horton in his book Lords of Secrecy provides a
powerful indictment of secrecy in US agencies involved in
spying and surveillance. Horton argues that public discussion is essential for a democratic society, citing the
example of ancient Athens, where citizens were involved
in important decisions, including about security, namely
going to war. Ancient Athens was successful in relation to
its more authoritarian rivals, such as Sparta, because it was
a “knowledge-based democracy,” gaining strength from
7 Scott Horton, Lords of Secrecy: The National Security Elite and
America’s Stealth Warfare (New York: Nation Books, 2015), p.
157.
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sharing and debating ideas from many individuals and
sectors of society.
Horton traces the rise of excess secrecy in the US to
the emergence after World War II of the national security
elites, who dealt with nuclear weapons development and
the challenge from the Soviet Union. He says the problem
of unaccountable power was recognised by President
Harry Truman and senior advisers who set up the Central
Intelligence Agency; they established oversight mechanisms via the legislative branch of government, namely
Congress. However, according to Horton, the huge size
and resources of the spy agencies, combined with their use
of secrecy, before long overwhelmed and captured their
congressional overseers. Secrecy became a tool to build
bureaucratic empires, to hide failures and to carry out
policies without scrutiny.
The next sector of society with the potential to
restrain the agencies was the media, but the US mass
media became tools of the state, being reluctant to break
stories about any sort of abuse, for the example the 1968
My Lai massacre in Vietnam or the torture at Abu Ghraib
prison revealed in 2004. So, according to Horton, the one
remaining group with the potential to challenge unaccountable secrecy is whistleblowers, who have become a
target for suppression.
Horton’s analysis points to the powerful role of
secrecy in agencies involved in spying and in undeclared
war, in particular the use of drones for extra-judicial
assassination. Secrecy can become an end in itself. Horton
himself is not making an argument against surveillance or
drones or wars. He just wants there to be an open discus-
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sion so that better informed decisions, with support from
politicians and the public, can be made.
This is enough background to indicate the complexities of spying and surveillance in relation to building
loyalty to the state. Basically, the government has to
pursue seemingly contradictory directions, maintaining
secrecy for operational reasons and to hide corruption and
abuses, while somehow convincing members of the public
that monitoring them is for their benefit.
In the following sections, I first outline tactics to
build loyalty to the state in relation to spying and surveillance, then tactics against alternatives to the standard
approach, and finally tactics to challenge surveillance.
Tactics to build loyalty
The first tactic is exposure of good things about the state.
Here the challenge is the greatest. The safest approach is
to expose only achievements, such as spying successes in
past wars and successes in preventing terrorism. However,
this has to be done carefully so as to suggest that bad guys
are the only targets. By carefully picking stories to release,
and angles on those stories, the aim is to encourage people
to value the role of intelligence services, positioning them
as protectors of the population.
Their role is explained as a necessary function of
maintaining security. Part of the explanation involves
suitable framing. Rather than refer to spying and surveillance, the usual language is of intelligence and national
security.
Governments routinely endorse their intelligence
agencies, and reward them generously with good salaries
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and conditions, as part of ample budgets that signify the
importance of their task.
In these ways, governments try to build citizen
loyalty to the agents of control. However, compared to
many other areas—museums, elections, sport, education,
media—the task is greater because spying itself is often
seen as a shady sort of activity, involving deception and
underhanded methods. It’s a bad method of achieving a
good goal, and the negative associations with the method
tend to rub off on the goal. So for many governments, the
less said the better. Justifications are only brought forth
when the issue has been publicised or when arguing for
greater resources. Their ideal technique is to condemn
spying by other governments and hope that no one even
thinks about their own spying.
Marginalising alternatives
Are there any alternatives to the usual government spying?
This is a difficult question to answer, because there is so
little discussion of alternatives. Let’s consider some possibilities.
One alternative is to say there should be no spying at
all. This is easy to challenge, because the bad guys—
foreign governments—are spying on us, so we need to spy
on them. So the no-spying option is usually posed as,
“There should be no spying on our own people.” This is
actually a radical alternative in countries where the
government is repressive and nearly all surveillance is
against internal opponents. To this option, governments
regularly use the method of fear-mongering, raising the
alarm about terrorists, communists, traitors, heretics or
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others who threaten the fabric of society, in other words
the government.
There are, in some cases, actual opponents who pose
some danger to the public: terrorists and criminals for
example. Such opponents are valuable for governments
because they help justify spying on everyone. For the
moment, assume there are legitimate reasons for surveillance. How should it be done?
The usual approach is to have a system but make sure
it is under legitimate political control, for example with
scrutiny by elected politicians, who supposedly serve as
agents of the public. The trouble is that spy agencies
become too powerful and can win over their political
masters, invoking the necessity of secrecy to ensure that
effective controls are seldom invoked. On a more nasty
level, spy agencies can collect dirt on politicians, implicitly threatening to covertly release the information. The
FBI under J. Edgar Hoover supposedly engaged in this
sort of blackmail. It is the sort of technique used by criminal organisations: demand participation in crime and then
use the possibility of exposure to deter disloyalty.
So what about alternatives that involve something
completely different? One possibility is promoting social
justice. Rather than spying on opponents, instead address
the sources of their grievances. This is good for a longterm view, but does not address the possibility of immediate threats.
One alternative is to introduce a “citizens inspectorate,” namely citizens who have the power to check
what spy agencies are doing and to make reports and
recommendations. To be effective, a citizen inspectorate
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would need to be sizeable and have a significant turnover
to prevent capture by the agencies.
Some agencies already have an oversight body or
individual, for example an inspector-general to whom
complaints can be made by employees or members of the
public. The trouble with such systems is that they usually
become closely aligned with the agency, the same problem
that occurs with legislative oversight.
If citizen inspectors were randomly chosen and
served short terms, they would be less likely to be able to
bought off or intimidated: some of them might be
independent enough to make probing assessments and
discourage abuses.
Agency heads would detest such a proposal, no doubt
arguing that citizen inspectors, lacking security clearances,
could not be allowed to know what agencies are doing.
This objection is the familiar claim that secrecy prevents
scrutiny.
Another alternative would be to set up a secure avenue for leaks from agencies. By analogy with WikiLeaks,
it might be called SpyLeaks. This would enable abuses to
be exposed with less likelihood of reprisals. Then comes
the question of who would have access to the leaks.
Perhaps legislators, or citizen inspectors, or even the
general public.
Given the efforts of the US government to shut down
WikiLeaks, it is obvious that SpyLeaks would never get
off the ground. If it were ever implemented by agencies
themselves, it might well have a back door so that agency
officials could identify the leakers.
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Giliam de Valk and I wrote an article about “publicly
shared intelligence.”8 Giliam in his PhD research compared the performance of the Dutch intelligence services,
which operated with the usual secrecy, with a very different sort of intelligence operation: the Shipping Research
Bureau. The Bureau operated at the time of apartheid in
South Africa, when there was an international embargo of
oil imports as a form of pressure against the regime.
However, some companies broke the embargo, sending
their ships surreptitiously to deliver oil to South Africa.
The Bureau sought to collect information about these
rogue traders and expose them, thereby shaming the
companies.
The Bureau used secrecy in some aspects of its
collection and analysis of data. Individuals sent the Bureau
information about ships, and it sought to verify this information, but did not release the names of its informants.
But the Bureau’s reports were public. Unlike spy agencies,
it made its assessments available for scrutiny.
Giliam in his research found that the Bureau’s reports
were far more accurate than reports of the Dutch intelligence agencies. Publicly shared intelligence apparently
had an advantage. This was what you might expect: open
scrutiny improves quality. The same thing happens in
science. The quality of the open scientific literature, which
is subject to peer review before publication and available
for scrutiny by anyone after publication, is widely
8 Giliam de Valk and Brian Martin, “Publicly shared intelligence,” First Monday: Peer-reviewed Journal on the Internet,
Vol. 11, No. 9, September 2006.

90

Ruling tactics

regarded as superior to secret corporate or government
research. Similarly, open source software, in which the
code is publicly available for scrutiny, is usually superior
to proprietary software.
Publicly shared intelligence thus offers an alternative
to the usual government surveillance. By drawing on the
resources of the entire population both for inputs and
evaluation of assessments, this form of intelligence would
have the advantages of open source alternatives. (We
didn’t call it open source intelligence because that name
was already used for a different alternative: intelligence
drawing on openly accessible information, but lacking the
open scrutiny essential for quality control.)
Publicly shared intelligence would be a frontal challenge to conventional intelligence operations built around
secrecy. As expected, there has been no government
interest in this alternative. For all practical purposes, it is
invisible. No government has sought to test it.
From this brief discussion of ways to provide
stronger oversight of spy agencies, it should be obvious
that agencies will do nothing to publicise options that
enable significant independent citizen involvement, much
less actually implement them.
Challenging government surveillance
A key method of challenging surveillance is to expose it.
Secrecy serves spy agencies by hiding abuses and failures.
The bigger the abuse, usually the greater the secrecy.
Whistleblowers, leakers, investigators and journalists
play crucial roles. Edward Snowden revealed unparalleled
amounts of inside information. He was highly effective
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because he kept a low profile until he had gathered the
information. (He kept his plans secret.) He then carefully
chose a journalist and media outlet—Glenn Greenwald of
the Guardian—to whom to release the information. When
Greenwald wasn’t responsive, Snowden contacted Laura
Poitras, a dissident filmmaker and friend of Greenwald’s,
and arranged to meet them. Snowden chose well: the
Guardian’s editors refused to buckle to pressures from the
National Security Agency and its British equivalent, and
went ahead with exposé after exposé.
Another exposure technique is to reveal the identities
and activities of spies. The magazine CovertAction
Information Bulletin beginning in 1978 published the
names of a number of CIA agents. So effective was this
outing that in 1982 the US Congress passed a law making
such disclosures illegal and subject to severe penalties.
This response suggests the power of exposure: spies aim
to gather information about others but they don’t want
information gathered about themselves: their efforts rely
on secrecy and deception, for example false identities.
Today, it is far easier to collect and publish information. Citizens with digital cameras can record police
use of force as it happens, in many cases exposing abuses
that in previous decades would have been hidden from the
public. Similarly, recording of the identities and activities
of spies can be a powerful technique.
Another important technique is to counter the
justifications for surveillance. This is a big area. One
technique used by agencies is to lie about the value of
information gathered, for example in preventing terrorist
attacks. Critics can expose the failures of agencies, for
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example in not picking up on clues about the 9/11 attacks
or not anticipating the Arab spring. There were important
failures decades ago too, for example the falsity of the
alleged “missile gap” between the US and Soviet nuclear
arsenals in the late 1950s, and the failure to anticipate the
collapse of communist regimes in 1989. These were all
failures of US agencies; there would be equivalent
shortcomings in agencies in other countries that need to be
exposed and criticised.
Next is the issue of official channels. Many governments establish laws and regulators for privacy protection.
In practice, though, these seldom do much to control
surveillance operations. Indeed, there is a body of writing
on how privacy protection is routinely outflanked by
technological developments and rogue operations.9 What
does privacy legislation do in the face of ever-expanding
use of security cameras? What about revenge porn, when
people post sexual images of former sexual partners?
What about the Five Eyes surveillance of citizens?
Most employees tasked with enforcing privacy laws
and regulations do their best, and no doubt many
worthwhile protections have been implemented. But this is
a losing effort in the face of an onslaught of monitoring
capacities, including ones where people voluntarily offer
information that potentially can be used against them,
mostly in social media, also subject to monitoring and
analysis by governments.
9 For example, Simon Davies, Monitor: Extinguishing Privacy on
the Information Superhighway (Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 1996),
chapter 6.
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Rather than rely on privacy protection to limit
surveillance, a more promising approach is to mobilise
support, indeed to build a social movement. But despite
people’s serious concerns about government surveillance
and many abuses, there is little sign of the development of
a broad-based anti-surveillance movement.
There are many initiatives. The group Anonymous
has taken direct action online in support of WikiLeaks.
There are many supporters and users of encryption who
oppose efforts by US government officials to mandate
backdoors to encryption systems using the rationale of
needing to be able to track down terrorists. Then there are
software developers and entrepreneurs making accessible
the means to avoid surveillance. These include the developers and promoters of the Tor browser, search engines
like duckduckgo that do not record searches, convenient
encryption systems and anonymous remailers, among
others. A basic test is to ask, “Would this system be useful
to dissidents in a repressive regime?” If it is, then it is
probably worth promoting everywhere, including in
countries where governments ostensibly respect civil
liberties, because when it comes to surveillance, lots of
governments are seeking powers that can easily be used to
suppress dissent—and quite possibly are, given the
secrecy involved in the whole system.
Part of challenging surveillance is resisting it, and
that is not easy in a world with ubiquitous monitoring. It’s
possible to keep a low profile, but this might involve
considerable inconvenience, for example not having a
credit card, not driving (in areas where vehicle licence
numbers are monitored) and not using a mobile phone.
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Another form of resistance is to insert incorrect information into databases, for example “accidentally” using a
slightly different birthday or address for different databases, or perhaps some politician’s phone number.
Although this can make it more difficult to collate data
about you—you may end up with lots of nearly identical
but slightly different versions of yourself on databases—it
does little about surveillance more generally. Fake profiles
on Facebook, Google and other platforms are common,
many of them manufactured and sold to enhance the
buyer’s online image.
Because remaining outside routine surveillance is so
difficult, and putting false information into databases
usually has a marginal impact, probably a better form of
resistance is to make public statements or otherwise protest surveillance openly. Some opponents set out to disable
security cameras. Others perform colourful protests in
front of the cameras for the delectation of operators.
Spying and patriotism revisited
There are various ways to oppose spying operations, but
how do these relate to state power? To start, much
surveillance is undertaken by the state, so opposition
directly challenges state power. Other surveillance is
undertaken by companies, for commercial purposes. Facebook and Google collect information about users to better
direct advertisements, the lifeblood of their operations.
However, as Snowden’s leaks revealed, spy agencies use
various means to tap into private information streams.
Probably just as importantly, private data collection
makes people become used to exposing their lives online,
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without thinking about how data is being collected by
banks, phone companies and social media companies.
Surveillance is increasingly seen as normal, as nothing
much to worry about. When people regularly reveal details
about their lives to anonymous companies and government
agencies, they are likely to come up with rationalisations
to justify what they do. This helps explain why antisurveillance has not become a major social movement.
However, governments are still caught in their own
contradictions. They undertake surveillance, but want to
keep it secret and therefore have difficulty justifying it
when it is exposed. They want to make people believe that
all spying is on bad guys, but then are exposed spying on
their own citizens. So they point to the dangers of criminals and terrorists, but at the risk of becoming tainted by
their association with internal spying, often associated
with repressive regimes.
Government thus can have a hard time finding the
optimal balance between hiding and justifying their spying
operations. Surveillance is not a good means for them to
drum up support. Opponents can use the inherent contradictions in state surveillance in mobilising resistance, but
have their own challenges in trying to get people to care
enough to act, given the gradual encroachment of datagathering methods and the immediate benefits to individuals in acquiescing to this data-gathering.
Perhaps the most powerful technique is to use the
expanded capacities for collecting data against government agencies themselves. Already, police are changing
their behaviour because of the ubiquity of cameras
recording their actions. Perhaps government officials may
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decide to change their operations if they start becoming
the target of citizen surveillance.

7
Terrorism
On 15 December 2014, a man named Man Haron Monis
took hostage a group of patrons at the Lindt café in Martin
Place, in downtown Sydney. The police Tactical Response
Group was called. There was a stand-off lasting over 16
hours. In the dramatic climax of the siege, Monis killed
one of the hostages, the police stormed the café, another
hostage was killed (probably by a stray police bullet) and
so was Monis.
This event received saturation coverage in the media,
with continuous television treatments and page upon page
in the daily newspapers. After the siege was over, there
was an outpouring of sympathy for the two hostages who
died, with Martin Place being covered with thousands of
bouquets.
The siege seemed to unite people in support of the
state.1 The prime minister, Tony Abbott, took a strong
stand against Monis’ action and in support of the police,
and the federal opposition leader, Bill Shorten, backed
him to the hilt.

1 Paul H. Weaver, News and the Culture of Lying (New York:
Free Press, 1994), makes the point that news is oriented to crisis,
thereby promoting crisis government, giving greater power to the
executive and removing power from routine decision-making
processes.
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Was it a terrorist incident? This was debated in the
aftermath. Monis certainly was not a typical terrorist, and
was not part of any group making demands. The most
common view was that he was a “disturbed” individual,
with a long history of crimes and strange behaviour.
Association with Monis was toxic politically. Some
years earlier, the New South Wales opposition leader,
John Robertson, had written a letter in support of Monis,
who was a constituent. Although this was nothing special
at the time, after the siege it was deemed sufficient to
trigger a push for Robertson to resign.
Whether or not Monis’ siege counts as terrorism, it
served much the same function—from the point of view of
the state. It illustrates how terrorism serves the state. US
President George W. Bush, in the aftermath of the 11
September 2001 terrorist attacks, declared, “You are either
with us or with them [the terrorists].”2
The state is normally considered to include the
government, various government agencies, and perhaps
government-owned businesses. The eminent sociologist
Max Weber defined the state as the governing entity
claiming a monopoly over the use of legitimate violence—
legitimate in the eyes of the state. “Legitimate violence”
here refers to the police and military. Armed challenges to
the state are considered illegitimate, and are to be
repressed without reservations.
The basis for the legitimacy of the state is that it
protects the population against threats, most dramatically
the threat of invasion, conquest and subjugation. In times
2 See also the discussion of this quote in chapter 8 on language.
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of war, the power of the state increases dramatically in
order to defend the population—and the state itself.
Terrorism provides a substitute for war in terms of
mobilising support for the state. Citizens identify with the
government and look to it for protection. If “War is the
health of the state,” terrorism is a booster shot.3
Why is terrorism so effective in boosting state
power? After all, many people die every day, for various
reasons. Some die from disease; some are killed in traffic
accidents; some are murdered; some kill themselves.
Furthermore, in most places these and other dangers cause
far more deaths than terrorism. In many countries, traffic
accidents kill hundreds or thousands of people per year,
and many could be prevented by safer roads or by
diverting travellers to safer modes of transport, such as
trains. After 9/11, many US travellers avoided planes and
drove instead. Because driving is much riskier than flying,
the death rate from travelling accidents increased, perhaps
raising the death toll by more than the 9/11 attacks
themselves.4
It is worthwhile, therefore, looking at the mechanisms by which terrorism serves to generate support for
the state.5 The first tactic is exposure. A siege in a café,
3 Randolph Bourne famously said, “War is the health of the
state.” See chapter 13.
4 Gerd Gigerenzer, “Dread risk, September 11, and fatal traffic
accidents,” Psychological Science, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2003, pp. 286–
287.
5 The exposition here presents the system-support tactics outlined
in chapter 1.
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with hostages, is ideal fodder for media coverage. It has
drama, danger and an enemy, with police as the saviours,
providing a story that combines fear and potential reassurance. Traffic accidents and heart attacks seldom offer such
a compelling narrative.
In large part, terrorism obtains media coverage
because it is designed to do so. Some analysts have
described terrorism as “communication amplified by
violence.”6 The goal of what is conventionally called
terrorism is to capture public attention. The victims of the
terrorists are not the actual targets, but tools to generate
attention. The media come calling and provide the conduit
for gaining awareness from the wider public.
Terrorist attacks provide an ideal opportunity for
agents of the state—police or the military—to be heroes.
They respond to the threat, becoming the protectors of the
population. In this way, protection of the state becomes
fused with protection of the population. The state is seen
as the guardian of public safety. Terrorists are cast as
villains, as pure evil. For the purposes of the state, the
terrorists need to be evil, so a classic morality play is
enacted. Humanising the terrorists—seeing them as

6 Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media (London:
Sage, 1982). See also Brigitte L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated
Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and
Counterterrorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002);
Joseph S. Tuman, Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical
Dimensions of Terrorism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003).
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regular people, perhaps even fighting for their ideals—
would confuse the message.
Terrorism is usually explained to the population in
simple terms: the bad guys, the terrorists, are trying to
harm “us” and destroy “our” way of life.7 Other factors are
ignored or skated over, such as the harm or injustice that
might have created grievances (especially harm done by
the state itself), the double standards involved in ignoring
state terrorism (discussed later), or that there might be
better ways to deter or discredit terrorism. Official
explanations for terrorism almost never mention that if
suitable opportunities for citizens to express their views
existed, many grievances would evaporate. In cases of socalled “international terrorism,” almost always there are
“international grievances”—government involvement in
foreign countries, such as invasions, occupations, corporate exploitation or drone attacks—for which no opportunities for citizen participation in decision-making exist.
The most important technique by which terrorism is
interpreted by the state is framing, usually in a Hollywood
template with the government as the good guys and the
terrorists as the bad guys, with the only way for the good
guys to win being through superior force. With this way of
thinking, terrorism provides an unquestionable justification for state violence.
Anti-terrorism is enshrined through laws and regulations. In this way, the state indicates that terrorists are the
official enemy, and that opposing terrorism is legally
7 Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, Why Do People Hate
America? (Cambridge: Icon, 2002).
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mandated. Indeed, anyone who does not go along with this
agenda might be caught up in anti-terrorism laws and
regulations. The connection between anti-terrorism laws
and patriotism is most obvious in the US Patriot Act, an
anti-terrorism law passed after 9/11. The acronym8 is
intended to indicate that anti-terrorism is patriotic.
The state’s agencies usually give a stamp of approval
for anti-terrorism policies, with the main debates occurring within a narrow band of disagreement of how unrestrained agencies can be. A whole range of agencies may
be involved: government executives, parliaments, courts,
the military, police, spy agencies, and corporate contractors. By going along with government anti-terrorism
agendas, they help legitimise them.
Finally, anti-terrorism is imposed on the population
through repressive measures, including extensive surveillance, interrogations, arrests and show trials. Vocally
opposing the government’s anti-terrorism agenda may be
enough to trigger targeted surveillance, harassment (for
example, extra screening at airports), denial of jobs, or
worse. Imposing penalties, formal or informal, for being
critical of anti-terrorism discourages dissent. On the other
hand, those who enthusiastically join in the anti-terrorism
chorus may be rewarded with jobs, promotions, research
funding and media opportunities. Conspicuous patriotism,
via anti-terrorism, can pay.
8 The USA PATRIOT Act stands for Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act.
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Thus in a range of ways, governments can mobilise
support by drumming up concern about terrorism. The
irony is that terrorists play right into the government’s
hands.
Terrorism backfire
A physical attack on civilians is a powerful method of
gaining attention. As noted earlier, it is a mode of
communication, using violence against civilians to send a
message to a broad audience, with special salience for
governments.
Normally, when groups do something seen as unfair,
or just bad, they try to reduce public outrage by hiding
their actions, disparaging the targets, explaining away
their actions, using official channels to give a stamp of
approval, and intimidating or rewarding people involved.
Although harming innocent civilians is widely seen as
reprehensible, do terrorists use any of these methods to
reduce outrage? Quite the contrary: terrorists routinely try
to increase outrage.9
The most powerful terrorist actions are open rather
than hidden. Bombings or shootings are done in public.
Sometimes terrorists film and publicise their atrocities, for
example beheadings. They often try to maximise media
coverage. The 9/11 attacks were highly successful, occurring in broad daylight for all to see, targeting icons of US
capitalism and the state. Individual terrorists may try to
9 Many of the ideas here are addressed in Brian Martin, Justice
Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2007), chapter 12.
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hide their identity, but usually their organisations take
responsibility for acts. That is the whole point: terrorists
are trying to gain attention through the use of violence.
Terrorists can do little to reduce public outrage from
their acts. They have minimal capacity to devalue their
targets or to use official channels to give an appearance of
justice. They seldom have access to sympathetic media to
reinterpret their acts by lying about what they have done,
blaming others, or minimising the consequences. Indeed,
they are just as likely to exaggerate the impact.
So it seems that terrorists do everything possible to
generate outrage over their actions. They almost seem to
want to make violence backfire against them, generating
greater disgust and opposition. How then can terrorism be
considered a rational strategy? The one plausible explanation is that terrorists hope their opponents, who are much
stronger, will over-react, use excessive state violence and
trigger greater resistance to the government. Other explanations involve processes that are less functional for
achieving the explicit goals of the terrorists. Terrorism can
be an expression of resentment, getting back at detested
governments or officials. It can build in-group solidarity,
and attract new followers, through a type of initiation, but
at the expense of generating greater opposition at the same
time. Most terrorist acts are carried out by men; using
violence can be a way of asserting male superiority and
excluding most women.
Whatever the reasons, anti-state terrorism serves the
state, so there is a mutually reinforcing interaction
between states and their violent opponents, with neither
side having much incentive to search for alternatives. Yet,
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if terrorism is considered purely in functional terms,
namely being effective in achieving its goals, then
nonviolent alternatives would be far superior in most
cases. But for states, terrorists provide the ideal opponents,
offering a rationale for their own violence.
The words “terrorism” and “terrorist” are widely used
as if they have a clear meaning. I have used them here to
refer to the use of violence against civilians by non-state
groups, with al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks as a prime example.
However, looking more closely at the concept of terrorism
soon generates confusion.10 There are actually dozens of
different definitions. Furthermore, governments seldom
bother with academic definitions, but simply label their
opponents terrorists. The US government, fighting in
Vietnam, labelled the National Liberation Front,
commonly called the Viet Cong, as terrorists. In South
Africa under the racist system of apartheid, the government labelled its opponents, the African National
Congress, as terrorists. In the Philippines, the government
labels its armed opponents, engaged in a rebellion in rural
areas, as terrorists. In India, Maoist rebels fight the
government in parts of the country; the government calls
them terrorists. But in these conflicts, governments often
10 See Conor Geerty, The Future of Terrorism (London: Phoenix,
1997) for a critique of the expression “terrorism” as originally
referring to state terror and eventually becoming an incoherent
term of condemnation. On the peculiar logic underpinning antiterrorist practices, see Richard Jackson, “The epistemological
crisis of counterterrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol. 8,
No. 1, 2015, pp. 33–54.
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are responsible for far more rape, pillage, torture and
murder than their opponents. So perhaps these governments should be called terrorists too.
That is exactly what some scholars have done. They
take the term “terrorism” at its face value, namely as
referring to actions that strike terror into the minds of
citizens, and note that by this definition, governments are
by far the biggest terrorists. High-level aerial bombing can
be just as terrifying as explosions in marketplaces, and
torture by governments can be just as devastating as
torture by insurgents. Terrorism by governments is called
“state terrorism.”11
In the Indochina war, two or three million Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians and others died due to US
military actions, which included bombing, torture, assassinations (tens of thousands of them), and forced movements of populations into secure compounds, which might
be called concentration camps. A large percentage of the
victims were civilians. Similarly, in places like Guatemala
11 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political
Economy of Human Rights (Boston: South End Press, 1979);
Frederick H. Gareau, State Terrorism and the United States:
From Counterinsurgency to the War on Terrorism (Atlanta, GA:
Clarity Press, 2004); Alexander George (ed.), Western State
Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Michael Stohl and
George A. Lopez (eds.), The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of
Governmental Violence and Repression (Westport, CT:
Greenwood, 1984); Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez (eds.),
Terrible Beyond Endurance? The Foreign Policy of State
Terrorism (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1988). See also the
discussion of state crime in chapter 4.
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and Indonesia, where hundreds of thousands of civilians
have been killed, nearly all the killing has been on behalf
of governments.
When governments undertake large-scale killing,
they nearly always accompany this by measures to reduce
public outrage.12 They usually
• hide what they are doing, at least from wider
audiences
• devalue their targets (using the label “terrorists” is
just one technique)
• reinterpret their actions by lying (for example,
civilians killed are called insurgents), minimising
consequences, blaming others (such as “rogue elements” being covertly funded) and framing their
actions as worthy (for example, protecting national
security)
• use official channels to give an appearance of
justice (such as formal inquiries into killings)
• intimidate and reward people involved, including
journalists and witnesses.
The double standard is stark.13 Governments kill, or
threaten to kill, large numbers of civilians, something that

12 Brian Martin, “Managing outrage over genocide: case study
Rwanda,” Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol. 21, No. 3,
2009, pp. 275–290; Brian Martin, “Euthanasia tactics: patterns of
injustice and outrage,” SpringerPlus, Vol. 2, No. 256, 6 June
2013, http://www.springerplus.com/content/2/1/256.
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strikes terror into the hearts of potential victims. Yet many
of these same governments are able to escape censure for
their own activities, while pointing the finger at allegedly
dangerous enemies, the so-called terrorists, turning their
comparatively low-level attacks into justification for
massive mobilisation and retaliation. This double standard
is accomplished by parallel sets of tactics, on the one hand
to reduce outrage from the government’s own actions and
on the other to mobilise outrage against the “terrorists.”
It is not surprising that there is vastly more scholarship on non-state terrorism than on state terrorism, and
that the very idea of state terrorism is almost never
presented in the media or textbooks and is largely
unknown to the wider public. It is in this context that it is
possible to say that terrorism strengthens the state. This
doesn’t happen automatically: governments do everything
possible to ensure that it does.
In the face of armed opposition, governments might
adopt measures to de-escalate conflict, for example by
promoting social justice, opening avenues for citizen
participation, prosecuting government agents involved in
torture and killing, and introducing a range of measures to
promote reconciliation. In a free and open society, with
opportunities to bring about change through the system,
terrorism would lose much of its attraction, and it would
not aid recruitment or popular support.
13 See also Brian Martin, “How activists can challenge double
standards,” Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements,
Vol. 7, No. 2, 2015, pp. 201–213.
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What often happens instead is an insidious process of
reinforcement. After an anti-state terrorist attack, the
government responds massively, for example with arrests,
torture or bombings—and in the course of this response
harms previously uninvolved civilians. This results in new
grievances, giving support to insurgent groups, who mount
further attacks, leading to more reprisals, and so forth. The
government, by choosing repression as its response to
terrorism, fosters the very conditions that stimulate more
terrorism. Do governments seem to worry about this? In
many cases, not at all. The more they are attacked, the
more governments gain greater power and legitimacy.
This pattern was apparent in Afghanistan after the
western invasion in October 2001, supposedly in retaliation for the 9 September 2001 attacks in the US. (Nearly
all the 9/11 attackers were from Saudi Arabia.) Bombing
in Afghanistan killed thousands of civilians, but this was
not publicised in the west, a type of cover-up. The
intended targets, the Taliban, were demonised as terrorists,
even though the CIA had supported them in the 1980s
after the Soviet government invaded Afghanistan. The
bombing of Afghanistan was explained as part of the war
on terror, even though it terrorised the Afghani population.
The attack was authorised by the United Nations Security
Council some time afterwards.
If anyone wants to increase the power of the state, a
terrorist attack is probably the single most effective way to
do so. After 9/11, there was enormous international
sympathy for the US government and people. The government massively increased military funding and
especially funding for national security. Dissent was
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portrayed as a threat. Patriotism was given an enormous
booster shot. The same thing has happened in other
countries after terrorist attacks, including Australia. In
October 2002, there was a bombing in Bali; though this
was in Indonesia, the primary victims were western
tourists, with 202 killed, 88 of them from Australia. The
number of Australians killed was nearly as high a proportion of the Australian population as the 9/11 death toll was
of the US population. Similarly, legislation was introduced
to give much more power to security agencies, and their
funding was increased dramatically.
What to do?
For those who are critical of excessive patriotism and
wary of the power of the state, what can be done to oppose
the role of terrorism in strengthening the state? This is a
very big subject, so only a few possible actions and initiatives can be mentioned.
On an individual level, it is possible to become better
informed about violence around the world, to be better
able to put terrorism in context. Since the end of the cold
war, there have been dozens of major conflicts, with the
most deadly ones being in Africa, including the Congo,
Algeria, Rwanda, Sudan and Burundi: in each of these
countries, hundreds of the thousands of people have died
in wars or genocides. The wars in the Congo have been
the most deadly, with some five million deaths. Compared
to this, international terrorism leads to relatively few
deaths. The implication is that the threat from non-state
terrorism in the west has been blown out of all proportion—thus serving to strengthen states—while more
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serious threats to the lives and safety of the world’s
population are mostly unknown to wider audiences.
Becoming aware of the figures and examples can provide
an antidote to the continual drum-roll about dangers from
terrorism.14
It is also worth studying the figures about other
threats to personal safety, such as traffic accidents,
drowning in bathtubs, falling over and domestic violence.
For most people, these are much greater threats to safety
than terrorism.
Another approach is to support alternatives that
undermine the attractions of terrorism for potential
terrorists. Greater social justice—treating people more
fairly, and addressing grievances—can foster commitment
to a society. Also important is opening channels for
change through the system. When people feel that they are
being treated badly and that there is no legitimate way to
make a difference, some of them may want to resort to
violence, even when it is counterproductive.
Research shows that methods of nonviolent action,
such as rallies, strikes, boycotts and sit-ins, are usually
more effective than violence in achieving the goals of
campaigners. Spreading the message about the power of
nonviolent action, and developing campaigns that use this
power, provide models for others to follow.15
14 Virgil Hawkins, Stealth Conflicts: How the World’s Worst
Violence Is Ignored (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008).
15 For specific applications to terrorism, see Tom H. Hastings,
Nonviolent Responses to Terrorism (Jefferson, NC: McFarland,
2004); Senthil Ram and Ralph Summy (eds.), Nonviolence: An
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Although nonviolent action may be more effective,
the sad reality is that governments seldom promote it, but
rather raise the alarm about terrorism, repress dissent,
resist nonviolent protest, and create the conditions that
foster terrorism. Nonviolent campaigners thus face a
double challenge: to demonstrate to others that nonviolence is a better option than violence, and to confront
authorities that resist peaceful change and thus create
conditions that stimulate violence. This is the challenge of
dealing with a government-terrorism symbiosis.
When alarms about terrorism are raised, another
approach, at an individual level, is to say “ho, hum” and
treat the whole issue as unimportant. Whenever terrorism
is reported on television, change the channel. If everyone
ignored it, the purveyors of concern about terrorism would
lose credibility. Unfortunately, this approach would not
make much difference unless adopted by a large number
of people.
Humour is another response. Indeed, quite a few
people feel that terrorism alarms are silly, and make jokes
about them. This can be risky at airports, where authorities
over-react to the slightest comment. Some types of
humour may be safer and more revealing. A “supportive”
humorous political stunt involves pretending you support
the cause you are making fun of. For example, you could
go around an airport or railway station reporting
Alternative for Defeating Global Terror(ism) (New York: Nova
Science Publishers, 2008). For my approach, see “Nonviolence
versus terrorism,” Social Alternatives, Vol. 21, No. 2, Autumn
2002, pp. 6–9. See also the discussion in chapter 13.
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unattended bags—even if unattended only briefly—or
perhaps reporting “suspicious behaviour” by well-dressed
businessmen. The next step is to work in teams. One
member leaves shopping bags unattended, each one
containing a balloon, or a present for the finder, while
another reports these potentially dangerous bags to the
authorities. However, stunts like this could go seriously
wrong if there was an actual attack while staff were
investigating false alarms.
My assessment is that it is not easy to develop a
campaign to address the out-of-proportion alarm about
terrorism. Governments do what they can to tout the risk,
and this feeds perfectly into media news values, while
meanwhile more serious problems are neglected. At a
basic level, the first step is not to get caught up in the
terrorism alarm, but beyond this, it is difficult to develop a
campaign to change the agenda. This is an area where
social experimentation is needed: activists can try out
various ways to redirecting attention, making fun of
terrorism alerts, promoting non-state responses, or in other
ways addressing the mutual reinforcement cycle between
states and terrorists.

8
Language
“We invaded Iraq.” I’ve read this statement numerous
times. It refers to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but the times
I’ve seen it, the author is not a US soldier, commander or
policy-maker, but instead a critic of the invasion. These
US critics are disgusted by the lies and damaging actions
of the US government—their own government! Hence the
word “we.”
Critics know full well the invasion was decided upon
by George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and
company, sold to a few other governments and carried out
through military chains of command. To say “We
invaded” is shorthand for something like “Top decision
makers in the US government ordered the US military to
organise an invasion. Isn’t it terrible that ‘our’ government
did this?”1
The trouble with “We invaded Iraq” is that it collapses the distinction between the government and the
population. “We” suggests that the writer identifies with
the government.
A US government official who supported the invasion of Iraq would never say, “We protested against the
invasion,” meaning that people in the US protested. Pro1 The word “our” only works for US readers. Foreigners cannot
be expected to feel ownership of or association with the US
government.

Language

115

testers are different from, indeed against, the government:
protesters are “they.”
The uses of “we” and “they” in relation to the
invasion of Iraq provide an example of how assumptions
about people and governments enter language and then are
strengthened in people’s minds by the constant repetition
of that language. This is a very big topic, and I’m only
going to touch the surface by mentioning several examples
in which language reflects and promotes the identification
between individuals and the state.
Consider these different entities:
• Country: a geographical area, encompassing people,
institutions and much else
• Government: the system of political leaders or
rulers
• People: everyone living in a country
In most news reporting about national and international
affairs, the country, government and people are not
distinguished. Think of “Berlin today said,” “The US
intervened” or “Britain is reluctant.” In media conventions
applying to international affairs, the name of the country
or the capital city is treated as referring to the government
or, more precisely, top officials in the government.
The effect of this sort of language is that it is difficult
to talk about—and think about—situations in which
people’s views or actions differ from those of government
policy-makers. Let’s go back to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Shortly before the invasion, there were massive rallies
across the world, the largest anti-war protest in history.
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Millions of people demonstrated their opposition to the
impending war. Yet the conventional language used to
describe what happened is inadequate and misleading. It is
inaccurate, in a literal sense, to say, “The US invaded
Iraq” because not everyone joined the invasion. It would
be inaccurate in the contrary direction to say, “The US
demonstrated against an invasion of Iraq” because not
everyone in the US demonstrated—but a much larger
number demonstrated against the invasion than were
involved in the invasion. (I’m setting aside the consideration that most US government officials did not refer to an
invasion at all, but instead talked about liberating Iraq.)
Governments are complex organisational entities. To
say they act, speak, bargain or feel is to liken them to
individuals who, in contrast, are assumed to be unitary. If
a part of a person’s body refuses to cooperate, it is seen as
dysfunctional, perhaps dangerous, like cancer. Treating a
country like an individual invites the assumption that
opponents of government policy are similarly dysfunctional, or even dangerous.
When Bush said, “You are either with us or with
them [the terrorists],” he played on this analogy of the
country with an individual. This “us”—in this instance
“us” is “US”—is treated as unitary, when in reality there is
no single “us.”
If Bush hadn’t been able to draw on the linguistic
assumption of government-country unity, he would have
had to say, “Either you support US government terrorism
policy or you oppose it.” That’s less punchy and less
threatening. It’s far easier to oppose policy than to oppose
“us”!
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The use of country names for government actions can
be called “statist language”: it linguistically attributes the
actions of the state—the government and especially
leading figures in the government—to the people, to an
entire society. It makes it awkward to talk about internal
tensions or dissent.2
Statist language is a convention: it is the standard
way of writing and speaking, especially about international affairs. Any other way can sound strange or
cumbersome. It’s easier to say, “Iraq invaded Kuwait”
than “Iraqi military forces invaded Kuwait.”
This convention can mask citizen opposition to
government. Saying “China decided” discourages people
from realising or remembering that it was only the
Chinese government, and probably just a few people at the
top, who made a decision, and that the bulk of the population were not involved or consulted and many of them
may not have wanted this decision if they had been
consulted.
In systems of representative government, government
leaders have the endorsement of being elected, but this
does not mean their policies reflect the unified desires of
the entire population. The freer the society, usually the
more that differences of opinion can be articulated.

2 This chapter draws on my article “Statist language,” Etc.— A
Review of General Semantics, Vol. 66, No. 4, October 2009, pp.
377–381. For a sophisticated treatment of language and national
identity, see Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage,
1995), pp. 87–127.
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Statist language is one type of what can be called
unitary language, in which a group of entities is treated as
a whole. Unitary language is appropriate when groups
operate under a command system, such as the human
body, or a group using consensus decision-making, so
everyone agrees. But whenever there is significant conflict
or internal disagreement, unitary language can be misleading. The statement “General Motors condemned the
strikers,” when the strikers are GM workers, offers a
different image than “GM management condemned GM
workers.”
Unitary language often reflects a hierarchical
worldview in which rulers or bosses speak on behalf of
their subordinates, whether or not there has been any
consultation. In the United Nations, when government
representatives speak on behalf of their countries this
might be reported as “China said” or “Germany said.” In
1994, the government of Rwanda held a seat on the UN
Security Council. The Rwandan government orchestrated
a genocide beginning in April, but tried to hide this from
the outside world. When the Rwandan Security Council
representative reported falsely that the killings had
stopped, conventional statist language might have expressed this as “Rwanda told the Security Council the
killings had stopped.” But it certainly wasn’t the Rwandan
people saying this: they were perpetrators, victims or
bystanders of the ongoing genocide.
Another feature of statist language is the assignment
of people to countries and vice versa. The people living in
France are the French, the people living in Guatemala are
Guatemalans, and so forth. Conversely, without the
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French there is no France. As noted by Michael Billig, “A
form of semantic cleansing operates in these terms: there
is no gap between the people and its country.”3 There are a
few anomalies in the linguistic binding of peoples and
countries. For example, there are no United Kingdonians,
and for much of the world “Americans” refers to US
people, not inhabitants of South and North America.
Generally, the grammatical conventions associating
people with countries serve to make the division of the
world via national boundaries seem natural rather than the
result of political and social action.
Sexist language
Statist language has many parallels with sexist language.
A few decades ago, it was conventional in English to use
“he” to mean “he or she,” to use “chairman” to refer to
either a man or a woman in the role of chair, and to use
“man” to mean “humans.” Male pronouns were standard
when referring to both sexes.
Feminists challenged what they called sexist language. They said male words made women invisible by
making readers visualise men rather than both sexes. Male
language made it harder to imagine a woman in a role,
especially a traditionally masculine role.
Defenders of the convention argued against change,
saying that everyone knew that “he” included both sexes
and that “he or she” is clumsy and “they” is ungrammatical. They made fun of critics by pointing to the alleged
absurdities involved in removing mention of men from
3 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 78.
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language: “woman” would have to be replaced by
“womon” and perhaps “person” by “perdaughter.”
The conservative defenders of sexist language lost, so
much so that many writers, in quoting from text written in
the 1960s or earlier, painstakingly notate male pronouns
with “[sic]” or replace them with “[he or she]” to highlight
their awareness of, and perhaps distaste for, the sexist
language in the original.
Examples
Statist language is so common that it easy to produce a
host of examples. To provide illustrations, I picked an
issue of the New York Times, the newspaper most
commonly cited as setting a standard for others. I chose an
arbitrary issue, 8 January 2009, the first day I was able to
purchase a copy during a visit to the United States.
On the front page is a story titled “China losing taste
for debt from the U.S.”4 Its lead paragraphs include
passages such as “Beijing is starting to keep more of its
money at home,” “declining Chinese appetite for United
States debt,” “China has spent” and “Beijing is seeking to
pay.” Of course it is not literally “China” that is “losing
taste for debt,” because the article makes no mention of
debt preferences among Chinese people, but actually top
Chinese economic policy-makers. Only later in the article
are there more precise references to “the Chinese government,” “Chinese businesses” and “China’s leadership.”
4 Keith Bradsher, “China losing taste for debt from the U.S.,”
New York Times, 8 January 2009, pp. A1, A10.
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On page A6 is the story “Ex-prostitutes say South
Korea and U.S. enabled sex trade near bases.”5 The reference to “South Korea” and “U.S.” must refer to military or
political authorities, because the average South Korean
plays no role in the sex trade and the average U.S. citizen
knows nothing at all about U.S. military bases in South
Korea, much less the existence of the sex trade—unless,
perhaps, they have read this or a similar article.
This story occasionally uses statist language but for
the most part uses more precise references. The first
sentence is “South Korea has railed for years against the
Japanese government’s waffling,” which doesn’t reveal
who in South Korea had railed—the government? activists?—but pinpoints the target of complaint, the Japanese
government.
In the second paragraph, the article says “Now, a
group of former prostitutes in South Korea have accused
some of their country’s former leaders of a different kind
of abuse: encouraging them to have sex with the American
soldiers who protected South Korea from North Korea.”
Note the precision of “a group of former prostitutes” and
“some of their country’s former leaders” compared to the
reference to “protected South Korea from North Korea,”
which implicitly groups North Korean citizens with the
North Korean government as a threat to South Korea,
again a single undifferentiated entity.
5 Choe Sang-Hun, “Ex-prostitutes say South Korea and U.S.
enabled sex trade near bases,” New York Times, 8 January 2009,
p. A6.
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On page A12, one of the several stories on the conflict in Gaza is titled “As Gaza battle goes on, Israel is set
to negotiate with Egypt on cease-fire.”6 The title refers of
course to the governments of Israel and Egypt. The first
sentence begins “Israel said Wednesday …” This common
formulation suggests that “Israel” is a person speaking
with a single voice. It disguises the diversity of political
opinion within Israel over policies and actions concerning
Gaza. Although many readers understand this diversity
and treat “Israel said” as “Israeli government spokepeople
said,” the statist shorthand may discourage thinking of the
complexity. For those not familiar with complexities of
Israeli politics, “Israel said” reinforces a mental image of
discrete entities, Israel, Egypt and Gaza.
Paragraph three begins “Israel suspended its military
operations in Gaza for three hours …” Perhaps the Israeli
government or military suspended military operations;
most Israelis had no say in this decision, and many
members of Israeli peace movements would not like to be
implicated in any decision to use military force in the first
place.
Paragraph five begins “Hamas fired 22 rockets into
Israel …” How many readers would stop to think that
perhaps not every member of Hamas supports firing
rockets? Certainly not all of them were involved in the
firing itself.
6 Steven Erlanger, “As Gaza battle goes on, Israel is set to negotiate with Egypt on cease-fire,” New York Times, 8 January 2009,
p. A12.
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Elsewhere in the article there is similar statist language, but more precise language is also used, with
references to, for example, “the Israeli Army,” “the Israeli
government,” and “the government spokesman.” It is certainly possible to write without statist constructions.
These are just a few examples taken from one issue
of the New York Times. The same observations could be
made using news reports from innumerable sources.
Alternatives
Instead of “We invaded Iraq” or “The US invaded Iraq,”
what would be a more accurate formulation? One possibility is “the US military invaded Iraq” or “The US
government launched an invasion of Iraq.” Referring to
the military or the government helps to direct attention to
those acting, thereby allowing that others, including
members of the US population, may not be involved or
supportive.
The use of a country’s name to refer to the government is quite convenient, and alternatives are cumbersome. The obvious alternative to “US” would be “US
government” or perhaps “USG” for short. Those who want
to be really precise in their language would say that “US
government” is still unacceptable, because not everyone in
the government supports actions taken in the name of the
government—certainly not the invasion of Iraq.
When talking or writing about government actions, it
is straightforward to avoid constructions that conflate the
government and the people in a country: just avoid any
statements that refer to the country acting as a whole. This
means not saying something like “China declared” but
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instead “a representative of the Chinese government
declared” and not saying “India is having talks with
Pakistan” but instead perhaps “Indian and Pakistani
government officials are having talks.” Because the alternatives are cumbersome, it is all too easy to revert to
conventional expressions.
Another option is to use the abbreviated form but in
an unconventional way. You might say “India opposed the
trade agreement” when actually Indian policy-makers
supported it—however, only those who are knowledgeable
about the issue will understand that you are referring to
civil society groups or popular opinion, not the
government.
Statist language brings a pervasive bias into reporting, especially on international affairs, typically favouring
governments over opponents and popular movements and
sometimes over popular opinion. Using different expressions is not easy: habits run deep. Challenging those habits
is a small step towards better understanding and better
strategic thinking. Non-statist language will not solve the
world’s problems but it can help make them more
apparent.

9
Citizenship
Robert Jovicic was born in France 1966 and came with his
Yugoslavian parents to Australia at the age of two. He
grew up Australian. His parents became Australian citizens but Jovicic never bothered to do so, because he had
permanent migrant status. But it wasn’t as permanent as
he might have thought. Jovicic became involved in
criminal activities. After spending time in jail, he was
deported from Australia, to Serbia, where he was unable to
work (having been given only a short visa) and didn’t
know the language.
Jovicic was vulnerable to expulsion from Australia
because he lacked citizenship. If his parents had been in
Australia when he was born, he could have remained in
Australia despite any crimes.1
Most people in the world are a citizen of a country;
some are citizens of two or more countries. Being a citizen
normally means you have the right to reside in a country.
Usually you can obtain a passport and travel to other
countries.
Citizenship is a key tool used by governments to
control populations. If you are not a citizen of any
country, you are “stateless” and at risk of being sent
somewhere you don’t want to go, or even imprisoned.
1 After publicity about his desperate plight, Jovicic was able to
return to Australia and be granted permanent resident status.
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A century or more ago, citizenship was not such a big
deal. Relatively few people travelled a lot, but for those
who did, there were fewer controls. Passports are a recent
invention.
The very idea of citizenship reflects identification
with a state, indeed it assumes the existence of states.
Without a state, you are a person. When subject to the
administration of a state, and accepted as one of its
subjects, you are a citizen. As a citizen, you have some
rights and privileges not available to those who are not
citizens—called aliens. Perhaps it is no coincidence that
people from outer space are called aliens. They are not
subjects of governments of the planet earth.
The control function of citizenship is most apparent
in the plight of refugees. People under threat in their own
countries due to war or persecution seek asylum somewhere else, but acceptance is not automatic: they have to
be assessed and certified as refugees, and even then they
may be kept in camps and prevented from full membership in the receiving country.
Australia illustrates some of the worst practices
regarding refugees. Except for Aborigines, the descendants of people who inhabited the continent for tens of
thousands of years, nearly everyone in Australia is either a
recent immigrant or a descendent of immigrants since the
first white settlement in 1788. Despite Australia being a
nation of immigrants, recent governments have demonised
refugees arriving by boat. They are intercepted by the
navy and either pushed back to their port of departure or
taken to detention camps in various locations. Those who
make it to the Australian continent are also put in camps,
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sometimes for years, sometimes with no prospect of
release. Many of the refugees are escaping conflicts, such
as in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the Australian military
is involved. The Australian government wants to fight the
enemy abroad but not accept responsibility for the human
consequences of the conflicts.
Since the early 1990s, Australian governments have
demonised asylum seekers in a populist pitch to xenophobic elements of the population. It is a classic case of
building in-group support by treating out-groups as
dangerous. Although many Australians have relentlessly
campaigned against the government’s refugee policy,
nevertheless both major political parties have continued
with the policy, making it ever more punitive, because
they believe this wins voter support.
At the same time, the Australian government has run
one of the largest planned immigration programmes in the
world, on a per capita basis. Hundreds of thousands of
immigrants are accepted each year, mainly in two categories: family reunions—existing family members already
reside in Australia—and occupational migrants, who bring
skills or money to the country. The result of the ongoing
immigration programme is that one out of four Australians
was born outside the country, from a range of countries:
Britain, New Zealand, China, India, Philippines, etc. The
parents of many other Australians were born outside the
country, most notably as part of the post-world-war-II
wave of immigrants coming from Britain, Italy, Greece,
Egypt and elsewhere.
So there is a contradiction at the heart of the Australian government’s treatment of immigrants. Those coming
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through formal channels are welcomed; those coming by
sea as refugees are portrayed as a threat to the country.2
Most people prefer living where they are. They have
ties to family and friends, cultural associations, local
knowledge and many other connections to their community. Most refugees are fleeing violence, exploitation or
extreme disadvantage. Most would prefer to stay in their
homeland if it could become stable, safe and prosperous.
The “open borders” movement argues in favour of
eliminating barriers to people moving to different parts of
the world.3 To most people, this sounds totally impracticable. Millions of people would immediately want to move
to the richest countries. But of course a switch to open
borders would not happen overnight. Imagine this scenario. In 20 years, barriers to moving between countries
would be removed. There would be intense pressure from
rich countries to end the conflicts that generate so many
refugees—for example in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka and
Syria—to challenge repressive rulers and to implement
policies to eliminate corruption and enable people to make
a decent living through honest labour. Taking these steps
would dramatically reduce incentives to move to other
countries. They would also reduce internal migration, a
serious problem in many countries.
Ending conflicts, promoting responsive government,
eliminating corruption and promoting prosperity are
2 Other contradictions in the treatment of immigrants are covered
in chapter 11, “Trade deals and tax havens.”
3 http://openborders.info; Teresa Hayter, Open Borders: The
Case Against Immigration Controls (London: Pluto, 2000).
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exactly the supposed goals of world development, but
there is little pressure on rich countries to push in these
directions. Indeed, many major conflicts are either initiated by western governments (think Afghanistan and Iraq,
among others) or simply ignored (Congo, Burundi, among
others). Rich-country economic policies have served to
exploit poor peoples of the world, through a range of
measures, while massive corruption undermines prospects
for economic improvement.
For the moment, the idea of open borders is a utopian
vision that can serve to stimulate thinking and direct
action towards a different sort of world, one in which
controls over poor people are replaced by controls over
exploitative practices. The idea of open borders is also
useful when thinking about tactics concerning citizenship
that serve the state—or challenge it.
Promoting country loyalty via citizenship
Let me start with the perspective that citizenship can serve
state elites by encouraging people to identify with their
country and state. What methods are used to do this? The
first is exposure of citizenship itself. This mainly occurs
by a contrast with non-citizens. Probably the majority of
people in most countries never even think of citizenship as
it applies to themselves: they simply take it for granted. It
becomes to their consciousness only when outsiders—
immigrants or refugees—seek citizenship. It also enters
awareness when travelling to areas where passports and
visas are required. In some countries, citizenship must be
verified before being able to vote or undertake certain
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jobs. In filling out forms, you may have to indicate your
citizenship.
The second promotion tactic is valuing. Many people
may take their citizenship for granted or treat it in a purely
pragmatic manner, as a necessity for getting around,
something like packing suitable clothes for a trip or
obtaining a trade qualification in order to get a job.
However, for others, citizenship is a matter of great pride.
Governments foster this for new citizens, in special
ceremonies. More generally, patriotism is commonly
intertwined with valuing citizenship, as a symbol of a
connection legitimised by government. Furthermore, many
people may come to think of citizenship as an achievement or highly desirable attribute, as something special
about themselves, rather than as an arbitrary designation
that is created and administered by governments.
The third promotion tactic is explanation or, in other
words, giving reasons for citizenship. Among legal
scholars, the rationales for citizenship are discussed, but
for the general public, there is little discussion of citizenship as a system. Instead, most commentary is about who
gets to be a citizen, who is excluded and the justifications
for different treatment. For example, the Australian government justifies its immigration programme mainly in
terms of the national interest, with two main groups:
business immigrants, who bring cash and business skills,
and family reunions. There are various debates about
these, and complaints about abuses of the system, but
seldom any questioning of citizenship as a system of
controlling movement.
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The fourth promotion tactic is endorsement. Governments give their official support to citizenship arrangements, with various formal processes associated with
them: employment restrictions on non-citizens, issuing of
passports, citizenship ceremonies, and the various patriotic
events and rhetoric. Citizenship is a key means of
demarcating an in-group, citizens of a country, from an
out-group, everyone else.
The fifth promotion tactic is rewards. Being a citizen
has quite a few advantages, depending on the country, for
example being able to come and go, have jobs, receive
welfare benefits and undertake lower cost education. Most
people born in a country and who remain in it take these
advantages for granted, but for others, gaining the benefits
of citizenship is a major issue, especially for those without
a lot of money, education and connections.
In summary, citizenship is one of the elements of the
complex of practices and ideas that cement many people’s
identification with a country. This means in practice
association with the country’s government, because the
government sets and administers the rules for citizenship,
in accordance (usually) with international agreements
between governments. Citizenship serves to control
people’s movements in a world where travel is easier than
ever before and where restraints on the movement of
capital have been dramatically reduced.
Citizenship thus is caught in the middle of some deep
contradictions. Governments are committed to the system
of citizenship because it gives them power, but it also is a
potent trigger for suspicion and even anger at out-groups,
including non-citizens who engage in commerce, for
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example buying property or selling goods in competition
with locals.
Alternatives to citizenship
Quite a few people don’t really care about citizenship. If
you were born a citizen and never travel anywhere
requiring a passport, being a citizen may not seem
important. Others treat citizenship as a pragmatic matter,
something necessary to get a job and move around, and
have no particular attachment to the country or countries
of which they are citizens.
Then there are a few people who envisage something
different. They might prefer to think of themselves as a
citizen of the world, a “global citizen,” with primary
loyalty to all humans, or perhaps the biosphere or the
planet, including everything from air to rocks. The
implications of an alternative model of citizenship can be
a matter for discussion. Does this mean freedom to move
to any part of the world? Or could a person only settle in
an area if invited by local residents? What about services
now provided by governments, such as unemployment
payments? Does global citizenship imply dissolution of
governments, or only that governments have to adapt to
free movement of citizens?
One possibility would be to look at the arrangements
within the European Union, which allow free movement,
without passport controls. The New Zealand and Australian governments have removed restrictions on movement
between the two countries. Could such arrangements be
gradually expanded to more parts of the world?
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For the purposes here of looking at tactics, it can be
useful to look at a particular alternative. However, alternatives to citizenship are so far off the mainstream agenda
that it is not necessary to specify details. There is virtually
no public discussion of alternatives to the conventional
model of citizenship. For those with money and skills,
there is considerable mobility, and citizenship is not a
rigid restraint. For those fleeing wars, exploitation,
discrimination or poverty, the citizenship system is a
barrier to finding a safe haven. It is for this latter group
that public discussion of alternatives is hardly ever
discussed as a serious option. So the first tactic against
alternatives is a de facto cover-up.
Next is denigration of alternatives. To the extent that
the idea of open borders is even acknowledged, it is
usually dismissed as unrealistic if not dangerous. More
revealing, though, is attitudes towards those seeking to
move to other countries but not welcome by governments.
Legitimately, they can be called asylum seekers or
refugees, or migrants seeking a better life. They are also
given derogatory labels. In Australia, people who attempt
to arrive by boat seeking asylum are commonly called
illegals, even though what they are doing is legal according to international law. They are called queue-jumpers,
even though there is no queue for seeking asylum. They
are called economic migrants (often with a contemptuous
tone of voice), suggesting they have no justification to
migrate, even though other sorts of economic migrants,
who have more education, money and connections, are
welcome. Sometimes, it is even suggested that asylum
seekers are criminals or terrorists.
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Because alternatives are not on the agenda, there is
not much public discussion of them. If open borders
entered the public debate, then undoubtedly arguments
would be raised against the possibility, but for the moment
the discussions remain among academics. Similarly, there
seems to be little need to take action to dampen enthusiasm for open borders through formal investigations or
intimidation of proponents. In Australia, the dominant
discourse is driven by policies on refugees. Opponents of
the government’s policies typically argue in terms of
international agreements concerning human rights, not in
terms of alternatives to citizenship.
Challenging the citizenship-patriotism connection
Because citizenship is so often taken for granted, a first
step in challenging usual assumptions is to point out
contradictions in the uses of citizenship, for example the
different way the rich and poor are treated.
One of the key flash points in citizenship struggles
involves responses to immigrants: people seeking to
change their residence and sometimes their citizenship. In
quite a few countries, governments put tight constraints on
acceptance of “unwelcome” immigrants. Pushing for fair
treatment of asylum seekers is an attempt to ensure that
international agreements are followed. There are many
campaigners involved in supporting the rights of refugees.
However, there is another side to the issue: governments pushing for free movement of capital and the
selection movement of labour to serve corporate agendas.
Highly skilled or wealthy individuals receive a welcome
seldom extended to asylum seekers arriving outside the
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usual protocols. Questioning the free flow of capital can
buy into a nationalist agenda. It is not so obvious whether
or how this challenges the systems of citizenship and
patriotism.
Rethink
It seems like there are two categories of citizenship, or
perhaps two categories of citizens. People who have
plenty of money and connections experience no barriers to
travel and to being able to live in other countries for short
or longer times. These are people who have the mobility
of capital: barriers have been removed, so they have
various options for deploying their labour. Call this
category P, for privileged or professional.
People in the second category have insufficient
money, skills or connections to move to more desirable
parts of the world. This category includes refugees. It also
includes people who are tied to land (farmers), to family
networks (through obligations) and to local sets of
institutions. People in the second category have limited
mobility; the cost in trying to move can be enormous, both
financial and associational. Call this category R, for
residential or restricted.
There seem to be different ways of thinking about
these two categories of people. P-people are welcome, at
least in some places, whereas R-people are unwelcome
except in special circumstances. Governments typically
welcome P-people but create barriers to R-people.
For P-people, citizenship becomes a secondary
matter, because it does little to restrict movement or work.
For R-people, citizenship is a crucial form of control.
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Nearly all the scare-mongering about immigration and
refugees is about mobilising concern by local R-people
against R-people from elsewhere.
Double standards
The use of citizenship as a method of control contains an
intrinsic double standard. First is the standard applied to
those without money, skills and connections. They are
citizens of their own country, but have little prospect of
gaining citizenship in another country, except through
enormous efforts and sometimes extreme sacrifice.
For many governments, these sorts of people are
undesired as potential immigrants. Furthermore, many
citizens identify with their governments and see the poor
people of the world as undesirable intruders, who should
stay where they are. This fear of foreigners is often linked
to racism. It has become almost an inevitable accompaniment to nationalism and country-centreness. Politicians
can promote this sort of xenophobia as a means of
building support, and because of the level of popular
support for measures against these sorts of immigrants,
some politicians fear to move too far in other directions.
However, there is another group of people: those with
money, skills and connections. For many practical
purposes, they are free to move to other countries for
visits, jobs and permanent residence. Though how easily
they can do this depends on the person and the country,
billionaires usually have more options than millionaires.
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Conclusion
Citizenship is a crucial element of the way the world is divided into countries, each administered by a government.
If you’re a citizen, you’re part of a recognised unit—a
country. If you’re not a citizen, you’re called “stateless”
and are much more vulnerable to ill treatment. Hence
there is a great incentive to be or become a citizen, thus
reinforcing everyday nationalism and the governments
that benefit from it.

10
Our economy
In Australia, the government and the media give extraordinary attention to the state of the economy. One of the
most common talking points is jobs. “The jobless rate has
increased from 4.8% to 5.0%. The government needs to
take action.” “Two hundred thousand new jobs were
created in the past three months.”
Loss of specific jobs can be a source of alarm. “We
need to provide support [meaning a government subsidy]
to the car industry, otherwise hundreds of jobs will be
lost.” “A factory just closed, and 25 workers lost their
jobs.”
There are lots of things to question concerning the
jobs mantra. Seldom does the government talk about
opportunity costs: a tariff or government subsidy to
manufacturing industry could instead have been provided
to a different sector, perhaps saving more jobs. Massive
investment in mining of iron ore or uranium might have
created several times as many jobs if put instead into solar
power and energy efficiency.
One of the assumptions in these discussions is that
the goal is more jobs. Hardly ever is there discussion of
whether these jobs are satisfying, secure or full-time—all
very relevant considering that many new jobs in Australia
are part-time and not permanent. Government statistics are
based on the arbitrary definition that if you work at least
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one hour per week, you are “employed.” This minimal
requirement is designed to boost the figure for the
employment rate.
An alternative perspective is that the goal should not
be jobs, but rather satisfying work for everyone, and
furthermore that paid work should not be the primary way
in which the allocation of the economic product—who
gets what—is determined; instead, allocation should be
according to need. This radical view is hardly ever articulated by mainstream commentators.
Set all this aside, and consider one additional
assumption underlying commentary on jobs: the focus is
always on Australian jobs. Never does anyone talk about
the value of creating more jobs in other countries,
especially in poor countries. Discussions about “the
economy” are about the Australian economy, or more
generally about the world economy and the economies of
Australia’s largest trading partners. Almost completely
absent is anyone asking, “How can Australian economic
policy help poor people of the world?”
The government focuses on boosting the Australian
economy, or sometimes boosting the fortunes some certain
groups within Australia, most commonly those better off.
Investors, such as investment funds, focus on returns for
themselves or their members. Trade unions focus on jobs,
wages and conditions for their members.
Concern about world poverty is commonly seen as
separate from concern about the Australian economy.
World poverty is treated as a matter for the foreign aid
budget or for voluntary organisations like World Vision or
simply for someone else, such as the United Nations, or
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perhaps for the governments of other countries. Alternatively, world poverty is seen as something that will be
addressed by improvements in the world economy, in the
usual trickle-down effect: as the rich become richer, some
of their wealth will provide jobs and greater income to the
poor. Meanwhile, though, attention is continually directed
to what is good for Australians.
Occasionally, there is some thought to workers elsewhere—they are stealing Australian jobs! When call
centres are closed in Australia and the work taken to India,
there are lots of gripes about loss of jobs and poorer
service, with only occasional mention of the benefits for
workers elsewhere. Similarly, Australian exports are seen
as a good thing because they bring money into Australia,
and only secondarily because they are providing a service
or product to others.
Overall, discussions of the economy within Australia
are incredibly country-centred: they are almost entirely
about what serves Australians. The government is seen as
the key player in the economic arena, designing policies
that will serve Australian businesses and workers.
Sometimes attention is drawn to regional or local
jobs and economic performance, such as job loss in the
state of New South Wales or the city of Sydney. There
might be reports about economic growth in China:
because there is so much trade between Australia and
China, the Chinese economy affects the much smaller
Australian economy.
In Europe, discussions of “the economy” might be
either about a country such as Italy or Germany, or the EU
more generally. In the US, the state or local economy will
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receive some attention along with the US economy generally. In neither case is there much awareness of how things
are going in Peru, Cambodia or Zambia—they are off the
radar.
The relative attention to jobs and economic performance can be seen as a form of competition for attention.
Those with the most power and influence try to make
people aware of things from their perspective. Governments seem to have the greatest influence, with mass
media usually following government priorities. This
process can be looked at in terms of tactics.
1. Exposure. Governments collect and publicise
statistics about the national economy, and to a lesser
extent local economies.
2. Valuing. More jobs and greater economic growth
are always seen as a good thing, while other priorities, such as happiness, equality or the environment,
are secondary.
3. Explanations. Attention is focused on paid work
and economic indicators are treated as signs of what
is most important.
4. Endorsement. Governments and various agencies
make authoritative announcements about jobs and the
economy, giving this emphasis a stamp of approval.
5. Rewards. Those who go along with the dominant
framing—especially those who collect and interpret
statistics and who write about the economy—can
expect a receptive and sympathetic audience.
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Australian news reports often tell whether the share
market has gone up or down, and give the latest exchange
rate with the US dollar. Sometimes reports tell about
economic trends in major countries, especially China and
the US. The economies of poor countries are almost never
mentioned.
Another aspect of self-centredness in public discourse about the economy is the issue of “Australianmade.” Decades ago, it was a matter of pride for some
Australians to buy a Holden, the General Motors car
manufactured in Australia. Buying a Toyota or some other
car from Japan or Korea was somehow not supporting
Australia. Those days are long gone: foreign cars are
common, and most people buy the cars they think are the
best value, which means the Australian car-manufacturing
industry is collapsing.
Nevertheless, there are complaints from some sectors
when the government is said not to be doing enough for
Australian businesses. When tariffs were reduced on some
products, such as clothes and food, imports boomed. Yet,
because of residual loyalty to the idea of being Australian,
some companies advertise themselves as being “Australian owned” or “proud to be 100% Australian,” though
some of these claims are dubious.
Then there are concerns raised when foreigners buy
properties and businesses in Australia. This is sometimes
presented as a foreign threat. There is a bit of racism
involved: there may be concerns raised about Chinese
investors buying Australian land, but none about British
investment. There is a clear double standard too, because
some Australian-based multinationals have bought
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properties or companies in other countries, with never a
peep of protest from commentators, except perhaps that it
might be unprofitable.
There are two competing pressures on discourse
about imports and exports. One is to maintain Australian
ownership and to buy Australian-made goods; the other is
to buy whatever is cheaper or better, whether made in
Australia or elsewhere. The thrust of capitalist markets is
towards greater international competition, so the appeal of
being “Australian-made” has been declining. The key
thing to note is that both discourses put Australians at the
centre, as beneficiaries either as workers and owners of
Australian businesses or as consumers of services and
products. There is little thought in either configuration of
thinking about benefiting people in other countries, except
as a spin-off of world economic growth.
A question arises: how does thinking about “the
economy” become so centred on benefits to the home
country? The primary driver is the national government,
where decisions are made about government expenditure,
trade agreements, investment guidelines and the like. It is
in the government’s own interest to build the national
economy: after all, the government obtains revenue by
extracting it from the economy. Regional and local governments want to develop their own economies, but they
have fewer resources to do so.
The Australian economy is semi-closed. Capital can
move fairly freely, but labour cannot. People in Australia
can move to different parts of the country in search of
better jobs, among other things, but immigration to
Australia is restricted. It is a central contradiction of

144

Ruling tactics

global capitalism, with its rhetoric about free markets, that
people cannot readily move across borders in search of
jobs. The result is an orientation to the economic entity in
which people can move. In Europe, this is the EU, so there
is a division of attention between national economies and
the EU economy. The Australian government has little
incentive to think more broadly in terms of its goals.
Economics in the media: an example
My comments here about the self-centredness of Australian economic discourse are based on observations over
many years. To back up these generalisations, it would be
necessary to carry out interviews, analyse media discourse
or listen to focus group discussions. Here, more modestly,
I only illustrate the Australian media’s orientation to the
Australian economy. I picked an issue of the Sydney
Morning Herald, considered one of Australia’s quality
newspapers, choosing the issue of 23 February 2015, the
day I wrote the first draft of the preceding text. My
comments here are about articles concerning economics in
the news pages.1
On page 2, there was an article about whether
workers in pubs should continue to be paid higher wages
on holidays declared by Australian states, in addition to
the standard eight national public holidays. For example,
the government of the state of Victoria declared a public
holiday on the weekend of the grand final of the Australian Rules football competition. The Australian Hotels
Association, representing pubs and clubs—where food and
1 A separate analysis could be undertaken of the business pages.
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alcohol are served—wanted uniformity across the country
in what are called penalty rates of pay. This was a story
about national economic matters.
On page 3 was an article about a scandal in the
National Australia Bank, one of Australia’s four major
banks. NAB financial advisers had been exposed for
offering misleading advice to customers, causing the
customers to lose large amounts of money. Due to
additional leaked documents about the scandal, adding to
previous exposés, there were calls for a royal commission
into Australia’s financial planning sector. This was a story
about national economic matters.
A brief report on page 6 began “Access to affordable
medicines could be under threat in Australia if the US gets
its way in secretive negotiations over a trade deal involving 12 Pacific-region countries, academics have warned.”
The theme was risks to Australian patients. The report
concluded with the statement “Trade Minister Andrew
Robb said he would not agree to anything that was against
Australia’s interests.” Both sides in the argument about the
trade agreement thus used the rhetoric of benefiting
Australians.
An article titled “Annual coal health toll $600m,
doctors say” reported on estimates of damage to health in
the Hunter region, around the city of Newcastle. The
article highlighted a clash between economic benefits to
the state versus health costs. “A 2014 report for the NSW
Minerals Council estimated Hunter coal contributes in
total $6.3 billion annually to the state’s economy, or
almost half of the total mining industry’s output in the
state. The region’s coal industry also employed more than
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18,000 people.” The orientation is to the economy of the
state.
On the comment pages, the editorial for the day
addressed the issue of the federal government’s payments
for childcare assistance, saying “Taxpayers subsidise
childcare by almost $7 billion a year,” something that
“helped the economy by allowing more mothers and
fathers to balance work and parenting, which in turn has
increased productivity, economic growth and living
standards.” However, the editorial stated, this system may
not be efficient. The assumption is that childcare policy
should be about benefiting the Australian economy.
Among the letters to the editor, a section was devoted
to ones about housing. An article the previous day, titled
“Rich pensioners may be too much at home,” raised
concerns about people owning million-dollars homes and
receiving the aged pension: perhaps they should move out.
Letter-writers contested this, for example pointing out that
the median house price in Sydney was approaching a
million dollars. The assumption underlying this debate
about the economics of retirement was that the trade-off
between what was fair to individuals, in particular elderly
homeowners, and fair to the Australian taxpayer.
Among the letters, there was one offering a contrast
to the usual emphasis on money: Jenny Blake commented
that, “… the joy of being part of your grandchildren’s
lives can never be calculated in dollars and cents. It is a
sad society we have become when everything is measured
by money.”
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Challenging economic self-centredness
There are quite a few ways to challenge the orientation of
economic thinking and discourse towards self-interest,
with “self” often involving an identification with the
country and the state. These can be generally classified
into methods of confrontation, fostering alternative identifications, and putting priority on different goals.
Methods of confrontation directly challenge the
standard orientation of economic thinking. The Occupy
movement’s slogan of “We are the 99%” is an example: it
switches the orientation from economic growth to
economic inequality. Then there are those who raise
awareness about poverty and disadvantage. They expose
crimes of the wealthy, point to exploitation of workers,
oppose trade deals that benefit the rich, and question the
world system of trade and debt. There are actually lots of
people pushing for a different set of priorities and who
provide a different agenda than the usual one built around
the rhetoric of economic nationalism.
A second set of methods seeks to promote identification with a different group than the country, region or city
that is the usual focus of economic discourse. The traditional socialist emphasis on the working class is a classic
example: the working class transcends national boundaries
and pits workers against the ruling class, thus questioning
economic nationalism with a different focus. However,
working-class consciousness often is linked to wages and
conditions of workers, and thus feeds into the preoccupation with what is good for workers—in this country. Trade
unions officials usually put the interests of unionists in
their union first, above other considerations. Seldom do
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they make decisions with a primary concern about
workers worldwide. Those who are unemployed or in nonunionised sectors of the world economy are not often of
great concern.
Rather than identifying with workers, another possibility is identifying with poor people worldwide—even if
you are not one of them. This is the approach of those
concerned with poverty reduction, movements against
exploitation, campaigners for rights of the most disadvantaged, public health advocates, and various others.
Whether identifying with poor people is an effective
counter to economic nationalism is probably best assessed
on a case-by-case basis.
A third set of methods to challenge state-centred
economic thinking questions the assumptions in conventional growth economics. An example is the idea of a
steady-state economy, namely one that doesn’t grow any
more. The steady-state economy is a long-term necessity,
at least when growth involves tangible things like energy
and consumer goods, simply because eventually resources
and non-renewable energy sources will be exhausted.
Therefore, it makes sense to start planning for a steadystate now.2
Research on happiness offers another way of
questioning normal thinking about economics. Greater
income does, on average, lead to higher reported
happiness, but only up to a point. Above a modest
standard of living, greater incomes lead to little or no
2 A classic reference: Herman E. Daly (ed.), Toward a Steadystate Economy (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1973).
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increases in reported happiness levels. One striking
finding is that in countries like Britain, Japan and the US,
recorded average happiness levels have hardly changed
nationwide over several decades, while the per capita
gross national product has greatly increased. What this
means is that people are earning more and they have
bigger houses, nicer cars and more electronic gadgets—
but they are no happier, on average, than earlier generations who were, by today’s standards, deprived.3
The interpretation of these findings has been contested, but what all economists accept is that money has a
declining marginal utility: an extra dollar means a lot more
to a poor person than to a billionaire. The implication, in
terms of collective welfare, is that there are greater
benefits from bringing people out of poverty than in
adding to the wealth of those already well off. In other
3 Gregg Easterbrook, The Progress Paradox: How Life Gets
Better While People Feel Worse (New York: Random House,
2003); Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer, Happiness and
Economics: How the Economy and Institutions Affect Wellbeing
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Bruno S. Frey
in collaboration with Alois Stutzer, Matthias Benz, Stephan
Meier, Simon Luechinger and Christine Benesch, Happiness: A
Revolution in Economics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008);
Richard Layard, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science
(London: Penguin, 2005). There are some who dispute this
finding. See, for example, Michael R. Hagerty and Ruut
Veenhoven, “Wealth and happiness revisited—growing national
income does go with greater happiness,” Social Indicators
Research, 64, 2003, 1–27, and subsequent articles by Richard
Easterlin and by Veenhoven and Hagerty.
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words, a more equal distribution of income and wealth
should be the goal, rather than increases in gross domestic
product: growth (progress) in equality, not growth in
wealth. Research suggests this will increase overall
happiness. Indeed, people who are materialistic, seeking
ever more income and possessions, tend to be less happy
than average; therefore, fostering a more caring and less
acquisitive society would improve wellbeing overall.4
Then there are particular activities that usually increase personal happiness, including helping others,
expressing gratitude and being physically active. These do
not require much money, and just about anyone can
undertake them. Potentially, they provide an alternative
direction for economic priorities.
Much of the research on happiness—also called
flourishing or wellbeing—is oriented to the individual,
which has the disadvantage of meshing with individualism
in materialistic striving. However, it is possible to rethink
some of the happiness-promoting activities as collective
endeavours, and furthermore ones that lead to social
changes. For example, helping others is a potent method
of improving one’s own happiness, as long as this doesn’t
become routine or obligatory. Designing a society around
enabling people to help each other directly—without
government as the intermediary body, collecting taxes and
providing welfare services—offers more prospects for
happiness.
4 Tim Kasser, The High Price of Materialism (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2002).
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This leads into economic alternatives, of which there
are many. Some alternatives involve a greater role for
government, other less. For example, a guaranteed annual
income is usually assumed to be provided by government,
whereas local currencies reduce the role of the central
government.
One of the most promising economic alternatives is
building the commons, namely the resources that are
freely available to everyone. Two traditional types of
commons are libraries and public parks. Anyone can
check out a book from a library or, these days, use the
Internet. Anyone can visit a park area in a city. The history
of libraries and parks is instructive: workers had to
struggle to introduce and maintain these facilities.5 After
all, they are competitors to private enterprise. It is possible
to imagine a world without libraries, but instead only
bookshops and Internet cafés, and a world without public
parks, but instead only privately run parks charging
substantial fees for entrance.
With the development of computing and the Internet,
a new type of commons has emerged, referred to as the
digital commons. Its best-known feature is free software,
such as the operating system Linux. Free software is
produced by collectives or networks of programmers who
provide their services without charge, and the resulting
products are available to anyone. One of the slogans of the
free software movement is “free as in free speech, not free
beer.” The key to free software, and its close relation open
5 Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1965), pp. 73–74.
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source software, is that the code is publicly available, so
anyone can use it or modify it, but not copyright it.6
The open source movement has inspired parallel
developments in a range of areas. For example, there are
now open-source colas, with the ingredients displayed on
beverage containers, and open-source code to run 3D
printing, an alternative to regular manufacturing.
The open source movement is expanding the role of
the commons, and is thereby providing an alternative to
government as a source of economic welfare. The
commons is a more general alternative to the economic
role of government, which is to collect taxes and provide
both individual and collective services. Governments can
support commons, as in the case of libraries and public
parks, but in other cases governments oppose commons
and instead support corporations and their efforts to
undermine or outlaw commons. This is apparent in
government support for expansion of intellectual property
regimes that protect the monopoly-privilege positions of
software companies, pharmaceutical manufacturers, large
book and journal publishers, and Hollywood producers.
6 Samir Chopra and Scott D. Dexter, Decoding Liberation: The
Promise of Free and Open Source Software (New York:
Routledge, 2008); Karl Fogel, Producing Open Source Software:
How to Run a Successful Free Software Project (Karl Fogel,
2005); Glyn Moody, Rebel Code: Linux and the Open Source
Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 2001); Steven Weber, The
Success of Open Source (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2004). The differences between free and open source
software and their associated movements are important but are
not central to the discussion here.
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In summary, there are at least three approaches to
challenging economic nationalism: confronting economic
self-centredness by questioning standard assumptions and
silences, for example as done by the Occupy movement;
promoting identification with a different group, such as
local government or the working class; and questioning
assumptions underlying conventional thinking about
economics, as in research on happiness and in the
commons as the basis for an economic alternative. All of
these are occurring and, to counter them, governments
remain active in shaping discourse.

11
Trade deals and tax havens
Globalisation is the process by which goods, services and
all sorts of activities become spread about the world rather
than restricted to particular localities. Globalisation can
occur with all sorts of things. Stamp collecting is a global
activity, and many collectors trade stamps with people in
other parts of the world.
The controversies over climate change, nuclear
power, fluoridation, vaccination and pesticides are globalised in the sense that the same sorts of arguments,
participants and actions are found in different places, and
there is considerable sharing of information and ideas
between groups in different places.1 There are differences,
to be sure. For example, in countries with nuclear power
stations, opponents focus more attention on reactor
accidents and long-lived radioactive waste than in
countries with no nuclear facilities. In some places, where
nuclear power has never been a serious option, there is
little debate about it. Globalisation does not mean that
exactly the same ideas, activities or products are found
everywhere, but rather there is a process by which similar
developments occur in many places, often with adaptations to the local circumstances.
1 Brian Martin, “The globalization of scientific controversy,”
Globalization, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2008, http://globalization.icaap.org/
content/v7.1/Martin.html
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Sport is increasingly globalised. There is one major
global sport with a huge following, football (otherwise
known as soccer), and many others for which there are
international competitions, such as table tennis and
swimming.
The English language is gradually becoming a global
language, becoming the dominant second language in
many countries in addition to countries where it is the first
language.
Globalisation is not always a good thing. Organised
crime is increasingly global, with ties between syndicates
in different countries. In the illegal drug trade, production,
distribution and sales often occur across country borders.
Despite globalisation, the majority of most activities
in the world occur locally and nationally. Most families,
for example, live together rather than being spread across
several countries. Most commuting is local. Despite the
increasing ease of international travel, many more trips are
to nearby locations. Globalisation needs to be seen in
conjunction with the contrary process of localisation.
My interest here is in one particular type of globalisation: the rise of large corporations whose operations span
several countries, and the associated distribution of goods
and services in markets in these countries. This can be
called corporate globalisation, to distinguish it from other
types of globalisation. Global trade has existed for centuries; corporate globalisation involves an increase in the
number and power of corporations, with headquarters in
one country, that have significant operations elsewhere. A
well known example is McDonald’s, whose outlets are
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found in dozens of countries and whose trademark arch is
one of the world’s most recognised logos.
Tactics and corporate globalisation
The state and globalisation seem, at least on the surface, to
be in tension with each other. The state exercises its power
from control over politics and economics within a country,
whereas multinational corporations have as primary goals
expansion and profits regardless of where they are based.
State elites presumably have most to gain by putting state
interests first, whereas multinational corporate elites care
less about any particular state and more about corporate
interests.
This tension is resolved by noting a common interest
between elites, namely those with most power and money
who are at the apex of political and economic systems.
Governments derive much of their income, through
taxation, from economic activity that is controlled and
stimulated by large corporations. Governments cannot
easily act against the interests of the largest corporations,
and few politicians want to, because they are lobbied by
corporate representatives and usually subscribe to a
capitalist ideology. Similarly, corporations depend on
governments to provide the legitimacy and coercion
necessary to preserve private property and to establish and
enforce rules for markets. Without governments, corporations could be challenged by their own workers, undermined by unscrupulous rivals, and lose access to markets.2
2 Robert L. Heilbroner, The Nature and Logic of Capitalism
(New York: Norton, 1985), p. 105: “remove the state and the
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A convenient way to understand the relationship
between states and multinational corporations is in terms
of a cooperative alliance of those with the most power and
wealth against those with much less. However, there are
tensions in the relationship, with leaders of the state and of
multinational corporations being pulled in different
directions by the logics of their respective enterprises. One
important tension arises from a central contradiction in
global capitalism, concerning the mobility of capital and
labour. By the logic of capitalism, both capital (money for
investments) and labour-power (workers) should be able
to move freely, so that capital can be deployed in areas of
greatest profitability and labour can similarly move to
where wages are highest. According to neoclassical
economic theory, this increases overall productivity to the
greatest extent. Accordingly, leaders of multinational
corporations have pushed against any restrictions on
where and how they can run their operations, and finance
capitalists have sought freedom to move money about as
they wish. In this context, the so-called Tobin tax, a tiny
percentage tax on any cross-border flow of money, is a
radical proposal, because it would put a brake on the most
volatile forms of financial speculation.
What then about the mobility of labour? Companies
usually prefer to have access to labour at lower wages if
skills are similar. One option is immigration; another is
guest workers, who come from lower-wage countries but
regime of capital would not last a day.” See also Michael Moran
and Maurice Wright (eds.), The Market and the State: Studies in
Interdependence (London: Macmillan, 1991).
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do not gain citizenship. For example, most of the routine
work in Saudi Arabia is done by millions of guest workers
from India, Pakistan, Egypt, the Philippines and other
countries. However, state elites put severe limits on the
movement of people who otherwise like to serve the
desires of corporate leaders. The reason is that state
loyalty is served by fostering a sense of us versus them:
the in-group bias of humans can be harnessed to build
loyalty to the abstract entity of a country.
Think of it this way. If states did not exist, and there
were no border controls or requirements for passports,
then people would be free to move wherever in the world
they liked, with the primary constraint that there was a
place for them in a new location. Most people would
probably prefer to stay near those among whom they grew
up and built relationships, but some—especially in areas
of exploitation and violent conflict—would prefer to
move.
This does not work when there are states that create
their own rationale by providing services to a population,
such as education and military defence, while maintaining
various forms of control over the population in order to
extract a surplus (through taxes and other means).
Unrestrained movement of people disturbs the connection.
If people can move freely, they are less likely to be
susceptible to the methods that state supporters use to
build identification with a country and its government. If
they travel widely, they are exposed to a variety of
political leaders and systems and may decide that the one
they grew up with could be improved.
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Those with money and desirable skills have, for
centuries, been better able to move across boundaries, and
some of them have developed global perspectives as a
result. But until the last century, most long-distance travel
was slow and expensive, and hence restricted. There has
been extensive migration, for example from Europe to
various colonised parts of the world, and from Africa to
life elsewhere as slaves. Mobility is nothing new, but the
ease of going back and forth within weeks or days is
unprecedented.
Cheap and easy mobility poses challenges to state
administrators. The extensive use of identity cards
(passports) is a recent innovation, introduced by states
seeking to establish themselves as the only legitimate
controller of people’s movements.3
All this suggests that the contradiction between the
mobility of labour, which would serve capitalists, and
control over the mobility of labour, which serves states,
has become ever more acute. This contradiction reveals
itself in the different methods used by governments in
relation to trade agreements.
Trade deals
Global trade has existed for millennia, well before the rise
of the state system and the imposition of border controls.
The industrial revolution and the emergence of modern
3 John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance,
Citizenship and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000).
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states happened over the same period, and each transformation shaped the other.4
The usual thinking about trade is that it is mutually
beneficial. Why then would a government set up barriers
to trade, such as high tariffs or prohibitions against
imports of specific goods? The reason is to protect local
enterprises from foreign competition. Unrestricted trade,
combined with protection of private property, typically
results in the development of oligopolies and monopolies.
Without restrictions, these could spread across boundaries,
engulfing local businesses. Protectionism enables a local
economy, under government or local business ownership,
to survive and expand until ready to compete internationally. As a rule, free trade serves those with the greatest
economic power.
So we come to contemporary trade agreements. They
are often called free trade agreements, but this is misleading because they usually contain various restraints on
trade, including quotas and intellectual property protection, and none enable significant mobility of labour. The
label “free trade” is useful to proponents because it
suggests that everyone will benefit while disguising the
mechanisms that restrain local decision-making. For
example, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) contains provisions allowing corporations to
sue governments over any law or regulation that hurts
profits. Many of the legal actions initiated under
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 are against the Canadian govern4 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD9901992 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992).
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ment due to its environmental regulations. Critics have
said that trade deals enable corporations to override the
policies of sovereign states.
Many trade deals mainly benefit the powerful groups
in the stronger parties to the deals. In the US, Congress
extends the duration of copyright whenever it is about to
expire, so for books, it is now 70 years after the death of
the author, with a related term for corporate works. This
extension of copyright has been dubbed the Mickey
Mouse Protection Act, because it retains the Disney
Corporation’s intellectual property rights over the cartoon
figure of Mickey Mouse, which would otherwise expire.
Intellectual property includes copyright, patents,
trademarks and trade secrets, among other forms of law
that restrict people’s use of ideas and their expression. It is
a restraint on trade: a copyrighted text cannot be used by
others for commercial purposes. The rationale for copyright is to allow a creator exclusive rights for a period of
time in order to stimulate creative production. The
duration of copyright, initially quite short, has been
extended far beyond any rational basis. Will authors really
want to write more novels because they know their heirs
(or their publishers) will be able to restrict others from
publishing them for decades after their death? What
difference will 70 rather than 50 years of post-death
protection make to their productivity or creativity? In
nearly every case, the benefits from such extended
protection flow not to the creator but to non-creators
whose control is guaranteed by the government. Such
examples make it obvious that intellectual property
regimes are in the service of powerful groups, especially
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pharmaceutical companies, major publishing houses,
software companies, and Hollywood producers.
Companies based in the United States gain most of
the benefit from these restraints on trade, sometimes called
monopoly privilege. In nearly every other country in the
world, greater monopoly privilege is harmful as assessed
on a national basis. For example, people and local
companies in Australia pay vastly more for access to
products covered by copyright, patents and other forms of
intellectual property than any returns from Australian
ownership. In practice, this means that Australians
(individuals, companies and the government) pay far more
for access to pharmaceutical drugs, proprietary software,
books and Hollywood films produced in the US or other
countries than returns from its own products similarly
covered. However, this did not prevent the Australian
government agreeing to extend its own copyright term
from 50 to 70 years post-death, something overwhelmingly advantaging US owners over Australian ones.
This is just one example of many showing that trade
deals serve multinational corporations over local interests,
and that governments will make agreements that hurt
national interests. They do it because their loyalties are
more to wealthy and powerful groups: they see the world
from the perspective of these groups and sincerely believe
that their actions will also serve the general interest.
This does pose a difficulty for governments. They
need to sell the deals to their own people. They are caught
in a dilemma: how to serve the interests of corporate (and
government) elites while convincing citizens that they are
serving national interests. Few of them think of this
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challenge in these terms, because they believe they are
serving national interests, but in practical terms they have
to negotiate the two prongs of the dilemma. To highlight
the dilemma, it is useful to look at the usual techniques
used by those who take actions that others might see as
unfair: cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, official
channels and intimidation. My expectation is that when
perpetrators in these circumstances are trying to serve two
contradictory goals, their use of these methods will be
inconsistent.
Let’s begin with cover-up and its obverse, exposure.
In negotiating trade deals, governments collectively
operate with great secrecy, not revealing the proposed
terms of the agreements. Yet at the same time they
trumpet the great advantages of the deals for their citizens.
The secrecy—the cover-up—of the provisions of the deals
is to hide their damaging aspects from their own citizens,
who might be able to mobilise to resist them. (Politicians
say secrecy is needed so negotiators can discuss sensitive
matters confidentially.) On the other hand, political
leaders are quite happy to say how wonderful the deals
will be for everyone. The tension between these two
stances is bridged by “trust us.”
In 1997, while the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was being negotiated in secret, a US citizens’
group, Global Tradewatch, obtained the text, which had
hitherto been kept secret, and circulated it to campaigners
in several countries. This exposure was instrumental in the
popular efforts to stop the MAI.
You might think that if deals were really so good for
everyone, politicians would be pleased to tell everyone
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about what conditions were being discussed and what
trade-offs were being considered. The reality is that many
of the points being discussed are unwelcome to citizens,
especially to specific groups. When the Australian
government was negotiating a “free trade” agreement with
the US government, it does not look good to say, “We’re
going to agree that no Australian-produced sugar will be
allowed to be sold in the US.” It looks like a restraint on
trade rather than free trade.
In 2015, while the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
was being secretly negotiated, WikiLeaks obtained and
published the proposed chapter on intellectual property.
This was embarrassing to some of the governments,
because they were seen as acting against the national
interest, instead serving the interests of pharmaceutical
and other companies. (This is not to mention that strengthening intellectual property provisions basically means
restraining rather than freeing enterprise.) This is another
example of how governments need to finesse the question
of cover-up and exposure: this involves hiding the
provisions and negotiations from citizens while telling
everyone—especially politicians who have to approve the
agreement—how wonderful life will be following
approval. The idea is to obtain political backing without
being influenced by popular resistance. (It should be noted
that most politicians undoubtedly believe in the value of
the trade deals they support.)
Next consider the value attached to trade agreements,
positive or negative. As already mentioned, governments
tout the advantages of the deals, appealing to the positive
connotations of “free” in “free trade.” Critics, on the other
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hand, have sought to discredit many trade deals, especially
the ones mainly benefiting the rich and powerful.
Closely associated with values associated with trade
deals are the many explanations of how they work or don’t
work. Proponents point to many advantages, usually
ignoring harmful effects, and critics do the reverse. Critics
often try to frame the deals as serving the interests of large
corporations at the expense of national sovereignty, which
nominally is under citizen control or at least influenced by
citizens via elections and public debate. However, the
responsiveness of elected representatives to the popular
will is elusive when it comes to trade agreements, as
indicated by the secrecy involved in the negotiations and
the reluctance of governments to sponsor a wide-ranging
public discussion.
The legitimacy of trade deals derives from their
official status. They are inter-government agreements, and
to the extent that governments have credibility, so then
should the agreements. It would hardly seem fair if
corporations simply stitched together a set of rules for
trade and imposed it on the world’s population. Governments, especially those with fair elections, have much
greater credibility for this purpose. Many members of the
public trust what political leaders say, at least until blatant
hypocrisies emerge: new leaders often have a honeymoon
period, short or long, and may be able to push through the
deals, especially when critics do not have details in
advance to muster contrary arguments: many deals are
faits accomplis. For corporations, governments are an
essential part of the process to make the deal and to
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provide protection of private property and regulations to
enable large corporations to thrive.
However, the fact that trade agreements are negotiated by governments provides remarkably little leverage
for critics. This is the appearance of justice without the
substance. After all, trade agreements are seldom a major
election issue and politicians in any case do not have to
follow through on election promises.
Finally, there are the methods of intimidation and
reward. Intimidation of trade-deal critics through funding
cuts or discrediting individuals is probably not as
important as the great awards for those who support the
deals. Some corporations and industry sectors receive
direct financial benefits. Some individuals receive jobs
and promotions. Journalists can gain better access when
they are sympathetic.
In summary, governments play a double game in
praising trade deals while restricting what members of the
public know about the process and outcomes. Their basic
strategy has to be to please two audiences: the corporations that benefit from the deals and the public that elects
the politicians and which can agitate in opposition. The
main ways that unpleasant truths about the deals—
especially that their primary benefits are to large
corporations—are dealt with is by hiding them from the
public as long as possible. Meanwhile, the deals are touted
under the assumption that benefits to the economy
automatically lead to benefits for everyone.
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Tax havens
Another source of tension for governments is the existence
of tax havens, which are locations enabling individuals
and businesses to avoid or minimise the tax they pay.5 For
example, a multinational corporation can establish its
central office in a jurisdiction with low taxes and high
financial secrecy, such as Switzerland, Hong Kong or the
Cayman Islands, and then use transfer pricing to reduce its
apparent income in higher-tax places like France and
Sweden.
Tax havens are just one aspect of a wider process of
tax avoidance and corrupt money transfers. Taxation is
one of the powers of governments, and indeed one that
enables the state to exist. Taxation can be thought of as an
imposition on free exchange between individuals and
groups; it is intended to be compulsory, and perhaps is the
only state compulsion that remains widespread.6
In this context, it is not surprising that many people
do what they can to reduce their tax, and many otherwise
law-abiding citizens think nothing of cheating when it
5 Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men
Who Stole the World (London: Bodley Head, 2011); Gabriel
Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations: the Scourge of Tax
Havens (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
6 Slavery and serfdom have been legally abolished, though forms
still continue in parts of the world. Military conscription has been
abolished in most countries, and jury duty and voting, though
compulsory in some countries, are neither onerous nor difficult to
avoid if really desired. Taxation, though, is standard everywhere.
Only the means of imposing tax vary.
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comes time to file their income tax forms. When tradespeople ask to be paid in cash, it can be a sign that they do
not intend to report the money as taxable income.
Although tax avoidance is widespread in many
countries, the focus here is on the richest individuals and
companies, the ones with annual incomes in the millions
or billions of dollars. They have a capacity to pay, but
commonly do what they can to reduce their tax bills. No
surprise here. What might be surprising is that governments often seem quite happy to allow this to occur. They
sometimes produce fiery rhetoric about tax avoidance but
at the same time serve the rich at the expense of the poor,
and this is something to be hidden when possible.
First, to take an extreme example of corrupt behaviour, consider loans to dictatorial regimes. In quite a few
cases, the dictator and his family (very rarely her family)
skim vast quantities of money from the loans into private
bank accounts, held for example in Switzerland through a
shell company in the Virgin Islands. Vast means billions
of dollars. This is out-and-out theft. So what do Western
governments do about it? They demand that the country
honour the debt, namely that the corrupt government (or a
successor government) cut government expenditure and
raise taxes in order to pay interest and capital on the loans.
Another approach would be to say to their own banks,
“You made a bad loan. Too bad. You just lost the capital.
Don’t be foolish and do it again. If you want your money
back, you’d better do something about Swiss banks that
hide the proceeds of crime.” In practice, Western governments usually allow these sorts of crimes to continue.
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Then there is tax avoidance that is nominally legal.
Large multinational corporations use transfer pricing to
minimise their tax. This involves pricing internal transfers
of goods and money within the company’s operations in
different countries in a way that ensures that tax is as low
as possible. Usually this means that most of the profits
appear to come from parts of the company based in lowtax places such as Ireland. In countries with higher taxes,
it is seemingly miraculous that revenues of billions of
dollars result in little or no profit.
If governments wanted to stamp out this sort of
practice, it wouldn’t be hard—at least in principle. After
all, the rules for international finance are collectively
made by governments and international bodies dominated
by governments. In practice, corrupt practices and legalbut-unfair practices have continued for decades. The obvious explanation is that the most powerful governments
operate to serve the wealthy and powerful at the expense
of their own populations. This creates a challenge for
governments: how to justify their policies to their own
populations.
Consider possibilities for cover-up and exposure. I
can speak of my impression of how this is dealt with in
Australia: the role of tax havens and transfer pricing is
seldom front-page news. It is more likely to be relegated
to the business pages of some newspapers. Instead,
governments encourage the media to report on cheating by
those lower down, for example welfare fraud, when an
unemployed person obtains more benefits than officially
allowed. Low-level cheaters may be given stiff penalties,
perhaps even going to prison, whereas executives of
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companies benefiting from massive rip-offs, legal or
illegal, are seldom brought before a court.
There is a lot of reporting on taxation, with most of
the attention on how taxes are too high, especially for
high-income earners, with the explanation being that
lower taxes are needed to offer incentives. However, tax
evasion by rich individuals and companies only occasionally receives attention. There have been some scandals, for
example the “bottom-of-the-harbour” schemes used to
evade tax,7 but these have not led to major reform. Official
inquiries usually lead nowhere.
The following news report indicates the problem (the
Coalition refers to the ruling Liberal-National Party
government):
Tax paid by companies controlled by Australia’s
richest business people, including Gina Rinehart,
James Packer and Lindsay Fox, will remain secret
after the Coalition succeeded in exempting private
companies from new tax disclosure requirements.8
Australian billionaires found it embarrassing for information to be made public about how little tax they paid—
sometimes almost none at all—so they quietly lobbied
7 Companies were stripped of their assets and profits and then,
before taxes were due, transferred to new, poor owners. The
stripped companies were metaphorically sunk to the bottom of the
harbour.
8 Heath Aston, “Law change shields tax of wealthiest companies,” Sydney Morning Herald, 16 October 2015, p. 4.
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against the required disclosures. This illustrates how
exposure can be a potent way of challenging injustice, and
how governments can serve the interests of a wealthy
minority at the expense of the Australian public.
It would be possible to examine additional methods
to reduce outrage over tax havens and other forms of
large-corporation tax evasion, under the categories devaluation, reinterpretation, official channels and intimidation.
Only sometimes are these methods needed, because coverup is usually adequate. Without going through a full
gamut of methods, suffice it to say that governments play
a dual game of stigmatising low-level tax evaders while
avoiding giving attention to tax havens and high-level
evaders.
Final comment
Economic inequality can be a source of public outrage, so
government and corporate elites unite in dampening
concern.9 In relation to nationalism, there is a special
challenge for state elites. By dint of their role in serving
powerful groups, including those in other countries, they
have a challenging task in maintaining the population’s
commitment to the country and to the state while reducing
concern about inequality and actions that benefit the rich
at the expense of others.
This is why corporate globalisation induces such a
curious mixture of responses by governments, many of
9 Susan Engel and Brian Martin, “Challenging economic inequality: tactics and strategies,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.
50, No. 49, 5 December 2015, pp. 42–48.
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which promote or tolerate trade deals and tax havens that
serve the global and mobile rich of the world at the
expense of their own citizens who have less money and
fewer options. Opposition to corporate globalisation can
come from both ends of the political spectrum, from
workers who feel threatened by cheap foreign labour,
which can feed into racist feelings, and campaigners such
as in the Occupy movement who challenge inequality.
Examining the tactics used by governments provides a
useful way of mapping the difficulties they face in
reconciling nationalism and economic inequality.

12
The psychology of rule
“Who’s the leader of your country? What do you think of
him (or her)?” A few people will answer, “I don’t know
and I don’t care.” More commonly, though, people have
strong emotional connections with rulers. These can be
positive or negative. Quite a few liberal-minded US
citizens had a visceral hatred of George W. Bush, while
quite a few US conservatives detested Barack Obama.
Systems of rule are invariably accompanied by
emotions and, more generally, psychological processes.
Usually these facilitate the operation of the system.
Think of dictatorships in which the ruler is glorified.
In China under the rule of Mao Tse-Tung, classrooms had
several large photographs: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin—
and Mao himself. Think of the German Nazi regime with
mass rallies, Hitler being the commanding figure.
Systems of representative government are not exempt
from exalting the country’s leader. In the United States,
there is excessive attention to the president. Media speculation about the next president starts more than a year
prior to an election: there seems to be more attention to the
question of who is or will be the president than to policies.
In other countries, a visit by the US president is a very big
deal.
In countries with a monarch, even one without
power, this provides a convenient figurehead that provides
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the basis for endless discussion. A royal wedding or the
birth of a child in line for the throne receives great media
attention, as if it makes any practical difference. But it
does make a difference: it is part of the psychology of
rule.
In parliamentary systems, citizens do not vote directly for the prime minister, who is chosen by elected
party members. Gradually, though, prime ministers have
taken on presidential attributes, so much so that opinion
polls ask people their views about the prime minister and
possible alternatives. The point here is that attention is
constantly directed upwards, to the person at the top. In
any moderately large country, few individuals ever have
an extended interaction with the ruler. A photo opportunity perhaps, or a handshake, but in most cases the ruler
is an icon, a figurehead, known through media coverage
rather than personal contact.
A clue about the psychology of rule is the oftenstated preference for a “strong leader,” one who is decisive, commanding and leading the way, as the term
“leader” might suggest. Strangely, though, this is in
contrast with a leader who is cautious and consultative,
which might seem to be more in tune with the ethos of
democracy. Admiration for strong leaders may reflect a
common pattern of treating leaders as rulers, admiring
them for being dominant.
There is a body of research showing that people have
a psychological predisposition to support the status quo or
“the system,” in other words the way the world is
currently organised. John Jost and colleagues argue that,
“there is a general (but not insurmountable) system justifi-
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cation motive to defend and justify the status quo and to
bolster the legitimacy of the existing social order.”1 There
is evidence that subordinate and oppressed groups may
support the existing system as much as those in privileged
and dominant positions.2 It is possible that, after creating
an egalitarian social order, this psychological motive
might help to maintain support for it. However, in the
present world order, system justification serves to encourage acceptance of the existence of governments, the state
system and social inequality.
Insight into the psychological dynamics of rule is
offered by gestalt therapist Philip Lichtenberg in his book
Community and Confluence.3 He draws on a standard idea

1 John T. Jost, Mahzarin R. Banaji and Brian A. Nosek, “A
decade of system justification theory: accumulated evidence of
conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo,” Political
Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 6, 2004, pp. 881–919.
2 This research has affinities with the moral foundation of authority, discussed in chapter 2.
3 Philip Lichtenberg, Community and Confluence: Undoing the
Clinch of Oppression (Cleveland, OH: Gestalt Institute of
Cleveland, 1994, 2nd edition). Other useful sources for understanding the psychology of rule include Arthur J. Deikman, The
Wrong Way Home: Uncovering the Patterns of Cult Behavior in
American Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990); Jeff Schmidt,
Disciplined Minds: A Critical Look at Salaried Professionals and
the Soul-Battering System that Shapes their Lives (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); Judith Wyatt and Chauncey Hare,
Work Abuse: How to Recognize and Survive It (Rochester, VT:
Schenkman Books, 1997). There is a vast body of research rele-
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in psychology: projection. In this process, a person
disowns part of their own personality and attributes it to
others, namely projects it onto them, rather like a movie
projector puts an image on the screen. For example, a
person who is often angry may complain about others
being angry; a person who is forgetful may accuse others
of forgetting things. A standard example is a man who is
uncomfortable with the feminine side of his psyche,
rejects it and sees it in homosexual men, who he detests or
even attacks.
Lichtenberg says that projection dynamics are at play
in attitudes towards leaders. Ordinary citizens forget or
disown their own capacity to take initiative and instead
attribute it to leaders. When citizens admire strong leaders,
they disempower themselves (forget or reject their own
capacities), project their own power onto the leader, and
admire it.
For disliked leaders, the process is similar, just with a
different emotional content: the key is not admiration or
hatred for the leader, but the feeling that the leader has
power and that the follower or subject does not.
Look to governments for action
The most obvious manifestation of this sort of projection
is the expectation that for something to happen, governments need to take action, or perhaps stop taking action.
The result is an incredible fixation on appealing to
governments, through letters to politicians, petitions,
vant to the psychology of rule. The sources listed here are ones I
have found useful from an activist and social change perspective.
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meetings, and so forth. It’s as if no one can act autonomously or independently: someone in power has to do the
acting, and so if you want action, then get politicians or
other government officials to do it.
I regularly see this with whistleblowers.4 After they
speak out in the public interest about corruption or hazards
to the public, they are often subject to reprisals from
bosses, senior management and, sometimes, co-workers.
So what do they do next? They try to find some official
body to take action to rectify the situation: the board of
management, the ombudsman, auditor-general, a government inquiry, court or politician. At one level this makes
sense: often the problems are far greater than what any
one person can address. Power needs to be exerted. The
question is, where does the power come from? Most
whistleblowers instinctively look “upwards,” towards
those with more formal power, in government or government agencies.
An alternative source of power is found by looking
sidewards, towards co-workers, ordinary citizens and
action groups. To do this requires taking initiative, for
example going to the media, going to meetings of
campaigning groups, or helping organise a campaign. But
many whistleblowers, and others subject to abuse and
exploitation, feel they are so powerless that their only
salvation is to find a saviour somewhere up within the
system, a white knight who will come to the rescue.
4 Brian Martin, “Illusions of whistleblower protection,” UTS Law
Review, No. 5, 2003, pp. 119–130.
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The process of projecting one’s power onto leaders
doesn’t happen automatically. It is helped along in various
ways, via education, media, elections and a psychological
process called introjection.
Encouragement for projection onto leaders starts with
what is taught in schools, including instruction (explicit or
implicit) about the way the system is supposed to work:
society, and especially government, is presented as a
hierarchy, with some people in higher positions than
others, and with those at the top making the crucial
decisions. Relatively little attention is given to social
movements and how ordinary people can organise and
take action. Most schools are themselves organised
hierarchically, with students being subordinate to teachers,
teachers to principals, and perhaps principals to school
boards or education departments. Students are taught to
seek solutions to their own problems by going to teachers
or the principal (or perhaps their parents), not to organise
student protests.
The media are a major influence in encouraging
people to project their power onto leaders. Media stories
prioritise what governments do, both nationally and
internationally. Politicians are regularly shown giving
their views, in part because staffers seek favourable media
coverage. Even without this, though, journalists and
editors will run a story about the president or prime
minister over one about grassroots action.
Media stories, as well as giving precedence to politicians and others with formal power in the system, also
encourage projection by seldom providing any sense of
how citizens can act on their own, without relying on
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leaders. There are some stories about trade unions, but
usually about their actions, not about the daily slog of
organising. There are some stories about environmental
groups, usually with attention to spokespeople, not about
what they spend most of their time doing.
The threat of global warming has triggered one of the
world’s greatest grassroots movements, with groups of all
sorts taking action, talking to neighbours, cutting back on
consumption, installing energy-efficient technologies and
contributing to community initiatives. Yet to look at media
treatments, nearly everything seems to depend on governments taking action. Governments do make a difference,
to be sure. The point here is that media coverage encourages people to look to governments for solutions or to
condemn governments for doing the wrong thing rather
than suggesting how people can take action directly.
Then there are elections, in which candidates
compete for people’s votes in order to occupy leadership
positions. The process of participating in an election can
serve, in a psychological sense, as one of giving consent to
the system of rule.5 An unelected national leader can be
seen as a dictator, as illegitimate; an elected national
leader is legitimate and is a person to whom the population has willingly granted power. Of course not everyone
votes and not everyone votes for the successful candidate,
but still elections as formal processes of selecting leaders
offer legitimacy and facilitate projection of power onto the
5 Benjamin Ginsberg, The Consequences of Consent: Elections,
Citizen Control and Popular Acquiescence (Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley, 1982).
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leader. After all, if voters have voluntarily chosen a leader,
then deferring to that leader makes sense psychologically.
Elections are a method of encouraging acquiescence.
This is one of the reasons that many dictators run
sham elections. Even though nearly everyone recognises
that the election has been rigged in one way or another,
the process is a ritual that encourages acceptance of the
outcome. In a way, it is analogous to singing the national
anthem.
Education, media coverage and elections serve to
encourage projection of power onto leaders, and leaders
contribute to this through a psychological process called
introjection. It involves, in this case, psychologically
taking on the power of others. Leaders assume they have
power, power that has been granted to them by their
followers, subordinates or subjects. Now someone might
say, “Well, actually, leaders do have power, so this thing
called introjection isn’t needed.” This assumes the common model of power as something that powerful people
possess and others have less of. However, a ruler does not
exert power simply through what is in their own hands:
their power depends on acquiescence or cooperation or
eager support.
A military commander can do little if the troops
refuse to obey. Arrest them and put them in prison! But
this requires someone to do the arresting. Thinking about
power this way leads to the perspective that it depends on
quite a lot of people proceeding as if the ruler does indeed
hold power as a possession: subordinates do as they are
told, whether with enthusiasm or reluctance, knowing that
if they don’t, they may suffer penalties implemented by
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other subordinates who do what they are told. If all the
subordinates got together and made their own decisions,
the power of the ruler would evaporate.6
Introjection enables leaders to command more effectively. They believe, deep down, that a mandate has been
granted to them, or that they are powerful, and the resulting feeling of authority helps them maintain the loyalty or
acquiescence of others. In short, belief helps to maintain
the reality.
When leaders deeply believe they are powerful, the
corollary is that followers are relatively powerless. In
practice, leaders can do little unless their followers support
them, by doing their biding. Leaders, somewhere in their
minds, may appreciate their own limited power, but to be
effective commanders they have to get rid of this insight,
so they project it onto their followers. The complementary
process is that followers introject the belief of their own
powerlessness projected by their leaders.
The concepts of projection and introjection are ways
of understanding mental dynamics. If these concepts are
not appealing, it may be more useful to talk about belief
systems. Leaders adopt belief systems in which they are
powerful and their followers are not, and many followers
6 The idea that people consent to being ruled was first articulated
by Étienne de La Boétie, Anti-dictator (New York: Columbia
University Press, [1548] 1942), with the title sometimes translated as Discourse on Voluntary Servitude. The trajectory of La
Boétie’s ideas has been examined by Roland Bleiker, Popular
Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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adopt belief systems in which they are powerless compared to their leaders.
The processes of projection and introjection are most
obvious in the case of national leaders and power, but can
be observed elsewhere. Take for example the Nobel
prizes, bestowed annually on the person or group considered to have made superlative contributions to physics,
chemistry, physiology/medicine, economics, literature and
peace. When you stop to think about it, the committee
does not change the reality of a person’s achievement. A
high-performing scientist does not suddenly have greater
achievement as a result of receiving a Nobel prize: their
achievement is the same; only the recognition has
changed. Yet many observers treat the awarding of a
Nobel prize as a type of anointment to greatness. Suddenly
the winner is highly sought after for interviews, talks, and
articles, and their opinions on all sorts of issues—in many
cases quite separate from their prize-winning research—
are treated with reverence. In psychological terms, greatness, in terms of brilliance and wisdom, is projected on
prize-winners, some of whom introject—psychologically
accept—this projection and start believing they are more
exceptional than before. (Of course many might already
have believed they are qualitatively different from others.)
Projection and introjection can be traced back to
other authority relationships, most obviously between
children and parents. It is apparent in the Stockholm
syndrome, in which captives, for example people who
have been kidnapped, start identifying with their captors
and lose the capacity to resist or escape even when the
opportunity arises. It relates to the idea of learned
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helplessness: experiments show how mice, as a result of
particular experiments, lose the capacity to try to escape
electric shocks, even when the opportunity is at hand.
Projection of power is also apparent in studies of obedience to authority, in which experimental subjects take
actions, such as hurting another person, when instructed to
by authority figures or simply encouraged to by the way
the experimental situation is set up.7
Projection is easier when it is collective. If everyone
else is applauding a political leader, it is easy to go along
with the crowd. On the other hand, all it takes is a bit of
dissent and it becomes easier to dissent.
Tactics of projection
Projection is a psychological state, orientation or process,
and the focus here is on projection of people’s power onto
leaders, especially national leaders. To talk of the tactics
of projection is to refer to methods that encourage this
type of projection. These tactics follow directly from the
previous discussion of the role of education, the media,
elections and introjection in encouraging projection of
power onto leaders.
First is exposure of the power of leaders, which is
routinely highlighted in the media, especially during
elections. Leaders themselves contribute through their
interactions with others, often touting what they have
accomplished, while seldom mentioning that they could
do nothing without the governmental apparatus at their
7 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper &
Row, 1974).
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disposal. National leaders have media teams to promote
their visibility, in a selective way, highlighting positives.
Second is valuing the power of leaders. Again, this is
routinely promoted in schools, the media and elections. Of
course, leadership is contested, so leaders are treated as
good or bad depending on whether a voter supports them
and/or their party. Still, the principle of leadership is
seldom questioned. In schools or the media, there are few
voices saying, “Maybe our national leaders should have
less power.”
Third is explaining that having powerful leaders is a
good thing, or is just the way things are. The necessity of
hierarchies is not often the subject of a careful analysis; it
is more commonly assumed than argued. Arguments may
be brought out in the face of criticisms. Otherwise they are
usually relegated to academic journals. Least of all is the
process of projection ever discussed.
Fourth is endorsement of leaders having power, and
of citizens projecting their own power onto leaders. This
occurs most obviously during elections, which can be
understood as rituals in which voters endorse candidates,
obviously enough, and more generally by participating
endorse the system of electoral representation in which
elected officials are granted power to make decisions on
behalf of the rest of the population. Without the ritual,
governmental power would not have the same legitimacy:
elections serve a psychological purpose of encouraging
projection of power onto leaders.
Fifth is rewards for projecting power onto leaders,
and here it is possible to think of psychological rewards.
Being part of a community with like-minded others is one
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reward: if everyone else is treating leaders as holders of
power, then there is a satisfaction in conforming to this
way of thinking. More deeply, projection of power allows
relinquishing one’s own agency and putting trust in a
higher power. This can evoke the experience of childhood
and trust in one’s parents, something that for many can
provide a feeling of security and safety. If the parent
(national leader) is always there, is a source of good, and
has been endorsed by the population, there is no need to
assert oneself, namely to take the initiative to promote a
different sort of society, one without powerful leaders at
the top.
Tactics of counter-projection
One alternative to projecting power onto leaders is simply
not to project it—not to put so much attention and
expectations on leaders—but rather acknowledge one’s
own power to act, and assume the responsibility for doing
what is possible in the circumstances. Another alternative
is to project power to a collective, such as a trade union or
activist group or social movement, while participating in
it. These sorts of psychological alternatives, namely
different ways of emotionally engaging with the world and
the exercise of power in it, are systematically suppressed.
Cover-up is the first technique. Schools teach little
about the agency of ordinary citizens compared to that of
rulers; mass media give little attention to grassroots
empowerment compared to the power of leaders; elections
signal that the role of citizens is voting for rulers; and
leaders, through their projection of their own dependency
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onto followers, discourage recognition of the capacity for
autonomous action.
Devaluation is a second technique. In as much as
grassroots, independent action is acknowledged as existing, it is typically painted as a threat or as ineffectual.
Mass protests are portrayed as dangerous threats to the
social order. For workers to demand decision-making
roles in the production process is treated as subversion.
And so on. The implication is that identifying with these
manifestations of collective action is misguided, indeed
almost a sign of mental disorder.
Reinterpretation is a third technique: it involves
explanations of why psychological alternatives are wrong.
Reinterpretation in other contexts, for example to justify
shooting of peaceful protesters, can involve lying about
what happened, minimising the consequences, blaming
others, and framing the actions as legitimate. For psychological processes, these techniques are internalised within
a person’s thoughts and emotions. They can involve moral
disengagement through processes such as displacement of
responsibility, ignoring consequences, and dehumanisation.8
Official channels constitute a fourth technique for
suppressing alternatives to projection of power onto
8 Samantha Reis and Brian Martin, “Psychological dynamics of
outrage against injustice,” Peace Research: The Canadian
Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2008, pp.
5–23. See especially the work of Albert Bandura, Social
Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1986), pp. 375–389.
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leaders. Official channels include expert panels, ombudsmen, regulatory agencies and any other formal process
that promises to provide justice. Elections are one
important official channel. In the case of projection of
power, official channels are the recipients of expectations
for obtaining justice, and top-level leaders are the ultimate
official channel. In psychological terms, the very existence
of official channels creates the expectation that someone
out there will be the savour who slashes through evil
doings and provides salvation. By the same token, the
existence of official channels discourages recognition that
action can be taken directly, without relying on people in
formal positions of authority.
Intimidation is a fifth technique for suppressing alternatives. In the material world, this can involve threats,
dismissal and physical attacks. In the psychological world,
intimidation can occur by the threat of a different idea to a
person’s way of understanding the world and their place in
it. One such threat is posed by cognitive dissonance, when
ideas about the world clash with actual occurrences. Many
people believe the world is just.9 Poverty and exploitation
pose a threat to this belief, and the solution can be the idea
that people are to blame for their own misfortune, even
when the evidence suggests otherwise. This is known as
blaming the victim, and is a common phenomenon.10 The
idea that people have significant agency separately from
9 Melvin J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental
Delusion (New York: Plenum, 1980).
10 William Ryan, Blaming the Victim (New York: Vintage,
1972).
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leaders can be quite threatening, and promptly dismissed
from consciousness. This is a sort of internal, psychological intimidation. It can be thought of as the process of
introjecting powerlessness, which in practice means being
fearful of one’s own capacity to act.
Challenging the psychology of rule
The psychology of rule, including projection of power
onto leaders and the introjection of powerlessness, can be
deeply entrenched, sometimes deeper than actual rule. It
might be said that, “You can take the ruler away from the
people, but not the ruler out of their minds.” After the
execution of the king during the French revolution, it was
not long before there was a new ruler, Napoleon; it might
be that his rise was easier because of the population’s long
experience of being ruled. A similar dynamic occurred in
Russia: after the overthrow of the oppressive rule by the
Czar, the workers’ and soldiers’ soviets promised an
egalitarian future but before long Stalin became dictator.
Many people assume that a person’s personality is
fixed, but actually personality is adaptable. Many people
suffer from anxiety or depression or sometimes both.
These are aspects of personality, and psychologists have
spent enormous efforts in finding ways to change them.
One of the most used methods is cognitive-behavioural
therapy, in which a person learns to counter unwelcome
thoughts by thinking about reasons why they are irrational.
By doing this on a regular basis, it gradually becomes
habitual, and levels of anxiety and depression can be
reduced.
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Some years ago I was a subject in a study of “personality coaching.” Like other subjects, I first took the standard NEO Personality Inventory questionnaire, obtaining
scores on the five main traits of personality, called
neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness and
conscientiousness. Each of these five areas has six subtraits. For example, under neuroticism—more politely
called emotionality—there are anxiety, anger-hostility,
depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness and vulnerability. After receiving our personality profiles, we
received weekly coaching for a couple of months, with
exercises to change any aspect of personality we chose.
Many subjects decided to try to reduce their scores on a
sub-trait of neuroticism, which makes sense: who wants to
be anxious or depressed? I chose a different area: a subtrait of openness called feelings, and over the period of the
study my scores changed to reflect a greater receptivity to
my own and others’ feelings.
The point here is that personality traits, as normally
measured, may be fairly stable, but they are not fixed.
They are, in part, a response to environmental influences.
If the traits of individuals can be shifted through coaching,
it makes sense to think that traits of many individuals can
be shifted by changes in culture and the economy. Quite a
few observers of US culture have noted that narcissism—
characterised by self-centredness, grandiosity, lack of
empathy, and rage when prerogatives are threatened—has
become far more common.11 For example, surveys of
11 Jean M. Twenge and W. Keith Campbell, The Narcissism
Epidemic: Living in the Age of Entitlement (New York: Free
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college students show that in the matter of a few decades,
far more see their goal in life as personal advancement,
especially in making money, than serving worthy causes.
Indeed, personal advancement is seen as a worthy cause!
This increase in narcissism can be linked to the rise of
neoliberalism and the associated promotion of materialism
and individualism.
It also makes sense to think of personality as potentially malleable because of the many efforts to get people
of think and behave in different ways. Some advertising is
about encouraging people to buy particular products, but
much advertising is about getting people to think of
themselves in different ways, and in particular to be
dissatisfied with themselves, as being incomplete and
needing a product or service to fix the deficiency.
The psychology of rule is no different. There may be
some basic tendencies in the human psyche, but the
processes of projection and introjection can be changed, in
two ways. One way is for people to project power to a
different recipient; the other is to reduce the tendency to
project power at all.
With this context, it is worth going through different
types of tactics both to challenge the psychology of rule
and to promote a different sort of thinking that might be
called “empowered thinking.” First is the tactic of
exposure. To counter the constant attention to leaders in
Press, 2009). See also Sandy Hotchkiss, Why Is It Always about
You? The Seven Deadly Sins of Narcissism (New York: Free
Press, 2003); Anne Manne, The Life of I: The New Culture of
Narcissism (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2014).
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education, the media and elections, it is not enough to
highlight the bad aspects of individual leaders, because the
deeper problem is the emphasis on leadership, at least with
the assumption of hierarchy, with its formal differences in
power. Hating leaders is not so very different from
adoring them, because each involves projection of power.
Perhaps being indifferent is a more suitable attitude to
cultivate. To do this, avoiding attention to political leaders
can be helpful, instead focusing attention on the power of
so-called ordinary people.
The difficulty of doing this can be seen by trying to
find textbooks that present history and politics from the
point of view of the people rather than rulers. There are a
few choices, such as E. P. Thompson’s The Making of the
English Working Class and Howard Zinn’s A People’s
History of the United States. Even after cultivating a
people’s-history mentality, there is the challenge of everyday conversations. Within organisations, much gossip is
about bosses, not about the capacities of co-workers, and
then there is commentary on the latest news about local
and national politics, nearly always driven by discussion
about leaders. If you’re regularly able to turn conversations away from politicians to how to work together
independently of leaders, you have a rare skill indeed.
The next tactic is devaluing and valuing: devaluing
the belief in the power of rulers and valuing the belief in
the power of ordinary people. The devaluing of the power
of rulers is a bit tricky. As noted earlier, it’s not enough to
be hostile to the current rulers, as that continues to assume
that they are important, being worthy of investment of
emotional energy. Turning love of a national leader into
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hatred of the national leader may make it easier to
encourage challenges to this particular leader, but it is not
clear whether this is a great improvement in challenging
the emotional investment in leadership. Perhaps a more
suitable goal is reducing or even removing the emotional
energy invested in any leader, either positive or negative,
and either current or future. The importance of this can be
seen by noticing how many people who detest a current
leader pin great hopes on some future one. If salvation is
seen as coming from a change in leadership, the projection
of power onto leaders has not been devalued.
Perhaps a better attitude is indifference, ignoring the
constant media coverage and discussions about national
politics (or paying little attention to speculations about
what the boss will do, or who will be the next boss), or
perhaps treating all this attention with an attitude of
detached amusement, rather the way you might respond to
attention to a celebrity about whom you have little
knowledge and no interest. How to foster such an indifference or detachment is a big topic. At an individual level, it
might mean reducing media consumption. At an interpersonal level, when talking with friends for example, it
might involve switching the topic or developing some
humorous gibes about the constant attention to leaders.
With some friends, it might be possible to say, “It’s
fascinating how the prime minister has been able to entice
you into paying attention to herself/himself.” With others,
“It’s really boring to talk about the prime minister.” Or,
“Aren’t there some other people we could talk about?”
Depending on your occupation and position, you
might have a more direct way to influence the valuing of
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others. As a journalist or blogger, you can make choices
about focusing on leaders and their agency, for example
focusing on government policy, or on citizens and their
agency, for example local initiatives for change. As a
manager, you can make choices about how to interact with
subordinates, either as a director or a facilitator; to foster
agency by your subordinates, you can try to avoid introjecting power and deflect others’ interest in your thinking
and instead encourage independent thinking, for example
by nominating a person to be a devil’s advocate. In some
techniques, there’s a fair bit going on besides valuing. The
point is that by changing one’s behaviour and fostering
behaviour change in others, it’s possible to influence their
ways of feeling about power and agency.
The next tactic is interpretation, which means
explaining what’s going on. In this case, interpretation is
about the ways of explaining the distribution of power.
Interpretation tactics that serve rulers involve explaining
unequal power as natural, inevitable, functional, necessary
or unquestionable. To challenge such interpretation tactics, alternative views can be presented that leaders are
power-hungry, self-serving, corrupt and a danger to
society and that it is much better to develop the capacity of
ordinary people to cooperate and make decisions for
themselves. In short, rulers are not needed.
There is plenty of writing and examples available that
can be used to counter the standard interpretation techniques, and which can be introduced in conversations,
meetings, blogs and campaigns. How much this can shape
feelings about rule, in particular the projection of power
onto leaders, is an intriguing question. If people were
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entirely rational, then arguments and evidence would be
sufficient to change thinking and behaviour, but people are
commonly driven by their intuitive minds.12 Projection of
power is hardly ever the result of a calm, careful analysis
of desirable ways of emotionally relating to rulers and
subjects. Likewise, overcoming projection of power is
seldom going to be achieved by arguments alone. Nearly
always, experience—for example, involvement in grassroots campaigns—is more likely to influence gut reactions. After gut reactions shift, then a person may seek out
evidence and arguments to support their new intuitive
feelings. So evidence and arguments are valuable, but
more to support those who already have corresponding
feelings than to create those feelings.
The fourth set of tactics is discrediting tactics used by
rulers and endorsing alternatives. Translated into the psychology of rule, this means discrediting projection of
power onto rulers and instead endorsing accepting one’s
own power and capacity to act.
It’s worth reiterating that discrediting rulers’ tactics
does not necessarily mean discrediting particular rulers.
After all, lots of people hate the president, or the boss for
that matter. To hate a person is still to invest emotional
energy in them, and usually to project some power onto
them. Lichtenberg observes that agents of rulers, such as
police, soldiers and informers, often are psychologically
fused with rulers. When those who are weaker develop a
passionate hatred of these agents, such as activists who
detest the police, this can reflect a projection of their own
12 See chapter 2.
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tendencies to identify with rulers. In other words, scorning, blaming or hating the agents is a means of warding
off a desire to submit to power. Lichtenberg recommends
that challengers learn about their own psychological
tendencies by interacting with agents of power.13
Rather than condemning agents of power, what
should be involved here is discrediting rulership, namely
the structures and processes of domination, including the
benign exercise of power and control. It might be easy to
reject domination at an intellectual level. What’s needed is
changing one’s intuitive response, to react at a gut level
against rulership, and favourably towards non-hierarchical
alternatives.
There is research showing that people’s reactions to
sexually or racially coded information—for example
pictures of people—are deeply embedded in their minds.
You might think you aren’t prejudiced, but sophisticated
experiments show that most people react differently in
their brains to images of men and women, or black and
white people.14
One way to change automatic responses is to practise
by using conscious attention and behaviour to shape
intuition. An example is for a shy person to pretend to be
outgoing, for instance to approach strangers and start a
conversation. At first it feels uncomfortable, because the
intuitive mind yells out in pain. After a few months of
13 Lichtenberg, Community and Confluence, 91–95.
14 Mahzarin R. Banaji and Anthony G. Greenwald, Blindspot:
Hidden Biases of Good People (New York: Delacorte Press,
2013).
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practising being outgoing, the intuitive mind learns from
the actual behaviour that it’s okay, and stops rebelling.
How to apply the same approach to challenging the
automatic projection of power remains to be systematically tested. It’s plausible to think it can occur by regularly
associating revolting things, like a detested food, with
systems of domination. Likewise, a parallel process of
valuing alternatives to rulership could be developed.
The fifth and final set of tactics involves rewards,
either refusing the rewards provided by leaders and
fostering and accepting the rewards of equal relationships.
In the case of the psychology of rule, the rewards are
psychological rather than being money, power or position,
but psychological rewards can be just as potent as any
others.
The reward from projecting power onto rulers is
being freed of any expectation of agency or responsibility.
It is like becoming a child who trusts parents to protect
them. It is a feeling of security. Projecting power can provide a psychological reward even when the parent/leader
is oppressive, because this still means acquiescing and not
being burdened with the expectation of escaping or
challenging the ruler and acting autonomously.
The tactic of rulers is to encourage projection of
power, and to introject power, so the counter-tactic is to
refuse to project power. This means accepting one’s own
power, not relying on rulers or leaders or bosses to be the
solution to problems, but instead thinking, planning and
acting in whatever way is possible. It means taking direct
action rather than appealing to leaders to take action. It
means planting a community garden rather than asking for
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official permission to set up a garden. It means using
encryption and other techniques for secure communication
rather than relying on government agencies to protect
privacy. It means cutting your own greenhouse gas
emissions or joining the “transition town” movement for
energy security rather than appealing to national leaders to
establish policies to deal with climate change. It means
helping communities prepare to defend against aggression
rather than relying on military defence.15
These examples also point to the parallel process of
providing rewards for alternatives. The psychological
rewards from direct action include the satisfaction of
exerting one’s own agency, of making practical steps
towards alternatives, and of working with others in a
common cause. Setting goals and working with others
towards achieving them is known to improve wellbeing.16
Psychologically, reducing projection of power and taking
on more responsibility for one’s future can be satisfying
indeed. This satisfaction can be the basis for continued
efforts to overcome projection of power and build a
society without domination.
Conclusion
To challenge systems of domination, action is crucial, and
there is plenty of effort put into methods such as protests,
strikes, boycotts, setting up alternative systems of govern15 Brian Martin, Social Defence, Social Change (London:
Freedom Press, 1993).
16 Sonja Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness (New York:
Penguin, 2007).

198

Ruling tactics

ance—and armed struggle, too. Taking action is essential,
but it does not always lead to changes in the way people
think and feel. If people feel more secure when projecting
power onto leaders, then overthrowing a repressive
government may simply be the prelude to another
autocratic ruler.
One way to foster a psychology of autonomy, selfefficacy and cooperative endeavour is to begin behaving
towards others in ways that reflect these ideals. This can
be done in campaigning groups and in day-to-day interactions. By behaving in egalitarian ways, gradually the
psychology of rule is transformed into a psychology of
egalitarianism, along the lines of the sayings “Be the
change you want to see” and “Live the revolution.” These
slogans contain important truths: change starts now rather
than after the revolution, and personal change is part and
parcel of social change. By following the sentiment in
these slogans, there is another process, or rather set of
processes: changes in behaviour lead to changes in
thought and emotion, and vice versa.
While changing the psychology of rule via new
modes of action is vital, there is also a place for a direct
focus on psychology, in particular on the mutual processes
of projection and introjection of power. In this chapter, the
focus has been on tactics by which projection is fostered
and challenged. Usually, when thinking about tactics, they
are out in the world of action, in business, military or
activist campaigns. But struggles over the way people
think and feel can also be thought of in terms of tactics,
and the same sorts of tactics are relevant as in other
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domains: exposure, valuing, interpreting, endorsing and
rewarding, and their opposites.
One of the advantages of focusing on psychological
tactics is that it is possible to begin immediately. There is
no need to join an action group (though that might be
helpful) and formulate a campaign strategy. Anyone can
start observing their own environment—including media
consumption, everyday conversations, topics that trigger
emotions, and sensations of discomfort and relief—and
experimenting with different ways of talking and thinking.
It may not seem like doing a lot, but it can be part of a
wider process. It is important, too. Otherwise, why would
there be such incessant efforts to encourage people to
project power onto leaders?
Finally, there is much to learn about the psychology
of rule and of egalitarianism. These are not important
research topics in psychology, nor do activist groups
systematically develop ways of changing the ways people
think. Indeed, many activists see salvation in different
rulers, or in their own activist leaders, rather than in
alternatives to rulership itself. Of course, there is plenty to
debate in this area, and not everyone aspires to end
expectations about dependence on leaders. What is
important is to openly address the issues of leadership,
rule, projection and introjection.

13
War
Just after World War I, US essayist Randolph Bourne
wrote, “War is the health of the state.” This statement
captures key insights about patriotism: war is a means of
both strengthening state power and stimulating loyalty to
the state.
An ultimate test of loyalty is willingness to die for
one’s group. The key question is, “what group are you
willing to die for?” Some parents are willing to die for
their children. But why should young men be eager to risk
their lives for an abstract entity called a country? That is a
mystery. An even stronger test of loyalty is willingness to
kill for one’s group. Why should anyone offer to kill a
stranger on behalf of an abstraction?
At a general level, war functions to accentuate group
identification. There is a threat to the group, so members
rally in defence. The threat is from the “enemy”: to
safeguard the group, the enemy must be defeated, even
destroyed. This impulse is deeply rooted in human
evolution. But this still doesn’t explain why such strong
loyalty can be attached to the country and government
rather than to some other entity, such as the family. After
all, in modern warfare, defeat does not necessarily mean
destruction for families or individuals—just a new set of
rulers, perhaps more benevolent ones. Why would a
mother or father expect a son to risk his life for a country?
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Part of the answer is that governments use a number of
techniques to foster identification and loyalty.
In Europe in the late 1800s, the socialist movement
gained great strength. It was epitomised by the slogan
“Working people of the world, unite!”—though in practice
the actual slogan referred to working men, with women
left out of the picture. The idea was that the working class
would stand together against the ruling class. As political
crises hit Europe in the early 1900s, with the possibility of
war, socialist leaders called on workers to refuse to fight
each other. But then came the so-called Great War
beginning in 1914—today called World War I but perhaps
more accurately called a European war—and most
workers rallied not against the ruling class but in support
of their governments, to fight and kill each other,
sacrificing their lives for their states. This was the context
in which Randolph Bourne said that war is the health of
the state. World War I stimulated patriotism, strengthened
European states against their own populations, and
undermined hopes of a peaceful transition to socialism.
In his famous novel 1984, George Orwell envisaged a
world divided into three competing superstates, Oceania,
Eurasia and Eastasia, constantly at war with each other.
War provided the pretext for dictatorship, including pervasive surveillance of citizens, including the novel’s
protagonist, Winston Smith. The novel was completed in
1948, and it can be argued that Orwell was portraying not
a future dystopia but rather elements of contemporary
reality, in the Soviet Union and other repressive communist states of the time as well as aspects of so-called
western democracies, just emerging from years of total
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warfare in which citizens were subordinated to the
common struggle against the enemy, and about to plunge
into a struggle called the cold war in which there was the
potential of destruction by nuclear weapons.

PROMOTING PATRIOTISM
Efforts to promote patriotism are especially prominent in
relation to wars. To illustrate some of the methods used, I
will use a range of examples, especially from World Wars
I and II, which involved unprecedented mobilisation of
societies for war.
Exposure
A crucial technique is exposure: war receives high visibility. Governments naturally want to highlight their efforts
against the enemy. The mass media, with their preoccupation with conflict and emphasis on proximity and local
relevance, give saturation coverage of war-related stories.
During wartime, governments and mass media operate
together to highlight relevant issues, for example that
sacrifices are needed, that resources for war-fighting are
top priority and that troops are putting their lives on the
line.
Valuing
Exposure usually operates in conjunction with valuing: the
war effort is seen as worthy. Supporting the government is
patriotic. Troops are glorified. This can occur in the
media, but is even more potent within families and local
communities. In Australia during World War I, men who
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volunteered for the army were seen by many as brave,
loyal and indeed everything a man should be. For many
women, a man in a uniform was far more desirable than
one not in the military. Supporting the troops became a
test of loyalty.
The glorification of troops continues after wars are
over. After World War I, monuments were constructed
throughout Australia in memory of the soldiers who died
in the war. In Canberra, the national capital, the War
Memorial is an impressive building with the name of
every Australian soldier who died in any war engraved on
a wall. In small towns and local suburbs throughout the
country, there are smaller memorials to soldiers.
This glorification of Australian soldiers occurred
despite the fact that Australia was not even under attack in
World War I: soldiers were sent to Europe to fight on
behalf of Britain, the home country. Australia had been a
British colony, only becoming an independent country in
1901. So Australian nationalism was subordinated to
British agendas.
The glorification of Australian soldiers occurred
despite World War I being a massive sacrifice of lives for
little purpose. Anzac Day, 25 April, is an Australian
public holiday in honour of military personnel who served
in wars. Anzac stands for the Australian and New Zealand
Army Corps. The year 2015 was the one hundredth
anniversary of the landing of Australian and New Zealand
soldiers at Gallipoli, in Turkey, where they futilely tried to
advance against Turkish troops. A bloodbath resulted,
with high casualties on both sides.
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Even supporters of the war might say that this
episode in Australian history was an absurd waste of lives
and that British commanders were incompetent. Furthermore, some Australian soldiers at the time said they respected their Turkish counterparts. Yet the overwhelming
sentiment remains that these Australian soldiers were
brave, advancing in the face of almost certain death.
Sacrificing their lives for their country was noble. All
those who “served their country” in uniform are honoured
today, but especially those who lost their lives in battle.
Death is thought to have brought them a type of greatness.
Critics of war might harbour different thoughts, for
example that these soldiers were naive and foolish pawns
in an insane, purposeless conflict, that they would have
been braver to have not joined the army, or that as
members of the working class they should have been
fighting against their upper-class commanders rather than
other working men. But such thoughts usually remain
private. Articulating them in public is to transgress against
a ritual that retains the full endorsement of the political
establishment.
Explanation
A third technique to promote patriotism in relation to war
is explanation, namely providing plausible reasons why
military defence is necessary. In many cases, formal
explanations are not needed, because of underlying
assumptions: there is an enemy, actually or potentially
dangerous, and the threat must be countered by lethal
force. Note that there are several assumptions involved in
this seemingly simple proposition: (1) there is an oppo-
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nent; (2) the opponent is dangerous: an enemy; (3) the
way to counter this dangerous enemy is through military
means.
The first assumption—there is an enemy—appeals to
the idea that we are a group and they are not part of the
group, and hence they are an enemy. The essence of
fostering patriotism is the ensure that the in-group is
thought of as the country or state or nation, and not some
other grouping such as an extended family, business,
sporting club, social class or network of like-minded
individuals.
The second assumption, that the opponent is dangerous, grows out of a common expectation that out-groups
are a threat to the in-group. An alternative is that the outgroup is actually more desirable. Maybe the so-called
enemy is actually a friend bringing salvation. This, to a
patriot, is treason, discussed later. For the purposes here,
the assumption of an enemy is part of the rationale for the
military.
The third assumption—that military defence is
necessary to counter the dangerous enemy—builds on the
common belief that the only way to oppose violence is
through superior violence. Defenders of military defence
hardly need to argue that the only way to stop an invasion
is through military means.
The rationale for military forces can sometimes
require dubious logic. A classic example is the theory of
nuclear deterrence touted during the cold war. From the
side of the US government and its allies, the Soviet bloc
was the enemy; it was dangerous because of its armed
forces, especially its nuclear weapons; and the only way to
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counter this threat was through superior force, including a
superior nuclear arsenal. The Soviet government was told
that if they attacked, they would be met by an overwhelming counter-attack, destroying them. This threat was
supposed to deter them from attacking. The Soviets were
assumed to think in exactly the same way, so the result
was deterrence via mutually assured destruction or MAD.
This rationale contained several flaws. Because of
secrecy about the capability of nuclear arsenals, it was
easy to exaggerate the threat. In the 1960 election
campaign in the US, John Kennedy campaigned on a
claim that there was a “missile gap,” namely that the
Soviet nuclear arsenal contained more missiles, even after
being informed by military figures that no such gap
existed.1 In fact, the US nuclear arsenal was far superior,
so it was the Soviet missile forces that suffered from
inferiority. Threat exaggeration has been a recurrent
feature of US strategic nuclear policy-making.
Another flaw in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is
its selective application, which operates with thinking like
this: “It’s good for us to be strong to deter the enemy, but
some enemies are so dangerous they should not be
allowed to deter us.” In the 1970s, most of the world’s
governments signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The governments of existing nuclear weapons states—US,
Soviet Union, Britain, France, China—pledged to reduce
their arsenals, while other governments pledged not to
1 Gary A. Donaldson, The First Modern Campaign: Kennedy,
Nixon, and the Election of 1960 (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2007), p. 128.
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acquire nuclear weapons. The idea of the treaty was to
stop “proliferation” of nuclear weapons capabilities,
namely to stop additional governments getting their own
arsenals. But what does this say about the doctrine of
deterrence? If governments are deterred from attacking by
nuclear weapons in the hands of enemies, then surely
more governments should have their own arsenals, and
eventually military aggression, or at least nuclear aggression, would cease.
The double standard in reactions to nuclear weapons
arsenals is sometimes acute. The US government has
repeatedly raised the alarm about weapons programmes in
other countries, notably North Korea, Iraq and Iran, all the
time sitting on its own arsenal of thousands of nuclear
weapons with sophisticated delivery mechanisms. The US
government claims it needs the weapons to deter attackers,
but desperately wants to stop other governments acquiring
their own deterrents. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was
launched on the pretext of stopping the threat of Iraqi
nuclear weapons, a threat that turned out to be nonexistent.
Then there is the case of Israeli nuclear weapons, an
arsenal thought to number dozens or hundreds, about
which US policy makers never raise any concern. The
implication is that deterrence doctrine involves an implicit
double standard: nuclear weapons are a deterrent, or just
not even mentioned, when they are in the hands of the
good guys, but are a grave threat to world peace when in
the hands of bad guys.
The case of nuclear weapons and deterrence theory is
just one example of the rationale behind military races.
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The enemy’s military threat is misperceived, almost
always by being exaggerated, thereby justifying a military
build-up that is seen as entirely defensive and used to
maintain peace. In blunt terms, our military is for peace,
theirs is for war. Deterrence theory and related logicalsounding rationalisations serve to hide or sugar-coat this
basic assumption.
Another common explanation of the need for military
force is to defend against attack. However, in many cases
there is no credible threat, yet threats are still invoked.
One of the arguments is that a threat may arise suddenly,
so military preparedness is required just in case. Think of
New Zealand, thousands of kilometres away from other
major population centres and of no strategic significance.
Yet the government of New Zealand maintains military
forces, allied to the US government.2 The argument about
the need for defence is plausible when there actually is a
threat, but when there is no threat but no major reduction
in military preparedness, this exposes the argument as
hollow.
Endorsements
Another key method of promoting group loyalty to the
state and its military forces is endorsement. In most
countries, nearly all prominent individuals—politicians,
2 The New Zealand government is not as tied to the US military
as the governments of Australia, Britain or Canada. For example,
in the 1980s the New Zealand government refused to allow visits
of US nuclear ships, much to the annoyance of US political
leaders.
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religious leaders, business executives, heads of government departments, and others—endorse the troops. There
may be disagreements about particular wars, weapons
systems or levels of military expenditure, but very few
people of significance question the basics about military
forces. To the contrary, many of them state their commitment: supporting the military is a test of loyalty, to the
extent that anyone who is seen as too weak in their
enthusiasm may be accused of being unpatriotic.
Rewards
Rewards are another method of promoting patriotism in
relation to war. In Palestine, Hamas provides financial
support to families of suicide bombers. To some, this is
outrageous, but most other governments give extra
benefits to at least some of those involved in war-making.
Veterans may have special hospitals and medical services,
and may receive special pensions. In the US after World
War II, the GI Bill gave veterans special access to higher
education. Many veterans and their families say not
enough is done for those who risk their lives on behalf of
their countries. However, many others commit their lives
to helping others—nurses, teachers and fire-fighters, for
example—but do not receive special benefits.
Far more than material benefits are the psychological
rewards, with soldiers being treated as heroes. Some who
display special valour receive citations.
Then there are the rewards for those at the top of the
hierarchy: commanders, generals and top politicians.
Wartime leaders who perform well are commonly seen as
exceptional individuals and greatly admired. A classic
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example is Winston Churchill, Britain’s prime minister
during World War II. Outside of this war, his record was
far less noteworthy. The cult of the leader is found in
many dictatorships; war, requiring mobilisation of a
society to defend against the enemy, exalts leaders even in
systems of representative government. This is because
uniting in a cause encourages individuals to put their trust
in the leader, and project their own sense of agency to the
leader.3
National leaders thus have much to gain from fostering conflict. An enemy is, in a sense, a leader’s ally in
building support for the state.
In summary, there are five main ways to promote
patriotism and state-centred thinking in relation to war:
exposure, valuing, explanations, endorsements and
rewards. When these work effectively, they become part
of the culture, adopted by individuals as part of their
thinking and overriding other loyalties. This is most
dramatically demonstrated when individuals are willing
both to kill and to sacrifice their lives for their country and
when family members are proud they have done so.

CHALLENGES
Not everyone goes along with the glorification of war and
the patriotic duty to support the state against its alleged
enemies. Indeed, in many places opposition to war has
been vociferous and sustained. There is nothing natural in
war-related patriotism: support for the country, and for its
3 See chapter 12.
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military forces, is only one way in which loyalty can be
assigned. The existence of alternative loyalties is why
continued efforts are exerted to promote patriotism and to
hide or discredit alternatives.
The next step in analysing tactics of patriotism in
relation to war is to examine direct challenges, taken
separately from promoting alternatives to war, which I
address later. Each of the five main methods of promoting
patriotism can be countered. This is a huge topic. For
example, peace movements have used a wide variety of
methods, including advertisements, petitions, rallies,
marches, refusal to join the military, and blockades. Many
of these actions are in relation to particular wars or
weapons systems, for example nuclear weapons.
Only some of these challenges to war present themselves as direct challenges to patriotism. Indeed, some
peace activists are careful to portray themselves as true
patriots, serving their country’s interests by opposing
disastrous policies that lead to death, destruction and loss
of civil liberties. Furthermore, peace activists are often
quite respectful of the troops, emphasising that their
opposition is to policies and practices, not individuals. In
this section, I present a few examples of challenges that
more directly target the promotion of patriotism in relation
to war. Many of these confrontations involve presenting
alternatives to war, for example diplomacy or nonviolent
action; I will address these later.
Challenging pro-military messages
First consider the high visibility of war stories, war
reporting and war memorials. Many challenges to the
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exposure of war occur out of sight. For example, a local
government might be planning to build a memorial to war
dead, and some staff members argue that the funds could
better be spent elsewhere, or that a memorial be built in
honour of peace campaigners. Librarians might choose to
order books on peace rather than war. Panels in charge of
the syllabus for a school district might prefer a text that
gives less prominence to war. There are many such quiet
battles over the visibility of war.
Most reporting on conflicts gives a one-sided
perspective, with emphasis on violent acts and on simplistic storylines involving good guys and bad guys. Watching
the news, it is very hard for viewers to appreciate the
sources of conflict, to understand the complexities involved, or realise that nonviolent methods are being used.
For example, news about the Israel-Palestine conflict
seldom gives any indication that nonviolent methods—
such as protests, strikes, boycotts and occupations—are
regularly used.
Critics of this usual approach to reporting conflicts
have called it “war journalism” and have proposed an
alternative, “peace journalism.”4 It involves offering a
broader, more in-depth treatment of conflicts, including
driving forces, historical context, different participants,
options for resolution, long-term impacts and so forth. To
the extent that journalists—both professionals and citizens—take up the principles of peace journalism, reporting of conflicts is transformed: a different sort of picture is
4 Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick, Peace Journalism
(Stroud, UK: Hawthorn Press, 2005).
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presented, with less emphasis on the latest violent clash
and more information about causes, motivations, multiple
players, precedents, initiatives, options and solutions.
Peace journalists, rather than racing to the scene of some
new atrocity, will be investigating ongoing conflicts—
often ones invisible in war journalism—probing the back
stories and exposing dimensions normally ignored.5
Devaluing war and the state
Given that glorification of troops and their noble cause is
standard in the usual war-linked patriotism, one option for
challenging war and the state is to do the opposite: treat
them as misguided, worthless, counterproductive, reprehensible or criminal. This is risky territory for opponents
of war, because defenders of the faith are very sensitive to
any criticism—especially criticism of soldiers.
On Anzac day, 25 April, in all parts of Australia there
is a dawn service to remember soldiers who lost their lives
in war, and a march in which veterans participate, some
wearing their uniforms. The annual Anzac Day march is
not a promising time to challenge any part of the Anzac
legend. In 1980 in Canberra, the national capital of
Australia, a group of women attempted to join the Anzac
Day march in memory of women raped in war.6 They
carried placards including “Rape is war against women,”
“Soldiers are phallic murderers” and “Women are always
5 Virgil Hawkins, Stealth Conflicts: How the World’s Worst
Violence Is Ignored (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008).
6 This information is drawn from articles and letters in the
Canberra Times. Copies available on request.
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the victims.” They planned to lay a wreath with a sign
saying, “In memory of women raped in war.” This protest
action was a direct challenge to the mythology of the
noble Anzacs: it suggested that some of them might have
been rapists. It is well documented that rape by soldiers is
a frequent occurrence: women in conquered territories are
prime targets. Sometimes rape is a conscious tool for
subjugating populations; more often it is an act in which
men take advantage of their power and the absence of any
policing of their crimes.
Police arrested 14 women, alleging there was an
imminent breach of the peace. (It is ironic when protesters
against war are charged with breaching the “peace.”) In
September, a special magistrate convicted the women.
Most received fines; three were jailed for a month.
According to a newspaper story, the magistrate said they
were “social mutineers” who were involved in “wilful and
collective defiance of authority, of a sort which in a
military sense would be called mutiny.” The three who
were jailed were said to have a “tendency to become
social anarchists.”
The attitude of the police and the magistrate—shared
by many of the veterans marching on Anzac Day—reflects
an extreme antipathy towards any action that devalues
soldiers, in this case by pointing to actions by soldiers that
are usually ignored in remembrances of a glorious past. It
is unthinkable that the troops were anything less than
noble.7
7 The magistrate’s comments stimulated a storm of protest.
Dozens of women prepared for civil disobedience at the following

War

215

In many parts of the world, it remains risky to show
disrespect towards veterans. Lindsay Stone discovered this
the hard way. She liked to take photos of herself making
provocative irreverent gestures, as a way of having fun.
One photo she posted on social media was of herself
making a rude gesture in front of a military cemetery. This
was taken up by critics, and Stone was inundated with
hundreds of thousands of abusive comments. As a result,
she lost her job.8 This illustrates that many people continue to be very upset by anyone showing disrespect for
soldiers. It also suggests that challenging the glorification
of troops is risky.
It is far safer to criticise political leaders who take
countries to war. The troops, after all, are just doing their
jobs.
With the abolition of conscription in many countries
and the rise of professional armies that use economic
incentives for recruitment, is it safer to challenge the
reverence associated with being a soldier? Professionals
are volunteers, to be sure, but no longer in a sacrificial
mission as in World War I. There are many others who
volunteer for dangerous occupations, such as fire fighting
and coal mining. Furthermore, the risk to many members
of military forces in western armies is minimal. Those
who sit in bunkers in Nevada and pilot drones on the other
year’s Anzac Day march. Meanwhile, the government passed a
new law against such protests. In the end, hundreds of women
were allowed to join the march.
8 Jon Ronson, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed (London:
Picador, 2015).
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side of the world are not risking their lives, though their
jobs require skill and dedication.
Then there are mercenaries, a category of soldier
different from volunteers or conscripts: mercenaries are
soldiers for hire. In the US, mercenaries are called contractors, a euphemism. Rather than being front-line
soldiers, contractors more commonly fill support roles
such as driving vehicles, and undertake unsavoury operations such as interrogations, renditions and assassinations.
Few members of the public realise that in the Iraq war
beginning in 2003, there eventually were more US contractors than US troops. Though most contractors are
highly professional and motivated by wanting to help
others, nevertheless to be seen as a “gun for hire” is not
nearly as glorious as being a regular soldier. So it is not
surprising that the US government plays down the role of
contractors and emphasises the contribution of its regular
armed forces.
In many wars, some politicians and soldiers are guilty
of war crimes. This might be waging an unjust war, killing
civilians, torturing enemy troops and committing or
tolerating atrocities. Exposing these crimes is a powerful
way to discredit those involved.
After World War II, leading Nazis were charged with
war crimes and brought to trial in Nuremberg, Germany.
This was a more civilised way of addressing war crimes
than the more common approach of summary execution.
Nevertheless, what is striking about responses to war
crimes is that nearly always it is the enemy that is targeted. Making a case that the victor, or the more powerful
side, was guilty of war crimes is a potent way to discredit

War

217

war-makers, but it is difficult to get many people to pay
attention. During World War II, the Allies carried out
extensive bombing of civilian targets in Germany and
Japan, yet few called this a war crime.9
Challenging justifications for war
Part of the connection between war and patriotism lies in
the official justifications for going to war and continuing
in war. Challenging the official rationales thus plays a role
in challenging the patriotism-war link. Doing this is an
important task, and one often done extremely well. There
are numerous speeches, articles and books that question
particular wars, or war in general, with careful arguments
and ethical considerations.
Prior to the US-government-led invasion of Iraq in
2003, there was a massive protest movement. As part of
this movement, various writers challenged the official
rationales for the war. After the invasion, the intellectual
questioning of the enterprise continued.10 However, this
level of questioning is unusual. US military involvement
9 Eric Markusen and David Kopf, The Holocaust and Strategic
Bombing: Genocide and Total War in the Twentieth Century
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995).
10 See for example Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris: The
Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War
(New York: Broadway Books, 2007); Sheldon Rampton and John
Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda
in Bush’s War on Iraq (New York: Tarcher/Penguin, 2003);
Norman Solomon, War Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits
Keep Spinning Us to Death (New York: Wiley, 2005).
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in Vietnam began in the 1940s with support for French
colonialists, and continued through the 1950s and 1960s.
The US movement against the war gradually developed in
the 1960s, along with the escalation of the war itself.
Noam Chomsky’s trenchant criticisms of US policy, for
example in American Power and the New Mandarins,
played a significant role in stimulating opposition.
Going back to earlier wars, well-articulated opposition sometimes took quite some time to develop. More
important, in many countries, was the fact that governments suppressed criticism. In Nazi Germany, there might
have been critiques of Hitler’s war plans, but they did not
have a high public profile.
Challenging justifications for war can also be done
retrospectively, in histories. Very few histories of the US
offer comprehensive critiques of the war of 1812 or the
Mexican war, for example.11 Challenging pro-war and
one-sided histories is important in countering the usual
justifications for war.
Challenging endorsements
When national leaders and other high-profile figures say
they support greater military expenditures and greater
preparedness for war, this gives greater legitimacy to the
military and the state. Many people do not examine the

11 The classic source is Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the
United States (New York: Harper & Row, 1980). See also Mark
Cronlund Anderson, Holy War: Cowboys, Indians, and 9/11s
(Regina, Saskatchewan: University of Regina Press, 2016).
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arguments themselves, but rather base their views on those
in authority or who they respect.
There are several ways to counter endorsements. One
option is counter-endorsements: find some prominent
individuals who will make statements challenging the
military. If they are military figures, it’s even more
effective.12 Just a few counter-endorsements can be effective, especially when they change a monopoly of elite
opinion in a contested domain. This can make some
people unsure of what they should think.
Another approach is to expose something wrong with
those making the endorsements. Perhaps they have made
rash or inaccurate claims in the past. Perhaps they have
been guilty of electoral fraud. Maybe they have received
donations (bribes) from vested interests. They may say
one thing and do another. Exposing mistakes, corruption
and hypocrisy can be effective but carries the usual risks
of attacking the person and not their arguments: it can be
seen as underhanded.
Usually, most of those clamouring for war are not the
ones whose lives are at stake. Many of them are politicians, media commentators or public figures. A possible
retort is to ask why they aren’t going to the front lines or
making any of the sacrifices they are expecting of others.
More generally, it is possible to question whether
opinions or decisions should be made on the basis of
endorsements. This is an attempt to turn the discussion
12 A US general often quoted for his anti-war views is Smedley
D. Butler, War Is a Racket (Los Angeles, CA: Feral House, 2003,
originally published in 1935).
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from the status and prestige of people involved to a
consideration of the arguments.
Challenging rewards
Questioning or opposing rewards given to war supporters
is a delicate business: it can easily go wrong. Consider, for
example, health and other benefits provided to veterans.
Saying that these should be reduced is likely to generate
hostility. More promising is to say that every injured person—whether from battle, construction work or domestic
violence—should receive the same benefits and support.
Then there are the rewards for valiant acts on the
battlefield, such as the Victoria Cross or Medal of Honor.
For outsiders to say these are inappropriate or that they
glorify killing would likely create antagonism. However, it
could be effective if some of the award recipients question
recognition of bravery.
Easiest to criticise are corporations that make huge
profits from war-making. Another target is politicians who
instigate or prosecute military build-ups or wars. Politicians appreciate recognition and praise for their acts; if
instead they are met with protests and ridicule, they will
not be pleased.
In challenging rewards, it is those whose patriotism
and sacrifice are least questionable who can have the
greatest impact. For example, militaristic politicians are in
the best position to cut back financial benefits to veterans.
In general, though, challenging rewards for those involved
in war seems to be one of the least promising ways of
opposing the patriotism-war connection.
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***
So far, I have outlined five types of tactics for promoting
patriotism in relation to war—exposure, valuing, positive
interpretations, endorsement and rewards—and five corresponding counter-tactics for challenging the militarypatriotism complex. Now it is time to turn to another set of
tactics, involving alternatives to war. Instead of directly
questioning, devaluing or confronting the system, the idea
is to propose and promote a different way of doing things.
An example is diplomacy. As well as saying “This war
plan is foolish and likely to be disastrous” it is possible to
say, “Diplomacy should be the first option.”
To discuss alternatives to military preparations and
war is a big task. As well as peacemaking through the
efforts of professional diplomats, possibilities include
reducing military expenditures, converting military production to production for civilian purposes, relying
entirely on defensive-only military equipment and strategy
(for example, fortifications but not tanks), using foreign
aid to overcome poverty and inequality, building greater
understanding of other societies (to reduce fear of foreigners) and promoting education and journalistic approaches
that foster peace.

SOCIAL DEFENCE
Here, I will look at a specific alternative: defending
communities through popular nonviolent action—such as
rallies, strikes, boycotts and occupations—and getting rid
of military defence. This is called various names: social
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defence, civilian-based defence, nonviolent defence and
defence by civil resistance. I’ll usually refer to it as social
defence.13
Converting to social defence would involve a range
of transformations. Instead of relying on troops and
weapons to deter and defend against attack, people would
13 Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, War Without Weapons:
Non-violence in National Defence (London: Frances Pinter,
1974); Robert J. Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A
Gandhian Approach (Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 1996); Antonino Drago, Difesa Popolare Nonviolenta:
Premesse Teoriche, Principi Politici e Nuovi Scenari (Turin:
EGA, 2006); Theodor Ebert, Gewaltfreier Aufstand: Alternative
zum Bürgerkrieg [Nonviolent Insurrection: Alternative to Civil
War] (Freiburg: Rombach, 1968); Gustaaf Geeraerts (editor),
Possibilities of Civilian Defence in Western Europe (Amsterdam:
Swets and Zeitlinger, 1977); Stephen King-Hall, Defence in the
Nuclear Age (London: Victor Gollancz, 1958); Bradford Lyttle,
National Defense Thru Nonviolent Resistance (Chicago, IL:
Shahn-ti Sena, 1958); Brian Martin, Social Defence, Social
Change (London: Freedom Press, 1993); Johan Niezing, Sociale
Verdediging als Logisch Alternatief: Van Utopie naar Optie
(Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1987); Michael Randle, Civil
Resistance (London: Fontana, 1994); Adam Roberts (editor), The
Strategy of Civilian Defence: Non-violent Resistance to Aggression (London: Faber and Faber, 1967); Gene Sharp, Making
Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defense (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1985); Gene
Sharp with the assistance of Bruce Jenkins, Civilian-Based
Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990); Franklin Zahn, Alternative to the
Pentagon: Nonviolent Methods of Defending a Nation (Nyack,
NY: Fellowship Publications, 1996).
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need to take responsibility for defence themselves. This
would involve developing and practising skills in nonviolent action, planning for threats and contingencies, and
designing technological systems so they are unattractive to
enemies but instead can serve the resistance. For example,
people might learn the language and culture of potential
enemies, build links with opposition groups in potential
aggressor states, and set up resilient communication
systems.
In 1968, Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia. At that time the Soviet government
dominated Eastern European countries. In Czechoslovakia, there was a reform movement in the ruling
Communist Party, moderating some of the harsh controls
previously imposed. This was called “socialism with a
human face.” These developments were threatening to the
Soviet rulers, hence the invasion.
Czechoslovak military commanders decided not to
resist the invasion, recognising that armed resistance
would not succeed. Instead, there was a spontaneous nonviolent resistance by the Czechoslovak people, involving
rallies and noncooperation.14 The radio network broadcast
messages advocating resistance and advising against any
violence. The network received information that Soviet
14 H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Joseph
Wechsberg, The Voices (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969);
Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968:
Reform, Repression and Resistance (London: Chatto and Windus,
1969).
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troops were bringing jamming equipment in by rail. After
broadcasting this information, workers shunted the rail car
to a siding. Meanwhile, people removed street signs and
house numbers so the invaders could not easily track down
individuals.
Perhaps the most effective part of the resistance was
talking to the invading troops and convincing them that
they were doing the wrong thing. The invading Russian
troops had been told they were there to stop a capitalist
takeover. Czechoslovak resisters, who spoke Russian, told
them “No, we support socialism, Czechoslovak-style.”
Many of the troops became “unreliable” and were replaced by ones who could not speak Russian.
The active phase of the resistance lasted just a week,
after which Czechoslovak political leaders made unwise
concessions. However, the Soviet rulers were not able to
install a puppet government for eight months. The
invasion and the nonviolent resistance discredited the
Soviet government around the world, especially among
communist parties in the west, causing many members to
question Soviet leadership of the communist movement
and to form independent parties. Undoubtedly the fact that
resistance was nonviolent helped reduce the legitimacy of
the invasion. The Czechoslovak resistance foreshadowed
the Polish Solidarity movement in the 1980s and the
nonviolent movements that overthrew Eastern European
communist governments in 1989, including in Czechoslovakia.
The 1968 Czechoslovak resistance to the Soviet
invasion was spontaneous, yet it was remarkably successful. No form of resistance had much chance of success
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against the overwhelming Soviet military superiority;
nonviolent resistance maximised the cost to the Soviet
rulers. And this was without any preparation.
Military defence is not guaranteed to be successful.
Military planners recognise that to increase the prospects
of success, planning, preparation and training are essential. A spontaneous armed resistance cannot be expected to
succeed. The same applies to nonviolent defence: it is
more likely to be effective with comprehensive training—
and much else.
For example, building links with people in places
where a threat might arise is valuable. In Australia, for
decades some politicians and commentators drummed up a
fear of an invasion from “the north”—variously Indonesia,
China or Japan—used as a pretext for greater military
expenditures. (In recent years, this has been superseded by
alarm over terrorism.) Assuming, for the sake of
argument, there was some actual threat from Indonesia
(especially prior to 1998, when it was a military-based
regime), social-defence preparation in Australia would
involve building links with pro-democracy and anti-war
groups in Indonesia. The idea is that if the Indonesian
government launched an invasion, it would provide a
stimulus for a challenge to the Indonesian government.
Technology is also relevant. Secure communication
systems are essential to coordinate resistance and to
contact allies in other parts of the world. This might
involve making encryption standard, and designing
systems so that no one—including the government—can
monitor the content or pattern of communication. This
goes right against new Australian laws that require tele-
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communications providers to save metadata so it can be
used by security agencies in anti-terror investigations. Any
system that enables centralised control is a vulnerability in
the case of a foreign invasion, because it can be taken over
and used by the invaders.
There is much else that could be done to build a
social defence system: renewable, decentralised energy
systems; factories in which workers can shut down
production; resilient agricultural and transport systems.15
Most of all, a society prepared and designed for nonviolent resistance needs to be united in its goal, and in this
there is a similarity with conventional patriotism. The
difference is that social defence involves solidarity in
defence of community, not government, and is not tied to
the military.
This brings up an essential difference between social
and military defence. Militaries can be used to defend
against foreign enemies but are regularly used as tools by
governments to defend against “internal enemies,” which
is code for any citizen threat to the government or the
military. There are many military regimes around the
world, and in most countries the military, or a militarised
police, is the ultimate defender of government.
With social defence, citizens are empowered with the
skills and tools to challenge repressive rulers. This means
that preparations for social defence necessarily promote
skills and tools that can be used to challenge the government and other powerful groups, or at least any of its
15 Brian Martin, Technology for Nonviolent Struggle (London:
War Resisters’ International, 2001).
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policies that are unwelcome. For example, if workers have
the capacity to shut down production and resist efforts to
force them to get it going again—a very useful capacity in
the event of a takeover—then they can use their capacity
against bosses and owners. In fact, the ideal organisational
form for production in a social defence system involves
worker-community control, in a decentralised, cooperative
arrangement. This makes it difficult for any oppressor to
simply come in, replace the bosses and run the operation
for their own benefit.
During the Nazi occupation of Europe, in most occupied countries the Nazis did not aim to exterminate
everyone—their targets for this were Jews, Gypsies, gays
and a few other groups—but rather to exploit the population and resources for their own benefit. Rather than
destroy a factory, they would rather take it over and keep
it operating. But the Nazi occupiers did not have the
personnel and skills to replace all the managers of
factories, businesses and government departments across
Europe, so they relied on collaborators: citizens in the
occupied countries who would serve the Nazi cause. Two
prominent collaborators were Marshal Pétain in France
and Vidkun Quisling in Norway; officially they were
government leaders but in practice they were puppets of
the Nazis. But further down the pecking order, acquiescence was also essential to Nazi rule. Business managers
and government officials needed to keep doing their jobs.
In the Netherlands, there had been limited preparation in government departments for resistance to occupa-
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tion.16 Officials were supposed to do their job if it served
the people but to resign if forced to implement unethical
policies. However, in practice this plan was not carried
out. Most Dutch government employees continued to
work as usual. However, in other countries there was not
even any thinking about preparing to resist.
In a social defence system, planning, preparation and
training for resistance would be routine, in the same way
that fire brigades plan for emergencies and run fire drills
in workplaces. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a
network of a dozen social defence groups in the Netherlands, addressing different issues. One of them sought to
formulate principles and plans for resistance by government employees, so they would be better prepared than
they had been against the Nazis. In the 1970s and 1980s,
the primary foreign threat was from the Soviet Union:
there was serious concern about a Soviet invasion of
Europe, and indeed the rationale for the military alliance
NATO was to deter and defend against such a threat. With
the end of the cold war in 1989 and the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991, the threat evaporated and interest in
social defence dissipated.
Yet the same issues remained relevant. To develop an
alternative to military defence based on nonviolent
resistance requires extensive planning, preparation and
training. Most of all, it requires people to understand and
16 A. H. Heering, “Het openbaar bestuur onder vreemde
besetting,” Bestuurswetenschappen, nr 4, april/mei 1983, (“Public
administration under foreign occupation,” http://www.bmartin.cc/
pubs/peace/83Heering.html).
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be committed to unarmed resistance to aggression and
oppression. This would have implications for nearly every
aspect of society. The general direction for a transformation towards social defence is self-reliance, self-sufficiency, decentralised decision-making, and empowerment
of citizens through skill development and training.
A society organised for social defence would be a
society resistant to any form of domination—including by
its own government. What this means is that if people
have the understanding and skills to resist an invader, they
can use the same understanding and skills to challenge the
government itself, if it becomes oppressive in some way.
This, in my view, is the primary reason why few governments are keen to promote social defence.
Governments are protected from internal challenges
by their own systems of organised violence, primarily the
military and police. In practice, most of the time these
systems are not needed. Most people cooperate with laws,
and support enforcement of laws. When someone steals a
car or assaults a stranger, most citizens cooperate with
police in tracking down the culprit. But sometimes there
are serious challenges to the government or to other
powerful groups, especially corporations, and so force is
used to protect the system. When people refuse to pay
their taxes, then the courts, and the police if necessary, are
invoked to force compliance. If workers go on strike or
occupy the workplace, troops are sometimes brought in to
break the resistance.
Completing the picture is selective enforcement of
the law: when governments break their own laws, there is
seldom any penalty, and when big companies flout the
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law, they often get away with it or suffer only a small
symbolic penalty.17 The point is that the police and military nearly always support those with more power.
Governments write laws that benefit those with power and
wealth and then enforce the laws in a selective fashion,
with those with little power or wealth receiving most of
the blame for law-breaking.
In a society with a social defence system, ordinary
members of the public would be empowered. A government that lost the trust of significant portions of the
population would have a difficult time surviving. To
reiterate: empowering the people to resist oppression is
threatening to most governments, so social defence is
unlikely to be supported. It might be okay to support
people power movements in other countries, to challenge
enemy regimes, but promoting equivalent movements at
home is another story.
With this background, it is useful to look at tactics
used by governments to oppose the option of social
defence. This assessment offers some clues about how to
promote this alternative.
Cover-up
Few governments give any attention to social defence.
“Cover-up” is not quite the right word for this treatment,
which might better be called neglect or lack of interest.
The social defence option is not on the government
agenda, and there are no obvious means to raise it. When
17 See chapter 4.
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was the last time that a government sponsored a major
public investigation into modes of defence?
The mass media usually follow government cues, and
have given little attention to social defence. Peace movements often don’t promote alternatives as much as oppose
wars and weapons systems: they are better called antiwar
movements.
There has been interest in social defence in a few
parts of the world, including Australia, Britain, Canada
and the US, but most progress in this direction occurred in
Europe. This makes sense. European peoples had experience in being conquered and occupied by powerful
regimes—Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union—or, if
spared themselves, seeing their near neighbours being
subjugated. Military defence against a much more powerful opponent was pointless or worse, except as part of an
alliance with a powerful ally (the US military, via NATO).
But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, much of the
incentive to explore social defence evaporated. No threat,
hence no need for an alternative. Of course this didn’t
mean governments dismantled their military systems. It
meant that civil society groups became less active as the
official rationale for military forces became less salient.
Indeed, it might be said that governments became less
active in raising alarms about invasion, and hoped that few
would notice that the rationale for standing armies and
advanced weapons systems was gone. Then, conveniently,
terrorism apparently provided a new pretext for military
preparedness. Social defence provides a template for a
citizen-based alternative to conventional anti-terrorism,
but this was undeveloped and never captured much
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interest among peace groups. After all, anti-terrorism was
a pretext, and terrorism a minor problem, compared to the
real possibility of nuclear attack during the cold war.
Devaluation
Governments and their apologists, on the few occasions
when they took notice of social defence, could easily dismiss it as impractical—it simply wouldn’t work against a
determined invader. Their assumption has always been
that a ruthless aggressor will always be victorious over
nonviolent opposition.
This sort of dismissal by governments wouldn’t
matter so much except that it has long been shared by a
large proportion of the population. Most people have been
convinced, somewhere along the line, that violence is
superior. Hollywood films assist in this: the good guys
always win against bad guys by using violence, either
greater force or force used in a smarter way. Few
mainstream films show the power of collective nonviolent
action. Despite dozens of repressive regimes having been
toppled through mass citizen resistance over the past
century, this has not become the stuff of Hollywood
scripts. Instead, superheroes are a popular genre.
The glorification of violence as the antidote to threats
to the citizenry contains an implicit devaluation of popular
nonviolent action, which is assumed to be ineffectual and
hence easily dismissed.
Reinterpretation
Another response to the idea of social defence is to
provide arguments about why it won’t work. A typical one
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is to say, “It wouldn’t work against the Nazis.” This is less
an argument than an assertion that operates by appealing
to unarticulated assumptions, in particular that ruthless
violence will always triumph over nonviolent action. The
argument about the Nazis has been countered in several
ways, for example by noting that nonviolent action was
used against the Nazis in some countries, with a degree of
success,18 and more generally that nonviolent action was
not even tried systematically, and certainly not as a
strategy by governments.19
There have been few serious critiques of social
defence. One of them was a study by Alex Schmid, who
analysed opposition to a potential Soviet occupation of
Western Europe.20 Schmid, to his credit, also analysed
armed resistance to Soviet domination, for example in
Lithuania from 1944 to 1952, and found it too was
ineffective. Schmid’s arguments were questionable at the

18 Jacques Semelin, Unarmed against Hitler: Civilian Resistance
in Europe, 1939-1943 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993).
19 For a careful response to the argument about ruthless violence,
see Ralph Summy, “Nonviolence and the case of the extremely
ruthless opponent,” Pacifica Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1994, pp. 1–
29.
20 Alex P. Schmid, with Ellen Berends and Luuk Zonneveld,
Social Defence and Soviet Military Power: An Inquiry into the
Relevance of an Alternative Defence Concept (Leiden: Center for
the Study of Social Conflict, State University of Leiden, 1985).
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time.21 Their weakness was shown more dramatically a
few years later with the collapse of Eastern European
communist regimes in 1989 and the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in 1991, triumphs of people power against
repressive regimes.22
Careful arguments against social defence have not
played a major role in its dismissal apparently because it is
easy to dismiss the option on the basis of simplistic
assumptions about the superiority of violence and appeals
to the Nazi example and other assumed refutations.
Official channels
Attempts to convince governments that social defence is a
viable option, indeed a superior alternative to military
defence, have made little progress. Gene Sharp, the
world’s most prominent nonviolence researcher, wrote
two books about civilian-based defence and spent considerable effort seeking to convince the US government to
adopt the option.23 The US-based Civilian-Based Defense
Association, which largely followed Sharp’s approach,
also made efforts, all to no avail. The US government
never even initiated a major public investigation into
civilian-based defence. Seeking change via appealing to
elites turned out to be a dead end.
21 Brian Martin, Review of Alex P. Schmid, Social Defence and
Soviet Military Power, in Civilian-Based Defense: News &
Opinion, Vol. 4, No. 4, May 1988, pp. 6–11.
22 Michael Randle, People Power: The Building of a New
European Home (Stroud, UK: Hawthorn, 1991).
23 Sharp, note 13.
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A few governments have looked seriously at social
defence. Sweden has a “total defence” system incorporating conventional military defence, civil defence (bomb
shelters, underground factories and other preparations to
survive attack), psychological defence (preparation for the
possibility of war) and social defence. The idea is that in
case of invasion, if military defence fails, civil defence can
provide protection and the population will be psychologically prepared and able to use nonviolent means to resist.
This is not the same as a social defence system, especially
considering that mixing violent and nonviolent methods
can undermine the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance.
Still, the Swedish system nominally includes nonviolent
options, though they are subordinated to conventional
military means. It should be mentioned that Sweden has a
well-developed arms manufacturing industry, and its arms
exports are the largest in the world on a per capita basis: it
is not a model for fostering nonviolent alternatives.
As mentioned, in the Netherlands in the 1970s and
1980s there was considerable grassroots interest in social
defence, as well as a number of articles and books
exploring and promoting this option.24 Nevertheless, the
government was not much interested, until a minor party
was able to use its pivotal role to push for a dozen social
defence research projects.25 But this was reduced to a
24 J. P. Feddema, A. H. Heering and E. A. Huisman, Verdediging
met een Menselijk Gezicht: Grondslagen en Praktijk van Sociale
Verdediging (Amersfoort: De Horstink, 1982); Niezing, op. cit.
25 Giliam de Valk in cooperation with Johan Niezing, Research
on Civilian-Based Defence (Amsterdam: SISWO, 1993).
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single study—the Schmid study discussed earlier—which
turned out to be more critical than supportive of social
defence.
In Austria, conscripts are taught about social defence
for part of their training. In Italy, individuals who were
conscripted could opt for alternative service, and one
option was being involved with an organisation promoting
social defence.
Slovenia was formerly part of Yugoslavia. Around
the time of the Balkan wars, Slovenia sought independence, and obtained it without any fighting. At that time,
there was support for social defence. It was an optimal
time for changing, especially for a small, weak state with
no serious prospects of being able to defend militarily
against an aggressor. But the interest in social defence
faded and Slovenia ended up with a conventional military
system.
The Baltic states—Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—
were independent countries when, in 1940, they were
incorporated into the Soviet Union. The next year they
were conquered by Nazi Germany, and then reconquered
by the Soviet Union in 1944. After 1989, with the collapse
of Eastern European communist regimes through mass
citizen action, people in the Baltic states used nonviolent
means to agitate for independence, and were successful in
1991. It was a classic case study of a nonviolent challenge
to an oppressive ruler. So, some leaders thought, why not
change to a social defence system and thus institutionalise
this form of citizen resistance? There was interest—but
only in Lithuania did interest continue. In 2015, the

War

237

country’s Ministry of Defence produced a manual for
citizens on how to nonviolently resist an invasion.26
Various lessons can be drawn from these examples.
One is that more pressure is needed to get governments to
take social defence seriously. Another is that governments
are the least likely group to make moves towards social
defence. After all, if the state is built on a claimed
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence in public,
then social defence is a direct challenge to the state. Only
the most enlightened leaders are likely to take it seriously.
Intimidation and rewards
It’s possible to imagine that proponents of social defence
might be subject to threats and attacks, perhaps losing
their jobs or being arrested and assaulted. So far, there
seems little evidence of anything like this. It would be
ironic should this occur, because the methods of social
defence are designed to deal with attacks.
The other side of the coin is rewards for those who
support military defence, and there are plenty. Promoters
and supporters can obtain careers in the military or
supporting agencies, such as arms manufacturers, and bask
in the recognition that comes with being part of a country’s defence establishment. The entire military-industrial
complex—a complex to which can be added science,
education and other sectors—is built around rewards for
26 Maciej Bartkowski, Nonviolent Civilian Defense to Counter
Russian Hybrid Warfare (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Center for Advanced Governmental Studies, 2015),
http://www.advanced.jhu.edu/nonviolent

238

Ruling tactics

those contributing. To promote social defence instead is,
most likely, to forgo such rewards.
***
Social defence, as an alternative to military defence, thus
faces quite a few obstacles, classified here into the categories of cover-up (though neglect is a better description),
devaluation, reinterpretation, official channels and lack of
rewards (whereas there are considerable rewards for
supporting military defence). The next question is, how
can they be countered?
Exposure
The first and essential step in promoting social defence is
to make more people aware of this option. This can be
done via articles, blogs, talks, debates and media coverage. This seems obvious enough. Indeed, it is far easier
today to make information available than it was in the
1980s, before the Internet. Despite the apparent ease of
making the concept of social defence more visible, it has
not been happening. It is worth considering some factors.
One problem today is information overload. Decades
ago, the main challenge was gaining access to information
about social defence, which meant finding out about a
newsletter, article or book and obtaining it. Today, much
of the same information—in books for example—is
readily available for those who want to pursue it, but it is
drowned in masses of other information. This is nothing
new, but the factor of overload is much more significant
today.
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Another problem is that information needs to be
made relevant to today’s circumstances. Warfare is different today than in the 1980s, and likewise social defence
needs to be updated. Reading books written in the 1950s
or 1980s is informative, but to engage more people in the
ideas, contemporary relevance is vital. A big component
of social defence today is likely to be online. Tactics,
strategies, logistics and skills need updating.
Then there is the question of who is going to lead a
resurgence of interest in social defence. It is all very well
to talk about making the concept visible, but who will do
this? In analysing tactics to promote an alternative to the
war-state nexus, there need to be individuals and groups
who will pursue them.
There is yet another consideration. Perhaps it is
unwise to advocate directly for social defence, as this may
only stimulate opposition by those committed to military
defence. Another option would be to join campaigns that
increase the capacity for social defence, even though that
is not their purpose. Skills and strategies for overthrowing
dictators are highly relevant. So are skills and strategies
for challenging online surveillance, for developing local
energy self-reliance, for building transport systems not
dependent on imports of fuel, and a host of other areas.
Any centralised system is vulnerable to takeover.
Think of transport, for example. If most people can get
around by walking or cycling or vehicles powered by
locally produced energy, then the transport system is
resilient. Hence, the population cannot easily be subjugated by cutting off imports of oil or by occupying
refineries or power plants. The same applies to communi-
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cations. If a government can monitor everyone’s calls and
Internet usage, then the population is vulnerable to oppression by the government itself or by any aggressor that
takes over the system. The implication is that efforts to
build resilient transport systems and secure communication systems can make a community less vulnerable to
control. This is a contribution to the capacity for social
defence, even if no one ever thinks about defending
nonviolently against aggression.
Social defence through changes that pass unnoticed?
Is this better or worse than making more people aware of
the option?
Valuing
A second aspect of promoting social defence is to increase
its credibility by association with things people value. This
might include endorsements by high-status people or
associations with valued symbols.
Stephen King-Hall, a British naval officer in World
War I, later became a prominent social commentator and
an advocate of social defence. His book Defence in the
Nuclear Age, in which he recommended abandoning
military defence and defending Britain through citizen
nonviolent resistance, was one of the earliest full-scale
proposals for nonviolent defence.27 For respected military
personnel to give credence to social defence is a potent
endorsement, because it can make people think the option
is worth considering. So far, however, very few prominent
27 Stephen King-Hall, Defence in the Nuclear Age (London:
Victor Gollancz, 1958).
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people in any sphere of life—politicians, celebrities,
business executives, religious figures, famous scientists—
have endorsed social defence.
Some respected figures have endorsed nonviolence,
especially those who have led campaigns: Martin Luther
King, Jr, Nelson Mandela, Desmond Tutu, Aung San Suu
Kyi. However, no such figure has paid much attention to
social defence.
Endorsement can also come from respected organisations, but few have taken any notice of social defence,
much less given it their backing. The Green Party in
Germany, from its beginnings, endorsed social defence.
Although green parties are often associated primarily with
environmentalism—via the symbolic colour green—in
principle they are built around four principles: ecological
wisdom, social justice, grassroots democracy and nonviolence. However, whatever the formal policies of green
parties, in practice few of them have done much to
promote social defence. Perhaps this is a good thing,
because it can be risky for an alternative to be identified
with a political party, because then it may be more
strongly opposed by members of other parties.
So far, the principal endorsements of social defence
have come from those who have written about it and
advocated for it. Most of those in this category have been
peace researchers, such as Johan Niezing, Theodor Ebert,
Gene Sharp and Johan Galtung. They add credibility to
social defence in part through their status within the field,
but perhaps more on the basis of what they actually write.
Furthermore, most of their support for social defence was
during the cold war. Johan Galtung, the world’s leading
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peace researcher, wrote insightful essays on social defence
in the 1960s,28 but has not given the option much attention
in more recent works. Gene Sharp, the world’s most
prominent analyst of nonviolent action, wrote two
important books about civilian-based defence in the
decade before the end of the cold war. Since then, Sharp
has received quite a bit of mainstream recognition for his
work on nonviolent action, especially in the wake of the
Arab spring, but this has not had much spin-off for
civilian-based defence.
In summary, social defence has received few
endorsements outside of small community of scholars and
activists who study and support it. This no doubt has
contributed to its marginalisation.
Interpretation
Social defence, when it is raised with audiences unfamiliar
with it, receives a variety of responses. Some people
dismiss it out of hand; a few are intrigued and want to
know more. However, these responses are mostly at the
gut level, based on emotions and assumptions. At the
intellectual or cognitive level, though, there can be a calm,
logical engagement with arguments and evidence. At this
level, advocates of social defence can make quite a few
points.

28 Johan Galtung, Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace
Research, Volume Two (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976), pp.
305–426.

War

243

• Military defence cannot easily be separated from
military offence: systems nominally set up for defence can
be used for aggressive or interventionist purposes.
• Arms manufacture and sales underlie a huge
amount of killing and suffering throughout the world.
• Military forces, in many countries, are used to
support authoritarian governments.
• Social defence is based on methods of nonviolent
action that have been shown to be more effective than
armed struggle against repressive governments.
• Social defence is a system in which the means
reflect the ends: if the goal is a world in which conflict is
carried out without violence, then it is desirable that the
methods to achieve such a world should not involve
violence. (In contrast, military systems use the threat of
violence to pursue “peace.”)
• Social defence can build a sense of solidarity among
people, because preparations require this.
• Social defence systems promote skills throughout
the population, including skills in persuasion, communication, decision-making, protest, noncooperation, and selfreliance in energy, transportation, agriculture and other
arenas.
• People who learn the skills for social defence can
use those same skills to pursue social justice, for example
to challenge government repression and corporate abuses.
However, such arguments are unlikely to win over
anyone who is not already sympathetic.
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Mobilisation of support
Gene Sharp, who wrote important books about civilianbased defence, believed that governments could be
convinced to switch to this alternative after they were
shown it was more effective, but his efforts were unsuccessful. Indeed, although he received some polite hearings, the US government made no significant initiatives
towards civilian-based defence—not even an official
investigation—meanwhile spending hundreds of billions
of dollars every year on the military. This is a telling
example of how logic and evidence cannot make much
headway in the face of deeply held beliefs linked to vested
interests. It might also indicate that the real driving force
behind US military preparedness is not defence against
foreign enemies but rather protection of US state and
corporate interests.
Trying to convince government and military leaders
about the effectiveness of social defence is to use official
channels to bring about change. This is unlikely to be
successful, and indeed official channels such as government inquiries or expert panels often serve to give the
appearance of dealing with concerns while actually
nothing much happens. My view is that governments are
the least likely to take the initiative to introduce social
defence, because they have the strongest stake in having
military forces to protect their own interests.
Instead of appealing to governments, the alternative
is to mobilise support. For promoting social defence, this
means building popular support via a mass movement, in
the spirit of previous movements: anti-slavery, labour,
feminist, peace, environmental, animal rights and other
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movements. A movement for social defence could start
out as a subset of the peace movement, but to have any
chance of success it needs to have a wider base. The
labour movement is important because, in a social defence
system, workers need to be prepared and skilled in
withdrawing and/or using their labour to resist impositions
by an aggressor. Social defence is also relevant to most
other movements, via the skills needed for resistance and
via reorganisation of society to have the solidarity to
oppose aggression and repression.
In relation to patriotism, there is a complication.
Civilian-based defence, as presented by Sharp and others,
is seen as national defence, namely defence against
foreign aggressors. The idea is to replace one form of
national defence by another: military defence becomes
nonviolent defence. Much of the advocacy for civilianbased defence is built around this assumption. This has the
advantage of conforming to the usual thinking about
defence, and drawing on assumptions about nationalism
and patriotism. It does not question conventional government-promoted views about the military and its purposes.
Treating civilian-based defence as national defence is
at the same time a disadvantage. It assumes that state and
military leaders are the ones who will make decisions to
switch to a different form of defence, when they are the
least likely to want to make such a change.
Another way to think of social defence is as defence
of a community by its members. The word “community”
is vague and makes assumptions about relationships
between individuals. The idea, though, is that the state or
nation is not necessarily the unit being defended. A more

246

Ruling tactics

likely possibility is that people defend themselves against
their own government, including against troops or
militarised police. “Social defence” in this formulation is
defence against government repression. This is actually
the usual meaning of social defence in some European
countries. It makes sense in relation to the dual purpose of
military forces: to defend the state against external and
internal enemies. The internal “enemies,” in many cases,
are simply citizens who are challenging abuse of power by
the government. This is another way of seeing why few
government leaders are likely to be convinced to switch
from military to social defence.
Mobilisation of support for social defence means
getting individuals and groups to support and take action
to strengthen people’s commitment and skills to resist
aggression and repression and to develop plans and build
infrastructure to enable this. Since the 1990s, only a few
groups in a few countries have been advocating for social
defence, so most of the progress is happening in indirect
ways.
• The spreading of skills in nonviolent action against
repressive governments. This is ideal preparation for
social defence. In fact, people power movements are
social defence in action. What they lack is any sustained
way of creating a system for nonviolent resistance as an
alternative to military defence.
• Network communication systems, using phones,
texts, Facebook, Twitter and other social media. Repressive governments can more easily control one-directional
media such as television and newspapers; networked
media are more readily used for resistance. However,
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governments are increasingly collecting data from social
media to monitor dissent, so methods of opposing
surveillance, such as encryption, are important to enable
resistance.
• Technological self-reliance. Movements for local
food production, decentralised energy production, and
transport by walking and cycling help to make local
communities less dependent on centralised facilities that
can be controlled by governments.
• Protest movements—against poverty, exploitation
and a host of other injustices—can provide experience and
understanding in how to oppose repression, especially
when the movements involve mass participation using
methods of nonviolent action.
These and other developments are building capacity
that can be used against foreign aggressors and against
home-grown repressive governments. Whether this is an
adequate substitute for a social defence system is another
matter. Almost certainly it is not.
Governments continue to develop their capacities to
control their own populations, for example through monitoring of dissent through mass surveillance and targeted
intelligence operations, sophisticated public relations operations, suppression or cooption of initiatives for worker
self-management and participatory democracy, and
promotion of high-tech infrastructure—large power plants,
industrial agriculture dependent on pesticides, high-rise
buildings—that is high cost, potentially vulnerable to
disruption and amenable to centralised control. In the
context of defending against aggression, campaigns
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against this type of infrastructure contribute to making
communities less vulnerable to attack and domination.
Resistance to intimidation and rewards
Supporters of military systems, to oppose critics and
challengers, can intimidate them and/or offer rewards to
tempt them to change their views or actions. A typical sort
of intimidation is the surveillance, infiltration, disruption
and repression of peace groups. Typical rewards include
jobs and funding for supporters of the military, including
individuals, companies and sectors of the population.
These methods are likely to be used against promotion of
social defence, at least if this promotion gains traction.
Promoters of social defence therefore need to be
prepared to resist intimidation. This is a perfect example
of methods reflecting and serving goals: the goal is a
system for citizens to nonviolently defend against aggression and repression, and to promote this goal it may be
necessary to defend against repression. At the moment,
advocacy for social defence scarcely exists, and the risk of
repression is not so great. It can be expected that if a
significant movement develops and starts making progress
promoting and implementing social defence, elements
within the military may take serious steps to subvert or
crush the movement.
Countering rewards often can be more difficult than
countering intimidation. There are vastly more research
grants and career opportunities for military-related
projects than ones involving nonviolent action. Promising
nonviolence practitioners and researchers may be attracted
to jobs in the system that seem worthwhile but restrain
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activism. Resisting temptations is part of promoting
alternatives to the military. The bigger task is to change
the incentive structure. This is a huge challenge. Imagine
the hundreds of billions of dollars now spent on military
systems every year being redirected to the building and
maintenance of social defence systems. This would indeed
be a revolution in defence affairs.
Conclusion
There are two main ways to challenge state-centred
thinking linked to military systems. One is to directly
respond to the war machine, addressing the massive
attention to war, the glorification of military sacrifice, the
rationales for military forces, the institutional legitimation
of “defence,” and the intimidation of critics. Antiwar
movements have made an enormous difference in deterring or helping halt particular wars and opposing particular weapons systems. Even so, the war system remains
central to the world order, because military forces serve a
dual role, protecting the state against both external
enemies and internal challenges.
A second way to challenge military nationalism is to
propose alternatives to military defence. I examined one
particular alternative, social defence, that involves preparations for citizens to resist aggression and repression,
through understanding, training and choice of appropriate
technological systems. This option has been almost
completely marginalised. Nevertheless, an analysis of
tactics can be helpful in seeing ways to promote social
defence and the barriers likely to be encountered. In order
to be a challenge to state-based defence, social defence
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needs to be conceptualised as community defence, in
many cases against the state. This potential for
undermining state power is probably a primary reason
why few governments have made any steps towards
converting from military to social defence, or even
investigating the possibility.

14
Investigating tactics
The world seems to be made up of countries, and each one
has a government. Most people think about the world in
terms of countries and governments—it seems natural, and
it’s a convenient way to make sense of the news and much
everyday discussion. In addition, many people identify
with a particular country.
This way of seeing the world, while useful for some
purposes, can be misleading. Countries and governments
are not the same as the people in them. Furthermore,
governments often act contrary to the interests of the
population, instead serving the interests of those with the
most wealth and power.
What I call “ruling tactics,” which might also be
called “patriotism tactics,” are methods used to encourage
people to think in terms of countries and to identify with a
particular one, and not to question in any fundamental way
how wealth and power are distributed. To illustrate these
tactics, I’ve chosen a variety of issues such as sport and
terrorism. I picked these particular examples because I
know something about them and they are addressed in
everyday conversations. However, my assessments are far
from definitive. Much more could be done to examine
tactics in relation to any given topic, and to tackle
additional topics. If you want to do this, how should you
proceed?
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Consider a topic such as the economy, transport or
the arts. Concerning this topic, a useful first step is to ask
whether there is any plausible reason for people to identify
with a country. (See chapter 2.) Does the average person
really have much in common with thousands or millions
of others who will never be friends or even be introduced,
just because they are resident in the same area of land? For
example, it might sound beneficial that the economy has
grown, but looking more closely it could be that nearly all
the increased income has gone to the top 1% of earners:
not everyone has the same stake in our economy, namely
the country’s economy. If you’re one of the wealthy ones,
fine, but otherwise thinking in terms of our economy is
misleading. It’s even more misleading if you take into
account people in Bangladesh, Malawi and Peru.
The next step is to look at the common types of
tactics used by rulers and their supporters to gain support
for the system. As listed in the introduction, five tactics
are commonly used in relation to the system (the country,
the nation, the government).
System-support tactics
1. Exposure (of positives); attention
2. Valuing
3. Positive interpretation
4. Endorsement
5. Rewards
So you look for evidence of any of these tactics, for
example in the media, government policies or everyday
conversations. For example, what sorts of comments are
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there are about economic growth, especially of our
economy? If growth is mentioned, that’s exposure. If it’s
seen as a good thing, that’s valuing—and so forth.
After looking at tactics to encourage support for the
system, you can look at tactics to oppose challenges and
alternatives. To do this, you might need to learn more
about a particular alternative or campaign, such as the
Occupy movement, the global justice movement or the
steady-state economy. Then you look for evidence about
tactics against this alternative or campaign. The five tactics listed in chapter 1, regularly used against challenges to
the dominant view, are
System-support tactics: opposing challenges and
alternatives
1. Cover-up
2. Devaluing
3. Negative interpretation
4. Discrediting endorsements
5. Intimidation
For example, you might notice that there is little or no
discussion of steady-state economics—it is covered up—
or that when it is discussed, it is criticised or dismissed as
irrelevant or foolish.
Some of these techniques are more visible than
others, depending on the topic. Some alternatives are
hardly ever discussed: cover-up is so effective that other
techniques are not required. In relation to conventional
economics, Gandhian economics is one such alternative.
However, some economic alternatives occasionally obtain
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visibility, for example local currencies, the Tobin tax or a
guaranteed annual income, in which case you need to
examine the way they are treated by various commentators
and spokespeople. Evidence of devaluation and reinterpretation can come from what people say and write. Evidence
of intimidation can sometimes be hard to obtain: it is
hidden. Local currencies have sometimes been shut down
by governments, but this is not widely known.
If you’re involved in a campaign to challenge dominant perspectives and promote alternatives, then you can
go on to challenger tactics.
Opposing system-support tactics
1. Exposure (of negatives)
2. Devaluing
3. Negative interpretation
4. Discrediting endorsements
5. Refusing rewards
Promoting alternatives
1. Exposure
2. Valuing
3. Positive interpretation
4. Endorsement
5. Rewards
These tactics provide a rough framework for thinking
through how to proceed and in particular for seeing
whether there are actions that might be taken. For
example, if you are involved in promoting local currencies, you can oppose the tactics by rulers by exposing the
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negative consequences of the conventional money system,
devaluing it, explaining what is wrong with it, and so
forth. You can promote the alternative by publicising and
valuing it, and so on.
These are big topics, and no one can do everything.
To become deeply involved in just one issue such as local
currencies can become a life’s work and, depending on the
individual, it can be worthwhile putting most effort into
one or two tactics, for example explaining the alternative
to wider audiences or trying to implement it in a particular
area.
Another possibility is to look at what’s being done
already and seeing whether there are any significant gaps,
namely worthwhile tasks that are being neglected. This
could be an opportunity to make a difference.
It is helpful to remember that countries, borders and
states are human creations. They are all fairly new, and are
neither inevitable nor necessary aspects of the way
humans organise themselves. The fact that so many people
spend so much effort encouraging everyone to think in
terms of countries and governments indicates that this
perspective does not come naturally. There are strong
contrary pressures to think locally and globally. Systemsupport tactics are just tactics, not guaranteed to succeed.
Understanding them makes it easier to resist them more
effectively.
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